Human Security and the Copenhagen School's Securitization Approach:
Conceptualizing Human Security as a Securitizing Move[1]

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The article compares the Copenhagen School's securitization approach to the human security approach, both in terms of analytical utility and normative utility. It states that human security lacks any analytical utility, while having the upper hand on the securitization approach in terms of normative utility. The Copenhagen School is indeed unable to make recommendations aimed at improving the lives of the most disadvantaged.

Does the human security approach offer an alternative to the Copenhagen School's securitization approach? And, connected to this, what, if any, relationship exists between the two approaches? This article seeks to answer both of these critical questions. Such a comparative analysis between the human security agenda and the Copenhagen School's securitization approach may at first seem somewhat nonsensical. After all, one is a policy-making agenda whilst the other is a theoretical tool for the analysis of security policies. In short, the two concepts occupy different positions in the logic of security. It can be argued, however, that precisely because the two approaches occupy opposite ends of a spectrum, a comparative study helps to reveal the diverse nature of critical security studies. In this article, the human security approach–although a policymaking agenda–is taken to be an approach within critical security studies simply by virtue of being critical of the mainstream, state-centric security studies. Moreover, any comparative analysis carries with it the added benefit of showing the limitations of that which is compared. This article is no exception and comparing the securitization approach with the human security approach in terms of both analytical utility and normative utility sheds light on the shortcomings and merits of each approach; it does not seek to bring about competition between the two approaches, nor does it even suggest that such competition exists.

For purposes of structure this article is divided into two parts. The first part examines whether the human security approach offers an alternative to the securitization approach in terms of analytical utility. The second part engages with a different interpretation of "alternative." Thus, instead of reading "alternative" from within the "narrow" constraints of a concept's analytical utility (or put

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differently from the Copenhagen School's point of view) the article enquires into the normative utility of the human security approach and also that of the securitization approach. Normative utility hereby refers to the security analyst's ability to influence the securitization process in a deliberate and thought-out fashion to a desired effect.

The article finds that the human security approach offers an alternative to the securitization approach in terms of normative utility only. This is because it offers an approach whereby the objective when writing about security is not to perform the processes tracing of who can securitize, what issues, under what conditions – and with what effects. That is security analysis for the Copenhagen School.[2] Rather, the objective is to highlight persisting insecurities of individuals or groups of individuals. In other words, human security offers an alternative to security analysis per se. As such it offers an outlet for those interested in working towards achieving security. On the basis of this, the article concludes that both approaches are valuable in and of themselves and that neither can nor should replace the other.

Human security versus the securitization approach: analytical utility

Unlike other critical (or non state centric) approaches to security, the human security approach, as with the 1994 Human Development Report, Japan's "social safety nets" approach and Canada's and Norway's Human Security Program, originated from within the policymaking world.[3] Arguably because of this, proponents have struggled to put a theoretical edge to the concept. While some claim that this does not diminish the concept in any way, others appear to be feverishly on the lookout for this theoretical leverage, suggesting that, to some, not only practice but also theory matters.[4] The main contention in this theoretical debate centers upon whether (and, if so, how) to narrow the concept of human security into a workable definition. For the most part, this debate has coalesced around two rival definitions: first, there are those who define human security broadly as "freedom from want", understanding the concept as "more than safety from violent threats […] such as poverty, disease and environmental disasters."[5] And second, there are those who define human security more narrowly as "freedom from fear", whereby human security is understood as "freedom from violent threats" only.[6] For a flavour of this internal debate it is useful to cite proponents of both the wide and the narrow definitions. The first quote is taken from Lloyd Axworthy's contribution to Security Dialogue's 2004 symposium on human security.[7] Axworthy is a popular proponent of the wide conception of human security, who in his former role as Canadian foreign minister (1995-2000) was an instrumental figure in bringing about Canada's Human Security Program.[8] The second quote is taken from the eminent security analyst Keith Krause, who participated in the same symposium. Like Axworthy's explanation of the wide approach, Krause's view is fairly representative of the narrow approach to human security.

