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Revisiting Liberal Peacebuilding: BRICS and Turkey in Somalia

Volkan İPEK *

Abstract

Maintaining and providing peace and security in conflict-affected states are among the most crucial missions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Among the methods of peacemaking and peacekeeping it employs, the UNSC also offers peacebuilding, which consists of helping conflict-affected states that are making the transition from war to peace. Unlike great powers that prioritize military intervention in their peacebuilding strategy, the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and Turkey as models to rising powers prefer a political, institutional and economic development rather than military intervention, which makes their peacebuilding strategy liberal. Despite this general adoption of liberal peacebuilding however, their practices in Somalia are different. Turkey has taken more liberal peacebuilding steps in Somalia than the BRICS, both in terms of approach and quantity. This article analyzes the liberal peacebuilding strategies of the BRICS and Turkey, and explores how these strategies have been implemented in Somalia.

Keywords

BRICS, Turkey, Somalia, liberal peacebuilding, Africa

* Assistant Professor, Yeditepe University, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul, Turkey. E-mail: volkan.ipek@yeditepe.edu.tr. ORCID: 000-0002-8476-9364.

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Introduction

Even today, Giovanni Botero's 16th century classification of states into *granddissime* (great powers), *mezzano* (middle powers) and *piccioli* (small powers) retains its validity. A great power is defined by, but not limited to, a state's material resources, chiefly its relative military capability.[1] Great powers meet geographical challenges in their immediate region to prevent the influence of other nearby states, develop a global role that can easily stir the concern of regional states and take the opportunity to exploit regional conflicts for their own advantage.[2] Success or advantageousness in conjunctural indicators such as geography, population, economy, resources, military, diplomacy and national identity is inevitable for great powers too.[3] In addition to its material power, a great power hones its ability to use soft power with appeal and attraction.[4] A middle power, on the other hand, occupies an intermediate position in the power-based hierarchy, with a stronger position than small powers but a weaker position than great powers.[5] To have sufficient authority to stand on its own without the need of help from others is one characteristic of a middle power.[6] It often looks for solutions to global problems through multilateral solutions, diplomacy, compromise and good international citizenship.[7] An ability to recognize capacity, cooperation, creativity, coalition-building, credibility, context, content and choice in international politics is also critical for a state to be considered a middle power.[8] A small power is the opposite of a great power: a state that cannot enforce any conditions that a great power can enforce.

In Botero's power classification, special attention has been paid to middle powers since the emergence of rising/emerging powers at the end of the Cold War. The fact that rising powers are a relatively new class in global politics, originating from middle powers, highlights a debate on whether they are different from middle powers, and if so, how they differ and what characteristics they have in general. Despite little consensus on rising powers thus far, it is agreed that rising powers, above all, are emerging economies that seek to play a more central role in a capitalist economy.[9] Their wish for a more central role is also visible in international politics, where it appears as a willingness to challenge the status quo and revise the dominant forms of the system to reflect their own interests and values. Rising and middle powers intend to claim for more responsibility in international system, which they believe that it has been dominated by great powers, especially the USA. This brings the revision of such a system in a more legitimate and fair way that shall bring more role to rising and middle powers, consequently.[10]

Like other middle powers, the question of whether Turkey should be considered a rising or middle power Turkey's status as a rising or middle power has been widely discussed, largely with reference to the implementation of Turkish foreign policy in the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) period. Turkey's practices of humanitarian diplomacy around the globe; its intensive multilateralism, especially with the East and the South; its wish to take more responsibility in solving international problems like terrorism; its strong discourse about the need to revise the structure of international institutions; and its significant efforts toward reducing its material dependency on the West make Turkey an interesting case to consider whether it is a middle or a rising power. On one hand, Turkey has been considered a rising power because its government is committed to playing a greater role in an international system it characterizes as broken by global injustices, economic and social inequality, excessive militarization and undemocratic representation in international institutions.[11] On the other hand, Turkey has been seen as a middle power because it has sought to play a greater role in international cooperation to solve global problems by adopting humanitarian diplomacy since the Arab Spring.[12] Moreover, its balance between East and West, evidenced by its efforts to be a member of the EU and a leader of the Muslim world, in addition to its unwillingness to join the BRICS group make it a middle power.[13]

Temporary membership in the UNSC in 2009 and 2010 doubtlessly gave Turkey the chance to take on a greater role in international politics. Moreover, the temporary membership allied Turkey with Brazil, China and Russia—three of the BRICS—in peacebuilding.[14] Speeches in 42 of the 204 UNSC sessions held in 2010 clearly indicate these countries' consensus in supporting peacebuilding in conflict-affected states.[15] The shared emphasis on South-South Cooperation, the centrality of the sovereign state, the international community, state-building and development in peacebuilding indicate Turkey's closeness not only to Brazil, China and Russia but to all of the BRICS countries.[16] A form of peacebuilding adopted from the Western model but avoidant of military interventionism is the BRICS countries' path of choice.[17]

Stemming from this consensus between the BRICS countries and Turkey on peacebuilding, the article's aim is twofold: It first intends to compare Turkey's peacebuilding strategies with those of the BRICS countries, and second, it takes Somalia as case study to analyze these practices. In this process, the article seeks answers to the following questions: What is peacebuilding and how is liberal peacebuilding distinguished from peace-

building more generally? How is it criticized? How do the BRICS consider liberal peacebuilding in general? How does liberal peacebuilding differ from the traditional Western states' peacebuilding? Are the liberal peacebuilding strategies of all the BRICS countries the same or do they differ? What does Somalia mean for Turkey and the BRICS countries? How are Turkey and the BRICS countries implementing liberal peacebuilding in Somalia? It should be noted from the outset that although both the BRICS countries and Turkey have adopted liberal peacebuilding strategies, Turkey has a greater presence in Somalia than the BRICS countries. As methodology, the article uses secondary resources on the theory of liberal peacebuilding, the liberal peacebuilding strategies of the BRICS and Turkey, and their specific practices in Somalia.

Peacebuilding versus Liberal Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is one of the tools used by the United Nations (UN) alongside, for example, peacekeeping and peacemaking, to provide and maintain peace and security in conflict-affected states. Peacebuilding is referred to by the UN as the effort to assist countries and regions in their transitions from war to peace and to reduce a country's risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities for conflict management, and laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development.[18] Chapter VI of the UN Charter depicts peacemaking as a non-restrictive list of peaceful, diplomatic and judicial means of resolving disputes, whereas Chapter VII considers peacekeeping as an action that takes place before peace enforcement and before sanctions. Compared to peacemaking and peacekeeping, peacebuilding is more than a process that has a broad post-conflict agenda and more than an instrumentalist method to secure peace.[19] Peacebuilding activities are surveilled by the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as an intergovernmental advisory body of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the UNSC, which are the organs responsible for all peace efforts in conflict-affected states.[20]

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A considerably recent term first coined by former UN Secretary General

Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992, peacebuilding also means an analytical framework for promoting sustainable peace in societies that are emerging from or potentially entering into conflict. In practice, peacebuilding most often takes place in the final stages of conflict, immediately following the cessation of violence. It is incorporated into an analytical framework that seeks out the sources of and solutions to conflict, and explores practical approaches to preventing conflict, building consolidated peace and engaging in reconstruction/development. It typically focuses on stabilization, reconstruction and institution-building. Peacebuilding serves as an umbrella term that is used to help security- and development-related actors find a common denominator for strategic design and practical implementation. The ultimate goal of peacebuilding is to create a secure and stable environment in which the state is able to deliver security services in accordance with the rule of law and human rights, an environment of dialogue, reconciliation and functionality and a framework through which donors and international actors can engage in the field in a coherent way.[21] Peacebuilding has also been regarded as an international effort to create conditions for peace in countries emerging from civil war.

In practice, peacebuilding consists of peacemaking and peace enforcement missions that intend to secure local civilians and international governmental and non-governmental bodies operating in war-torn territories.[22]

Among the state and non-state actors that might implement peacebuilding, the most notable are the great powers which have defined peacebuilding as a wide range of approaches from limited observation to broad mandate operations, including military interventions and civilian rehabilitation missions.[23] The agencies of the great powers that implement peacebuilding are the U.S. Department of State, the UK Ministry of Defense, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Federal Foreign Office, and Japan's International Cooperation Agency.[24] Accordingly, the policies of great powers' agents in peacebuilding are managed from capitalist or regional safe hubs with delivery through other partners, such as national technical development agencies that are present on the ground, with close links to their embassies. Their general approach includes preparing country assessments and programming with limited consultation with the conflict-affected state's government, and using sanctions for political and economic conditionality linked to peace and development interventions. They address immediate conflict and humanitarian crises by preventing instability and violent extremism; contributing to health education and social sectors; adopting multilateralism and strong

coordination through country assessments with other partners and using structured monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems harmonized to OECD systems.

Compared to great powers' peacebuilding agents and policies, the peacebuilding of the BRICS countries and Turkey as rising powers is different. Direct aid delivery through presence on the ground; humanitarian and developmental assistance through multiple national government agencies; joint assessments and programming with local governments and people of the conflict-affected state; non-interference and respect for sovereignty with no direct or indirect conditionality; usage of solidarity, regional influence and soft power to increase trade and foreign investment; provision of political engagements and trade deals; infrastructure- and institution-building; strong bilateralism; little coordination with other development partners; and absent or weak monitoring and evaluation mechanisms distinguish the peacebuilding activities of the BRICS countries and Turkish from those of great powers. Moreover, the peacebuilding of the BRICS countries and Turkey tends to take place within South-South coordination, characterized by more locally appropriate knowledge and experiences, with emphasis on shared history, culture and religion, offering development with more flexibility and greater capacity to respond to challenging security environments when compared to great powers.[25]