"Although conflict, particularly civil war, continues to harm, the impact of environmental disasters, communicable disease, and poverty are often far greater. The urgency of these many threats, coupled with a policy vacuum, creates a critical need for the development of human security science and governance solutions."[9]

"Human security ought to be about 'freedom from fear' not about 'freedom from want' […] for two reasons. The first is a negative one: the broad vision of human security is ultimately nothing more than a shopping list; it involves slapping the label human security on a wide range of issues that have no necessary link. At a certain point, human security becomes a loose synonym for 'bad things that can happen', and it then loses all utility to policymakers–and incidentally to analysts. [Second and] more important, it is not clear that anything is gained by linking 'human security' to issues such as education, fair trade practices and public health."[10]

In addition, for a third view, consider this statement by anthropologists Donna Winslow & Thomas Hylland Eriksen, also taken from the above mentioned symposium: "The term itself [human security] is fuzzy and needs to be problematized, but in fact its appeal lies in its very vagueness.

As anthropologists, we do not limit ourselves to the 'traditional' definition of human security as freedom from fear and freedom from want. Rather, we examine how security is defined in different social and cultural contexts, through symbolic and social processes, and how security and insecurity are dealt with through social institutions."[11]

These quotes on how, and whether, to make human security theoretically more viable highlight a further obstacle on the way to achieving this goal, namely the inherently interdisciplinary nature of the concept. Although that is not a bad thing, (indeed in the social sciences the trend seems to be the more interdisciplinary the better) it could be argued that with regard to theoretical viability, this complicates matters significantly. Consider the examples above. Here we have voices from three different "disciplines": a (former) policymaker, a political scientist and two anthropologists. As is quite evident from the quotes, all of these come to human security with a different background and with different needs. In this case, the policymaker and the anthropologist are happy with what works in practice more than the theoretical viability, whilst for the political scientist–especially a theorist like Krause–a theoretical lever to the concept appears vital. Possibly, however, as long as proponents campaign for different definitions, and have a completely different take on theory, the concept is bound to remain–here using Roland Paris' expression–"slippery by design",with "human security [seemingly] capable of supporting virtually any hypothesis–along with its opposite–depending on the prejudices and interests of the particular researcher."[12]

" human security is the idea that the individual is at the receiving end of all security concerns."

It is fair to say therefore, that due to its popularity, it is rather difficult to provide an exact definition of what is even meant by human security. Generally speaking, however, human security is the idea that the individual is at the receiving end of all security concerns, whereby security is understood as freedom from want and/or freedom from fear. Whilst making the individual the object of security sounds straightforward, the difficulty begins when considering the definition of security. Hence, security threats now potentially lurk in all domains of life and, unsurprisingly, human security encompasses some seven different 'domains' of security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political.[13] Conceptually more difficult yet than the sheer endlessness of the threat spectrum is the provision of human security. Who is to provide human security? Surely the individual himself is in no position to provide for his own security, for how should an individual claim/legitimize his own right to survival? Thus, logically, the provision of human security can only be guaranteed by a larger entity such as society, the state, or some global institution, with as the Copenhagen School puts it "security action […] usually taken on behalf of, and with reference to, a collectivity."[14] Consequently, as the Copenhagen School member Barry Buzan puts it: "If the referent object of human security is collectives, then the job it is trying to do is better done by societal or identity security. […] Reductionism in security thinking eliminates the distinctiveness of international security being about interaction among social collectivities. While a moral case for making individuals the ultimate referent object can be constructed, the cost to be paid is loss of analytical purchase on collective actors both as the main agents of security provision and as possessors of a claim to survival in their own right."[15]