Table 1: Differences between the peacebuilding strategies of great powers, the BRICS countries and Turkey

Great powers' peacebuilding strategies	BRICS' & Turkey's peacebuilding strategies
Indirect services and assistance delivery	Direct services and assistance delivery
Preference to partner with their embassies in conflict-affected states	Preference to partner with national government agencies in conflict-affected states
Limited consultation with the government in conflict-affected states	Unlimited consultation with the government in conflict-affected states
Usage of sanctions when the conflict-affected state does not accept peacebuilding services	Non-usage of sanctions when the conflict-affected state does not accept peacebuilding services
Conditionality before delivery of peacebuilding services	Non-conditionality before delivery of peacebuilding services
Intervention in the sovereignty of the conflict-affected state	Non-intervention in the sovereignty of the conflict-affected state
Efforts to create a multilateral network while dealing with the conflict-affected state	Efforts to create a bilateral network while dealing with the conflict-affected state
Structured monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of services	Weak monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of services
Serving under UN auspices	Serving under but independent from UN auspices

With these differences, the BRICS countries and Turkey implement a type of peacebuilding strategy that is liberal and operates on the premise that political, economic or institutional fabrics such as strong political representation, market economy, security sector reform, democratization and rule of law must be constructed in order to guarantee peace and stability, which are not established on the basis of military intervention.[26] Their peacebuilding is liberal to the extent that tenets of liberal peace, such as democracy, rule of law, human rights and a capitalist market economy are implemented, instead of just an intervention to stop violence in affected states. They consider providing a liberal democratic model in a conflict-affected state with a political, institutional and economic institution-building, reconstruction and social engineering with the tools of democratic process, rule of law, free market and development, nurturing security for the state and a more active civil society rather than a military intervention.[27] In practice, the formal ending of wars and the usage of soft power are seen not as a basis for recovery, but rather a fundamental transformation toward peace, stability and development, including a transition to peace, democracy and a market economy.[28]

Liberal peacebuilding is defined in the UN Agenda for Peace, along with accommodation, reconciliation, emancipation, autonomy, social justice, and installation of liberalism in political, institutional and economic spheres.[29] In accordance with, a more peaceful state is the ultimate goal, which is a product of liberal peacebuilding on the basis of democracy and a market economy.[30] The liberal peacebuilding of Turkey and the BRICS coincides with an emancipatory model involving a bottom-up rather than a state-centric approach, with local participation and sensitivity to culture to the fullest extent possible. Deliberately, it differs from the conservative model that focuses on top-down, state-centric approach that ignores the assistance of local people and institutions for peacebuilding in the conflict affected state, and the orthodox model, which is the mixture of both top-down and state-centric approach and the intrusion of local people and institutions for peacebuilding in the conflict affected state.[31]

Even though it seems more ideal than just peacebuilding, serious critiques have been raised to liberal peacebuilding. First, liberal peacebuilding that favors economic and political institutionalism over security neglects that security is the product of liberalism that drives the contemporary development and peacebuilding discourse of post-conflict assistance. Since security was neglected by liberal peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, for example, conflict did not end.[32] Second, the changes that liberal peacebuilding tries to bring about must first be comprehended and internalized by the local

people of the conflict-affected state. Liberal peacebuilding tries to structure political and economic institutions, but it does not examine whether the local people of the conflict-affected state really endorse them.[33] Third, the installation of democracy has always been one of the unsolved problems. States that offer liberal peacebuilding at first promise to set up a consolidated democracy, but they all try to install their own democracy model in the end. Fourth, liberal peacebuilding is regarded by some as a new stage of colonialism, with the revival of the idea of *la mission civilisatrice,* the 'civilizing mission.' Once liberal peacebuilding starts, they argue, the conflict-affected state becomes dependent on the liberal peacebuilder states, which tend to redefine concepts like civilization, modernization and development on their behalf. It also leads to political control, physical occupation and domination over recipient states. Fifth, even though traditional liberal peacebuilding suggests no military intervention in theory, there is always a military intervention in practice even in the most liberal one. Sixth, peacebuilder states become more authoritarian over time, and start controlling the process of peace on their own without the need of any internal or, especially, external actor. Seventh, liberal peacebuilding is quite one-sided on the side of the donor state, and tends to have no moral foundations, as is evidenced by racist practices. Last, liberal peacebuilding has a serious problem of sources, which become insufficient after a very short time.[34]

Liberal Peacebuilding of the BRICS Countries and Turkey: Strategies

Brazil

As the largest slave-importing state in the Americas, as well as the last state to abolish the slave trade, Brazil's peacebuilding was constructed on the basis of its pacifist *consolidação da paz* (peace consolidation) ideology that goes back to 1822. Brazil's pacifism is emphasized in all of its Constitutions, in which Article 4 always states that the Brazilian state will not engage in war or conquest.[35] In addition, *consolidação da paz* expresses Brazil's respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of conflict-affected states, a position reemphasized in the Sanya declaration announced in 2014. Brazil's position of non-interventionism, commitment to South-South cooperation, support for developmental assistance and emphasis on the importance of engaging in political dialogue with conflict-affected states all originate from *consolidao do paz*. As a state that highlights the

South-South cooperation in its foreign policy, Brazil considers cooperation as the most important pillar of peacebuilding. That is why, Brazil not only played an important role in the establishment of BRICS and IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) but also expanded its technical cooperation with post-conflict countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and East Timor. Supporting the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), founding the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) are several examples of Brazil's liberal peacebuilding.[36] Brazil was elected to the UN Peacebuilding Commission for its contributions to the UN budget.