Once this shift takes place, however, what then sets human security apart from existing concepts of security such as the Copenhagen School's framework for analysis? The answer to this question is complicated, and at first even contradictory. The first part of the answer to this question is that nothing sets human security apart from other critical concepts of security. Thus, for example, under the Copenhagen School framework individuals can be both securitizing actors and/or referent objects of security. While this may be obvious to the securitization/Copenhagen School enthusiast, it requires some further explanation. The Copenhagen School's 1998 book *Security:*

A New Framework for Analysis quite clearly states that, "in principle, securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object."[16] Critics of the School time and again argue that the Copenhagen School in general, and the securitization approach in particular, operate with a state centric reading of security that is little different from mainstream approaches to security such as realism.[17] There are two likely reasons why critics might come to this conclusion. The first is that there is some discrepancy in Ole Wæver's (the originator of the securitization approach) numerous writings regarding the role of the state in security analysis, and by extension, therefore, in the securitization approach. Notably in 1995, for example, Wæver forcefully argues that "the concept of security belongs to the state"[18] whereas only three years later in the above mentioned 1998 book he (or rather they) argues for the incorporation of other referent objects of security, including the individual. Although this might seem like a rather bold contradiction in Wæver's argument, it is in fact consistent with the securitization approach's own logic. To recognize why this is the case, it is imperative to understand two fundamentals about the securitization approach. First, securitization theory is aimed at studying securitization and desecuritization[19] as they occur in practice. And, second, for securitization to work, a securitizing actor needs capabilities (by Wæver sometimes also referred to as "means"), because otherwise the securitization will amount to nothing more than a securitizing move. A securitizing move would be the expression of existential fear only, with no resonance with the audience and, importantly, no consequent security practice.

The first of these premises explains the changed view of the role of the state in security analysis in Wæver's writing. What changed was not (first and foremost at least) his opinion, but rather the practice of security. Thus, whereas during the Cold War the state was more or less universally accepted as the referent object of security, in the decade following the end of the Cold War the role of the state had become increasingly challenged by the recently emerged "New World Order" of the 1990s. Meanwhile, the concept of the state became simultaneously problematized in the academic world of International Relations theory. This new attitude towards the state led many– both policymakers and academics–to postulate referent objects other than the state at the centre of a particular security dynamic. The Copenhagen School was very much at the forefront of this trend, and other referent objects became swiftly incorporated into the securitization approach. Because they happened in practice, they needed to be accounted for in the theoretical framework, particularly if the securitization approach was to have longevity beyond these changes.

The other reason why critics might nonetheless view Wæver et al as state centric is tied to the second premise of the securitization approach. Although – as just argued – under the securitization approach anything can potentially become a referent object of security, much of the Copenhagen School's analysis still concerns itself with the role of the state in security analysis. Noteworthy here is the 2003 book *Regions and Powers* where, despite all that was said in the earlier published *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, the state once again takes centre stage in the School's analysis. While critics will no doubt interpret this as realist state centricism they are mistaken. The reason for the focus on the state is that most securitizations are still performed by state actors, as these – unlike most other securitizing actors – have the capabilities to make securitizations happen. This leaves, in the words of the Copenhagen School, the securitization approach "not dogmatically state centric in its premises, but [...] often somewhat state-centric in its findings."[20] A statement that confirms the first premise of the securitization approach, whereby the securitization analyst is interested in studying securitizations and desecuritizations as they occur in practice. In other words, if then the majority of securitizations and desecuritizations take place in the state centric domain this is not because of the personal preferences of Buzan and Wæver (in *Regions and Powers* the securitization analysts), but rather refers to what is going on in practice. That the Copenhagen School does not pick security issues in accordance with personal preferences, but rather with a view to what happens in practice,

is also highlighted by the fact that, although both Buzan and Wæver are very sceptical of "the individual" as a referent object of security,[21] the Copenhagen School's framework for analysis allows for the individual as both referent as well as provider of security.