Russia

Russia's liberal peacebuilding does not stem from a pacifist ideology, as Brazil's does, but like Brazil it supports non-conditionality in conflict-affected states. Russia tends to consider conflict-affected states as business opportunities rather than as actors to cooperate with. Hence, Russia's view of South-South cooperation is not identical to Brazil's. Contextually, Russia articulates its foreign policy on the basis of its national interests, rather than an assessment of which state needs what in terms of peacebuilding. For instance, the nuclear deal that Russia signed with South Africa in 2014; Gazprom's holding stakes in various Libyan oil and gas concessions, its involvement in joint ventures with Algeria's state-owned hydrocarbon exploitation company, SONATRACH; the signing of a memorandum of understanding with both Algeria and Libya in 2008; and the signing of gas cooperation agreements with Nigeria in 2009 are examples of how Russia manages its relationships with African states for its own national economic interests.[37] Russia's gas and oil deals with African states have concerned Europe, which does not want Russia's natural gas supplies to be empowered.[38] Like Brazil, Russia rejects conditionality in peacebuilding by condemning the Lomé Conventions of 1975 and 1990 and the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 as symbols of a European conditionality that forces conflict-affected states to have 'good governance,' referred to as the transparent, accountable management of the human, natural, economic and financial resources of sustainable development. Like Brazil, the assurance of reforming human rights, democracy or rule of law as a condition for peacebuilding is not necessary for Russia. Regarding

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Africa, Russia uses peacebuilding to sign defense cooperation agreements, such as the African Union (AU) peace agreement in 2019, as a means of building better cooperation in Africa, coordinating with the AU for more regional economic cooperation and Regional Economic Communities, pushing to disarm terrorist groups in Africa and transferring technology to African states.[39]

As a state that favors non-interventionism, Russia makes exceptions for the military interventions it carries out unilaterally in its bordering regions, regardless of whether or not they are classified as peacebuilding operations. It contributes hardly any troops to UN operations, and its interest in international peacebuilding operations is limited to preventing such operations from becoming instruments of Western influence.[40] Russia is one of the two BRICS that was elected to the UN Peacebuilding Commission directly by the UN Security Council.

India

Like Brazil and Russia, India underlines South-South cooperation in its liberal peacebuilding strategy. By regarding liberal peacebuilding within the framework of partnership with conflict-affected states, rather than being merely a donor to them, India believes that it is an international responsibility and obligation to share resources with poor and conflict-affected states. The Indian Development and Partnership Architecture, founded in 1947 by Prime Minister Nehru, describes the economic development of all countries as an obligation of the whole international community. India, which holds that liberal peacebuilding can be best accomplished through development, therefore established the Indian Aid Mission (IAM) in 1954. Many ministries have been involved in the Indian Development and Partnership Architecture, such as the Afro-Asian Rural Development Organization, the Center for Integrated Rural Development of Asia and the Pacific, the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Program, the Pan African e-network, the India Africa Programs and the India Afghanistan Programs.[41] The First India-Africa Forum was held in 2008, and the second in 2011. Specific to Africa, the Focus Africa Program with 24 African states, the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement with eight African states, the Pan Africa e-network Project, the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation, the India-Africa Forum Summit and the India-Africa Trade Ministers Dialogue were founded. The decision to extend the Indian Ministry of Finance for Indian Development and Economic Assistance to 2014–15 with 8.5 billion USD, which included the addition of water pumps, irrigation systems, solar-based mobiles and water purifiers

in Africa, is an example of India's liberal peacebuilding.[42] Even though India shares the South-South cooperation motive with Brazil and Russia, its aim to get a permanent seat in the UNSC is clearer. Moreover, unlike Brazil, which defends non-interventionism in peacebuilding, India stresses the importance of military intervention in the event of large-scale human rights violations, and at times uses very robust practices in the context of UN missions.[43] In addition, India's membership to the UN Peacebuilding Commission is limited with providing military personnel and civilian police to UN missions, compared to Brazil and South Africa that were elected to UN Peacebuilding Commission by the General Assembly, and China and Russia that were elected to UN Peacebuilding Commission by the Security Council.

China

In its liberal peacebuilding, China considers development as the objective, with good government as the focus, assistance orientation and non-intervention as a principle, reactivity as a strategic culture and empowering state capacity-enhancing national identification and promoting economic recovery as a method.[44] Like Brazil, Russia and India, China stresses that economic development is important for liberal peacebuilding. The financial and technical support given to African states through the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security and is an example of the Chinese peacebuilding praxis. China prefers engaging with matters on African security that aim to address the complexities of its expansive role in international institutions and a significant economic presence.[45] The policy of non-interference and South-South cooperation have also been in the orbit of China's peacebuilding, like that of Brazil, Russia and India. Relatedly, the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation and New Initiative for a China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, established in 2012, play a significant role in South-South cooperation for China. In terms of non-conditionality, China shares the view held by Brazil, India and Russia, and prefers asking nothing in return for its services. More so than Brazil, Russia and India, China has enjoyed acting as a bridge between the Third world states and the Western states, a

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role that facilitates China's reputation and peacebuilding maneuvers, especially in Africa.[46] As an outcome of its *zouchuqu zhanlue* (going abroad for peace) strategy, Chinese peacebuilding is deeply trusted in conflict-affected states. Like Brazil and Russia, China was also elected to the UN Peacebuilding Commission directly by the UN Security Council.

South Africa

As a great power in Africa, like China is in Asia, South Africa's strategy of liberal peacebuilding is based on mediating conflicts in the African continent. Its political narrative frames its relations with other African states as an equal partnership rather than a donor-recipient partnership, and it uses the language of solidarity, horizontality and *ubuntu* (humanity toward others). South Africa defines its development cooperation quite broadly; it includes private and public projects such as the donation of 1 million USD to the Central African Republic and the stationing of AU peace troops in Burundi. Unlike other BRICS, however, South Africa intervened in the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with its troops in the UNFORCE Intervention Brigade, which provided the Congolese army firepower to defeat the M23 rebellion. The South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation has defended the interventions, arguing that they took place upon the request of the conflict-affected states.[47] Despite its intervention in the DRC, South Africa has been one of the leading actors of continental cooperation by supporting the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the AU and African Peace and Security Architecture. Its efforts in facilitating the AU's 2013 decision to set up the African Capacity for Immediate Response to conflicts in Africa are noteworthy. South African liberal peacebuilding retains the mark of the lessons learned from the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, in terms of not imposing any pressure on other African governments while peacebuilding. Anti-imperialism, South-South cooperation, respect for sovereignty and the legacy of protecting human rights are the main tenets of post-apartheid South African peacebuilding.[48] Peace diplomacy has always been at the center of South African peacebuilding, characterizing its involvement in continental peacemaking with diplomatic interventions in the form of mediations, negotiation processes and AU network-based peacebuilding.[49] South Africa was elected to the UN Peacebuilding Commission by the Economic and Social Council.

Turkey

Turkey began highlighting the importance of maintaining global peace and

security from the very beginning of the Republic in 1923, under the guidance of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's *Yurtta Sulh Cihanda Sulh* (peace at home, peace abroad) principle. Turkish liberal peacebuilding involves an active and preventive diplomacy that constructs bridges between societies. The Alliance of Civilizations, proposed by Spain in 2005 and co-sponsored by Turkey; and the Group of Friends of Mediation, established in in 2010 and co-chaired by Turkey and Finland, are examples of Turkey's bridge initiatives. Contextually, seven strategies highlight Turkish liberal peacebuilding. First, is non-conditionality. Turkey, like the BRICS, does not expect any political or economic conditions from conflict-affected states in return for its peacebuilding. Second, is the shift toward people beyond the state. Turkey prefers interacting with the local people in conflict-affected states instead of merely the governments. Third, is direct delivery on the ground. Turkey prefers that its services be directly delivered to conflict-affected states without the need for secondary agents. Fourth, is support of economic development. Like the BRICS, Turkey believes that economic development in a conflict-affected state is one of the best ways to implement peacebuilding. Fifth, are education programs. Turkey offers scholarships for undergraduate and graduate studies in its universities to students from conflict-affected states.[50] As a non-member to the UN Peacebuilding Committee, Turkey set up its peacebuilding in Africa initiative on the basis of the Africa Opening plan declared in 1998.[51]

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Turkey & BRICS Liberal Peacebuilding: A Comparison