If the security relations emphasized under the human security approach are already catered to in other critical security literature such as the Copenhagen School's securitization approach, what is the added value of human security? Here the answer becomes somewhat convoluted and initially even contradictory. By taking an even closer look at human security it seems that everything sets the concept apart from the securitization approach. Unlike, for example, securitization theory's three step process of tracing that which constitutes an incident of securitization–(1) identification of existential threats (also known as securitizing moves) (2) emergency action and (3) effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules–human security offers no such thing.[22] Indeed, apart from the idea that security should be about individuals, human security entirely lacks a framework of analysis; this is truly the crux of the criticism of human security's analytical ability. It can be argued (somewhat harshly perhaps) that because of this, from a human security perspective alone, it is impossible to perform any kind of security analysis.

That being said, however, two questions immediately arise. First, is security analysis really what proponents of human security set out to perform? And, in connection with this, is analytical utility really the best and the fairest way by which to ascertain whether the human security approach offers an alternative to the securitization approach? Considering all that was said above it seems that instead of security analysis, what proponents of human security really do (and are interested in doing) is identify existential threats to individuals and/or groups of individuals. Therefore, rather than wishing to draw a clearer picture of who did what and when in any given security policy, they wish to achieve the securitization of individual human beings. Put into the language of the Copenhagen School, instead of performing security analysis, those who work within the human security tradition perform securitizing moves themselves, the first step in the three step process that is securitization. Going one step further than this, it can be argued, not only that human security is bereft of any kind of analytical utility, but also that it opens a further field of analysis, whereby it is conceivable to analyse the securitizing moves of human security proponents using the processes tracing tools offered by the securitization approach. Human security, in other words, is positioned at the explanadum end (that which is to be explained) of security studies, whilst the processes tracing tool that is the securitization approach can be used to analyse and explain who does what, and with what effects in the human security literature.

Human security versus the securitization approach: normative utility

Considering, however, that security analysis clearly is not the goal of the human security agenda, it seems unjust to measure the validity of the approach in these terms only. The better and fairer question to ask is instead: what is the normative utility of human security? And in connection with this, what is the normative utility of the securitization approach? As the following aims to show, it is by answering these questions that the human security approach emerges as a genuine alternative to the securitization approach. For purposes of structure, however, let us begin with the second question first.

> "The reason for the focus on the state is that most securitizations are still performed by state actors."

As this article has shown, the securitization approach is first and foremost a processes tracing tool that helps the security analyst determine when there is/was a process of securitization and/or desecuritization, how this came about. and who were the actors involved. The securitization approach is an important tool for the analysis of security and one that has been amply used in

the existing literature.[23] This said, however, the strengths of the securitization approach–pure security analysis–are also its limits, because with the securitization approach all that can be performed is security analysis and nothing above and beyond.[24] In a time when boundaries between the role of the security analyst and securitizing actors are more often than not either criticised or simply disregarded, many find this a considerable limitation.[25] Others even choose to ignore this limitation altogether and discuss at length the ethical and moral implications of the securitization approach.[26] Be that as it may, the fact remains that under the Copenhagen School's securitization approach the security analyst and the securitizing actor are both functionally and conceptually distinct entities: "The designation of what constitutes a security issue comes from political actors, not analysts, but analysts interpret political actors' actions and sort out when these actions fulfil the security criteria. It is, further, the analyst who judges whether the actor is effective in mobilizing support around the security reference (i.e., the attempted securitizers are "judged" first by other social actors and citizens, and the degree of their following is then interpreted and measured by us). Finally, to assess the significance of an instance of securitization, analysts study its effects on other units. The actor commands at only one very crucial step: the performance of a political act in a security mode."[27]

In recent times the attentiveness and subsequently the criticism of the limitation of pure security analysis has grown particularly acute. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, there has been an increased awareness that the constructivist security analyst–as well as the securitization analyst–involuntarily co-constitutes social and political reality by virtue of his or her own written text, and/or spoken word.[28] That is to say, this so-called "normative dilemma of speaking and writing security"[29] is believed to render the boundaries between security analysis and performing securitizing moves less rigid, as the securitization analyst alone, by selecting a case study, is said to reinforce existing dichotomies of security and insecurity.