Even though they implement liberal peacebuilding to conflict-affected states and agree on the principle of non-conditionality, direct delivery and cooperation of state and non-state actors, nuances remain in BRICS and Turkish strategies. One is worldview. Except for Russia, the liberal peacebuilding efforts of Brazil, India, China, South Africa and Turkey were constructed on different worldviews of pacifism. *Consolidao do paz* in Brazil, *satyagraha* in India, *zouchuqu zhanlue* in China, *ubuntu* in South Africa and *yurtta sulh cihanda sulh* in Turkey were successfully instrumentalized to each country's peacebuilding. The second one is their approach to the South-South cooperation. Thanks to their colonial experiences, Brazil, India and South Africa among the BRICS managed to develop a strong sensitivity about conflict-affected Third World states. A similar sensitivity

to the Third World is evident in Russia, China and Turkey, maybe not in terms of colonial experiences but in terms of a challenge to the American hegemony over the Third World. In addition, the principle of non-intervention in the sovereignty of conflict-affected states is critical. Unlike Russia and India, which consider interference necessary if conditions require; and South Africa, which actually practiced intervention in the DRC; Brazil, China and Turkey have not only had full respect for the sovereignty of conflict-affected states, but have not exerted any interference. To Turkey and the BRICS countries alike, economic development is essential. All the BRICS and Turkey reckon that economic development, which consists of augmenting imports, exports and investments, is one of the best methods for peacebuilding. Yet they have varying levels of involvement. In this sense, among the BRICS, China is the most successful so far, with Russia seeing peacebuilding as an opportunity to expand its economic influence. Last comes organizational structure. Russia and China are the only two BRICS that were elected to the UN Peacebuilding Commission directly by the Security Council, unlike Brazil, India and South Africa. Turkey, on the other hand, is not a member of the UN Peacebuilding Commission yet. In addition, unlike India, Russia, China and Turkey, which base their peacebuilding strategy in Africa through forums on Partnership with Africa, South Africa and Brazil have not announced such a contextual framework for Africa yet.

Table 2: Nuances between BRICS and Turkey's liberal peacebuilding strategies

	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa	Turkey
Worldview	*Consolidao da paz*	-	*Satyagraha*	*Zouchuqu zhanlue*	*Ubuntu*	*Yurtta sulh Cihanda sulh*
Actors	State and non-state	State and non-state	State and non-state	State and non-state	State	State and non-state
Intervention	Against	If needed but never practiced	If needed but never practiced	Against	If needed and practiced	Against
South-South Cooperation	Supportive	Supportive	Supportive	Supportive	Supportive but limited to Africa	Supportive
Economic development	Supportive	Supportive with profit making view	Supportive	Supportive	Supportive	Supportive
Conditionality	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against	Against
Organizational Structure	UN Peacebuilding Commission member	UN Peacebuilding Commission member	UN Peacebuilding Commission member	UN Peacebuilding Commission member	UN Peacebuilding Commission member	Not a UN Peacebuilding Commission member
Peacebuilding in Africa Initiative	The 2012 Brazil-Africa Forum	The 2019 Russia-Africa Summit	The 2008 India-Africa Forum	The 2000 China-Africa Forum	-	1998 Africa Opening Plan

BRICS and Turkey: Liberal Peacebuilding Practices in Somalia

Somalia's importance stems not only from its need for liberal peacebuilding, but also from the approach BRICS and Turkey have taken with it. Specifically, there are significant differences in how each of the BRICS countries and Turkey approach Somalia—differences that guide their liberal peacebuilding practices. Among the BRICS, Brazil is the least interested state in Somalia, and still does not have an embassy there, due to the general disconnection it has had toward Africa, especially post the Lula da Silva presidency. Among the twenty five official visits to Africa paid by Da Silva, none of them was to Somalia. In addition, the consistency that was shown in Brazilian foreign policy to-

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ward Africa by Da Silva rule was not shown by his successors [52] In addition to the initiatives of private enterprises in Africa, Brazil's liberal peacebuilding practices in Somalia consist of supporting the AU Mission there; sending observers to the U.S.-led Obangame Express, which brings together mostly African and European countries in carrying out antipiracy joint exercises in the Gulf of Guinea; donating 38,000 tons of food to Somalia and 15,000 tons of food to Ethiopia in 2011; and donating 300,000 USD for a project run by the UN Population Fund to address gender violence in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia in 2013.[53] One of Brazil's recent activities for liberal peacebuilding in Somalia took place in 2017, when the state condemned the terror attack committed by Al Shabaab.[54] Somaliland's Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Saad Ali Shire's confirmation as speaker at the 6th Brazil-Africa Forum in 2018 caused tension in bilateral relations.[55] Apart from this, Brazilians do not hear the name "Somalia," except in reference to the football player named Somalia who has been playing in the Botafogo club.[56]

In contrast to Brazil which had approached Somaliland by 2018, Russia has strengthened its political economic relations with Somalia, which has been taking more space in Russian foreign policy since the declaration of "Russia's National Security: Russian Federation to 2020" in 2015 taking the development of political, economic, trade and military cooperation with African and Latin American states into account. Russia had already started to show more interest in Somalia's oil, gas and uranium resources when Somali Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarken, asked for Russian assistance in fighting Al Shabab in 2016.[57] Even though Russia also does not have an Embassy in Somalia yet, like Brazil, it regularly condemns all attacks from Al Shabab and Somaliland to the Somali state.[58] Nonetheless, parallel to the economic significance Russia has attributed to Africa in general, Russian liberal peacebuilding in Somalia as an idea was born from the Russia-Africa Economic Forum in 2019 in which Russia stated the importance of the Somali market to Russia.[59]

Unlike Brazil and Russia, India has long seen Somalia as an important trade partner. India-Somalia historical ties date back to colonial and post-colonial times, during which 200 Indian families settled in Somalia in the 1940s, as an example. Structured in the context of this historical background, India served as Chair of the UNSC's Somalia-Eritrea Committee in 2012, traded 391 million USD in 2015 with Somalia, included Somalia in its Pan African-network and donated 9 million USD to the Somali state in 2012. Moreover, India offered Technical and Economic Cooperation

training scholarships and Indian Council for Cultural Relations scholarships to Somalia in 2014.[60] Militarily speaking, the Indian navy has been sailing off the shores of Somalia since 2008 as part of the UN Contact Group on Piracy.[61]

Like Russia, China's economic interest in Somalia comes from its motivation to participate in regional security governance in the Middle East for its growing energy, investment and trade interests.[62] The Road and Belt Initiative is an important catalyst for Chinese support of Somalia's development, since China wants no conflicts in states where the Initiative is planned. Besides economic interests, Somalia has also been regarded a project to enhance a diplomatic discourse to prevent Western states from dominating the Middle East, and as the gateway to develop relations with the Horn of Africa to gain support in such UN arbitrations as the South China Sea case against the Philippines.[63] In terms of liberal peacebuilding, the Chinese state-owned company CNOOC signed an oil exploration agreement with the Somali state in 2007; reconstructed the National Theatre, the Benadir Hospital, the Mogadishu Stadium and the road between Glyako and Burao in 2013;[64] signed off on the promotion of continuous development of China-Somalia relations in 2018 and urged the global community to help Somalia in 2019.[65] Moreover, the launch of diplomatic relations between Somaliland and Taiwan in July 2020 empowered political solidarity between China and Somalia.[66]

Even though it openly states in its liberal peacebuilding strategy that conflicts in Africa would take priority, South Africa's practice for Somalia is quite limited, more so than all the other BRICS members. The state reestablished formal relations with Somalia in 2012, after the end of the latter's civil war. The state sent 11 million USD to help rebuild Somalia's infrastructure and institutions that were damaged by Al Shabab.[67] With its support of AMISOM in Somalia, South Africa is more effective in peacekeeping than peacebuilding.

Compared to that of the BRICS, two factors-location and shared cultural ties might explain the Turkish approach in Somalia, which is both active and extensive and will be described in detail below. First, Somalia is situated in a critical strategic location between the Arabic Peninsula and the Horn of Africa; Turkey's military base there enables it to supervise the activities of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in the Gulf of Aden and the civil war in Yemen. This became especially important after these two states supported Khalifa Haftar, while Turkey supported the UN-backed government, in the Libyan Civil War. Second, Somalia's relatively homogenous

society compared to other Sub-Saharan African states facilitates the implementation of a constructivist foreign policy for Turkey, characterized by a preference for interacting with other states through common identity and common history claims. Contextually, Turkey's liberal peacebuilding practices in Somalia involve not only the political and economic but also the social development of the Somali state and people, and were preceded by cooperation between governmental and non-governmental organizations. In addition to the Turkish Embassy, the Turkish Consulate, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Development, the Ministry of Food Agriculture and Livestock, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Justice, the Turkish Armed Forces and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities have been responsible for specific political steps. These include restructuring the Somali army and police force, donating patrol boats, establishing training capacity-building programs, founding a Somalia Agricultural school, supporting a Mogadishu city plan, providing low income housing, rehabilitating Galyako Prison and giving direct budget support to the Somali government, training Somali diplomats, and deploying soldiers to fight piracy and Al Shabab, a group that has repeatedly attacked Turks living in Somalia. Policies to develop the security of the Somali people and state were also discussed in the Turkey-Somalia Conference in 2012 and the High Level Partnership Forum in 2016.

In addition to state agencies, institutions such as AFAD, TUBITAK, TIKA, the Housing Development Administration, the State Hydraulic Worlds and Religious Affairs Directorate distributed food during Ramadan, provided shelter, rendered emergency medical services, constructed logistics and supply centers, trained medical specialists, provided equipment to hospitals, constructed hospitals and health clinics, constructed schools, gave technical support and provided scholarships. Between 1992 and 2020, 1,092 students from Somalia received scholarships from the Turkish state.[68] Business groups such as Albayrak Ltd., which built capacities for fisheries and maritime activities, and Favori Ltd., which renovated the International Mogadishu Aden Abdelle Airport, are models of Turkish business presence in Somalia. In addition, humanitarian institutions such as the Turkish Red Crescent and the Turkish Religious Foundation, Doctors Worldwide, have drilled water wells, constructed urban roads and installed street lighting.[69] All of these agencies have been working toward eliminating Somalia's international isolation, providing intensive and comprehensive humanitarian aid, rebuilding infrastructure, helping restore security in the country by supporting Somali security forces and AMISOM and supporting the process of

political consensus and state-building in the country.[70] In addition, prioritizing institution-building and knowledge transfer; helping with political party development, constitutional reform and the creation of accountable institutions; establishing a standardized and transparent bidding process for contracts and subcontracts to avoid empowering predatory business people; helping Somalia create a professional, decentralized police force; and keeping Turkish business people operating are also components of the Turkish liberal peacebuilding strategy in Somalia.[71]