Second, there exist an increasing number of texts that seek to build bridges, or at least identify commonalities, between two or more of the European critical schools of security.[30] Evidently, part of this "bridge building" always includes analysis of the merits of the chosen approaches and, of course, a comparison between them. A comparison between the Welsh and the Copenhagen Schools' approaches to security, for example, quite clearly reveals that – unlike the securitization analyst – the Welsh School analyst is not tied to pure security analysis alone, but rather can enter the security equation with the purpose of informing securitizing actors of their "false consciousness" in their endorsing a particular securitization. This is an advantage the securitization analyst–distinct from the securitizing actor he or she is–does not have.[31] Of course the securitization approach, in turn, has considerable advantages over aspects of the Welsh School's approach. What these are, however, is not of interest for this argument. Rather, what is of interest is that such "bridge building" sheds light on the limitations of the respective approaches. In the case of the securitization approach, one limitation quite clearly lies in the inability of the securitization analyst to enter the security equation him/herself.[32] The existence of the normative dilemma of speaking and writing security makes this inability even more troubling, as it leaves the securitization analyst without any means to rectify what s/he her/himself has co-constituted, simply by virtue of performing security analysis. Wæver and the Copenhagen School have sought to counter this limitation by expressing a preference for–all things being equal–desecuritization.[33] This is based on the erroneous belief that all desecuritizations will lead to politicization, the realm where issues can be dealt with by normal and, more often than not, democratic means. Given, however, that not all desecuritizations lead to politicization and also that not all securitizations

> "Security analysis clearly is not the goal of the human security agenda."

have negative consequences, the Copenhagen school's preference for desecuritization is one-sided and ultimately limited. This, considered together with Wæver's (to some extent justified) qualms against moving an issue out of the democratic realm and into a heightened state of affairs, suggests that securitizations can be both positive and negative.[34]

It is important to note here that the adjectives "positive" and "negative" do not refer to the relative success of securitization. Instead, positive and negative refer to the consequences of one security policy compared to either another or to politicisation. Under such a consequentialist approach to the evaluation of security, a securitization is positive when it can be judged according to an agent-neutral value. Agent-neutrality is the property of those values that "can be articulated without reference back to the valuer."[35] A good example of an agent-neutral value is anything "that would reduce the amount of wretchedness in the world."[36] Human security constitutes just such an agent-neutral value, and the various elements of the human security agenda–when successful beyond the initial securitizing move–are thus valid examples of positive securitizations.

> "The human security approach, though inadequate with regard to analytical utility, has much to offer in terms of normative utility."

Given all that has been said here, it appears that although the securitization approach is extremely useful and, within critical security studies, practically unrivalled in terms of its analytical utility, the securitization approach is limited in terms of its normative utility. Normative utility hereby is understood in terms of the security analyst's ability to influence the securitization process in a deliberate and thought-out fashion and–though this ultimately depends on capabilities–to a desired effect. It does not refer to the involuntary co-constitution of social and political reality performed by all constructivist security analysts.

Moving now to the human security literature, and given all that has been said so far, it should be clear that the human security approach does not have these kinds of limitations. Thus, unlike the securitization approach, from a human security perspective, proponents can highlight insecurities on behalf of other individuals, especially those individuals who are in no position to speak for themselves. This, as Gunhild Hoogensen et al. call it, is the "enabling" capacity of human security,[37] which clearly can have positive connotations, including positive securitizations. Examples of such positive securitizations are the high profile ban on land mines and the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Both anti-personnel landmines and those actors subject to the ICC pose existential threats to human security. To quote the official Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction: "Anti-personnel mines […] kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement."[38]

While the ICC "may exercise jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes,"[39] including, among others, genocide by killing, genocide by deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm, crimes against humanity of murder, crimes against humanity of extermination, crimes against humanity of enslavement, war crimes of willful killing, war crimes of inhuman treatment, and war crimes of willfully causing great suffering.[40] It is important to notice that although the referent object of security in both these instances is clearly the individual, the provision of (human) security to a very large extent depends on states. This is because both of the above are treaty-based agreements that depend on the signatures, ratification, and subsequent implementation by their member *states*.[41] Moreover, the ICC is only

"complimentary" to national criminal courts, with considerable restrictions pertaining to its powers of jurisdiction.

"The International Criminal Court will complement national courts so that they retain jurisdiction to try genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. If a case is being considered by a country with jurisdiction over it, then the ICC cannot act unless the country is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute. A country may be determined to be 'unwilling' if it is clearly shielding someone from responsibility for ICC crimes. A country may be 'unable' when its legal system has collapsed."[42]

Given that even these exemplars of human security to a large extent rely on the cooperation of states, it appears that states – just as the Copenhagen School asserts – continue to matter empirically. Or, put differently, capabilities and means matter for securitization.

Regardless of the role of the state, however, the establishment of the ICC and the ban on landmines are proof that successful securitizations of human security are possible and–importantly for the argument of this article–both of these were fuelled by an ongoing discourse in all spheres of life, including academia. Given these positive examples, human security as an approach to security from which individuals can perform securitizing moves therefore has much worth in and of itself. It enables individuals to (at least to some small extent) initiate securitizations, including those who are otherwise not in a position of extraordinary decision making power in terms of security policy making, such as academics. It therefore seems that the human security approach, though inadequate with regard to analytical utility, has much to offer in terms of normative utility. With the "security analyst" (though it is doubtful whether we can satisfactorily use this word concerning the human security approach) and the securitizing actor being one and the same person, the human security proponent can–occasionally–influence select securitization processes in a deliberate and thought-out fashion, to a desired effect. Clearly, for those more interested in achieving securitizations as opposed to simply performing security analysis, this is a valuable alternative to the securitization approach and, indeed, to all security analysis.

Conclusion

It was the aim of this article to analyse the relationship between the Copenhagen School's securitization approach and the human security approach. A second key objective was to ascertain whether the latter poses a viable alternative to the former. When 'alternative' is defined in terms of analytical utility then the human security approach cannot possibly offer an alternative to the three step processes tracing tool that is securitization theory. Indeed, bereft of an analytical framework, the human security approach has no analytical utility. Moreover, from the perspective of the Copenhagen School, it can be argued that writers within the human security literature perform securitizing moves themselves, leaving the entire human security literature as ultimately something that can be analysed by the securitization approach. However, if "alternative" is understood more broadly in terms of normative utility, the human security approach does offer an alternative to the securitization approach, and indeed to all security analysis. With its focus on identifying existential threats to individuals (securitizing moves), human security offers an outlet to all those dissatisfied with security analysis, who are more interested in achieving securitization than simply analysing it. The Copenhagen School's securitization approach, in turn, is fundamentally limited in terms of its normative utility. Here the security analyst and the securitizing actor are two functionally distinct entities, with the securitization analyst in no position to enter the security equation at any point.

While the human security approach offers an alternative to the securitization approach, this is not the same as saying that human security can possibly, or indeed should, replace the securitization approach, or for that matter security analysis as a whole. Nor is this to say that security analysis can, or should, replace the human security approach. Rather, each is important in its own unique way: one contributing to our understanding of how

security is practiced, the other – on occasion and if successful – to its practice. HSJ

Notes

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[2] Ole Wæver. *Concepts of Security* PhD Dissertation University of Copenhagen (1997):14.

[3] S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuan Foong Khong. *Human security and the UN: A critical History* (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 2006).