The principle of non-conditionality is evident in Turkey's non-demand of anything in return from Somalia for all its peacebuilding activities, and from its people-oriented approach is evident in Turkish agencies' interactions with the Somali people alongside the Somali state when they pay an official visit. The 200-bed Tayyip Erdoğan Hospital and Digfer Hospital, established in 2015, and the project to construct 10,000 low-income houses, Turkish Airlines' delivery of 60 tons of food supply with the national campaign called #TurkishAirlinesHelpSomalia and the delivery of ventilators to the Somali people during the COVID-19 pandemic are examples of how these agencies have cared for the Somali people while peacebuilding. President Erdoğan's 2011 visit not only consolidated Turkish liberal peacebuilding in Somalia but also revitalized social relations between Turkey and Somalia with food assistance to Somali people who were suffering from a regional famine. Last but not least, Somalia's economic development was highlighted with 200 million USD in donations from the Turkish government and 350 million USD from Turkish NGOs in 2011. Between 2012 and 2014, Turkey's official development assistance to Somalia increased by nearly 30% from 1.2 billion in 2012 to 3.6 billion in 2014. Besides donations, infrastructure projects were also launched in Somalia as part of Turkey's liberal peacebuilding efforts. Turkish companies got contracts for the management of the Mogadishu airport and for the reconstruction of the Mogadishu seaport in the 2012 Turkey-Somalia Trade and Investment Forum. In 2013, Turkey allocated 4.5 million USD of direct budget support each month between June and December for the funding of salary shortfalls, and a three-year plan for security between Mogadishu and Ankara was signed.

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In 2016, Turkish exports to Somalia reached 115 million USD and Turkish Airlines started to fly to Mogadishu. That same year, President Erdoğan and Somali President Mohamud co-hosted a private sector Investment Conference in Istanbul to promote Turkish investments in Somalia.[72] Turkey also contributed to help Somalia pay back its debt to the IMF in 2020 by sending 3.4 million USD upon the campaign launched by the IMF for heavily indebted states.[73]

Table 3: BRICS and Turkey's approach to Somalia and number of liberal peacebuilding practices in Somalia

	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa	Turkey
Approach to Somalia	Humanitarian	Economic	Historical-Economic	Economic	Political	Humanitarian & Historical-Political
Number of liberal peacebuilding practices in Somalia	5	1	7	7	1	21

Conclusion

All states, great, middle, small or rising, may experience conflicts that necessitate serious peacebuilding practices. Nevertheless, global politics show that peacebuilding practices are mostly required for small states, rather than great, middle or rising ones. In the event of such conflicts, great and middle powers, as well as rising powers, have different perceptions of peacebuilding. Great powers try to practice a military intervention-based peacebuilding with corresponding strategies under UN auspices. Rising powers such as the BRICS countries and Turkey, on the other hand, have adopted a liberal peacebuilding strategy that does not locate military intervention at the center of the action but instead focuses on enhancing the political, economic and social dynamics in conflict-affected states to prevent the eruption of conflicts in the future. In addition, unlike great powers that prefer to engage in peacebuilding under UN auspices, the BRICS and Turkey prefer to develop their own liberal peacebuilding practices, independent from the UN programming.

The findings of this article not only reveal different strategies of liberal peacebuilding among the BRICS countries, but also show that Turkey has much more intensified and numerous liberal peacebuilding practices in Somalia than all of the BRICS. Turkey enjoys significant advantages while practicing liberal peacebuilding in Somalia. A more settled diplomatic pre-

sentation, a humanitarian-historical and political approach to Somalia rather than solely economic, its geographical closeness to Somalia, its record of more infrastructure projects it realized in Somalia, its more shared history with Somalis, its more rooted African Opening Plan are some of these advantages Turkey has, compared to BRICS, that renders Turkish liberal peacebuilding more feasible and effective in Somalia. Considering former American President Trump's derisive description of Somalia as having "No government, no safety, no police, no nothing, just anarchy,"[74] Turkey has the potential to show how seriously it takes Africa with its capacity for liberal peacebuilding practices in Somalia from nation building to state building. Liberal peacebuilding is very critical for a state like Somalia that is dealing with the tormenting outcomes of its civil war and struggle against Al-Shabab. When the fact that conflicts often occur in pre- and post-election periods in Africa, it becomes much more critical to consider the forthcoming 2021 elections in Somalia. Turkey shall continue its stable liberal peacebuilding practices in Somalia, and make efforts to convince the BRICS countries to take more responsibility there as well.

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