[4] Don Hubert. "An idea that works in practice" *Security Dialogue* 35 (3) (2004): 351; Paul Evans. "A concept still on the margins, but evolving from its Asian roots" *Security Dialogue* 35 (3) (2004): 363-364; Keith Krause. "The key to a powerful agenda, if properly delimited" *Security Dialogue*, 35 (3) (2004): 367-368; Andrew Mack. "A signifier of shared values" Security Dialogue, 35, (3) (2004): 366-367; S. Neil MacFarlane. "A useful concept that risks losing its political salience" *Security Dialogue* 35 (3) (2004): 368-269.

[5] Taylor Owen. "Human security – Conflict, critique and consensus: colloquium Remarks and a proposal for a threshold-based definition" *Security Dialogue* 35 (3) (2004): 375.

[6] Ibid. 375.

[7] "Special Section: What is 'Human Security'?" *Security Dialogue* 35(3): 345-371.

[8] Astri Suhrke. "Human security and the interests of states" *Security Dialogue* 30(3) (1990): 265-276.

[9] Lloyd Axworthy. "A new scientific field and policy Lens" *Security Dialogue* 35 (3) (2004): 348.

[10] Keith Krause (2004). op cit. 367-368.

[11] Donna Winslow and Thomas Hylland Eriksen. "A broad concept that encourages interdisciplinary thinking" *Security Dialogue* 35 (3) (2004): 361.

[12] Roland Paris. "Human Security –Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" *International Security* 26(2) (2001): 88; 93. (emphases added).

[13] UNDP report cited in ibid. 90.

[14] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap deWilde. *Security - A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner 1998): 36.

[15] Barry Buzan. "A reductionist, idealistic notion that adds little analytical value" *Security Dialogue*, 35 (3) (2004): 370.

[16] Ibid. 36 (emphasis added).

[17] See for instance, Steve Smith. "The Contested Concept of Security" in Ken Booth (ed) *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005): 37.

[18] Ole Waever. "Securitization and Desecuritization" In Lipschutz R. D. *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press 1995): 49.

[19] Desecuritization is the reverse of securitization, whereby issues are being moved out of the exceptional status, back into the normal policy making realm.

[20] Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. *Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 71.

[21] For Buzan's view on the matter, see also the quote by Buzan above.

[22] Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (1998). op. cit. 6.

[23] See for instance, Lene Hansen. "The little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma" *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29 (2) (2000): 285-306; Jef Huysmans. "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Agenda in Europe" *European Journal of International Relations* 4(4) (1998): 479-506; Bill McSweeney. "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School" *Review of International Studies* 22(1) (1996): 81-94; Thierry Balzacq. "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context" *European Journal of International Relations* 11(2) (2005): 171-201.

[24] Rita Taureck. "Securitization theory and securitization studies" *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9 (1) (2006): 53 -61.

[25] Chris Browning and Matt McDonald. "Securitization and Emancipation". Paper presented at the 48th ISA annual convention Chicago February/ March 2007; Mark B. Salter. "On Exactitude in Disciplinary Science: A Response to the Networked Manifesto" *Security Dialogue* 38 (1) (2007): 113-122; Jef Huysmans. "Language and the Mobilization of Security Expectations: The Normative Dilemma of Speaking and Writing Security". Paper for the ECPR Joint Sessions , Mannheim 26-31 March 1999; Jef Huysmans. "Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of 'Securitizing' Societal Issues" in Miles R. and Thraenhart D. (eds) *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (London: Pinter, 1995): 53-72.

[26] Claudia Aradau. "Security and the democratic scene: desecuritization and emancipation" *Journal of International Relations and Development* (7) (2004): 388-413; for a critique see Rita Taureck (2006). op.cit.

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[41] As of January 2007 104 countries have ratified the Rome Statute the treaty upon which the ICC is based, notably, however, many countries with large Armed forces, and/or large populations, and/or those in conflict prone regions have not signed the treaty including, for example, the United States, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Israel and Russia.
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