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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES: ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND CONTENDING APPROACHES

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Introduction

Security Studies, also known as International Security Studies (IIS), is an academic sub-field within the wider discipline of International Relations that studies organized violence, military conflict and national security. Stephen Walt (1991) points out that the intellectual field's boundaries are flexible and hence any attempt to draw and define the precise field of study is arbitrary. However, the basic aim of Security Studies remains simple to define: 'it is the phenomena of war' as security studies assert that conflict between governments is always possible and that the use of force has far-reaching consequences for states and societies. Thus, Security Studies can basically be characterized as 'the study the threat, use and control of military force' (Nye and Lynn Jones 1988).

Security Studies as a sub-field within International Relations emerged following the end of World War II, notably in the 1950s, with the onset of the Cold War between the Eastern and Western blocs. Security was inextricably linked to the military aspect, as most countries strive to maximize their military strength in order to ensure their security and survival against all intended threats, including attempts to subjugate their existence to another state, terrorist organization, or other armed group. As with IR, this sub-field of study is primarily a Western subject—mostly conducted in North America, Europe, and Australia, with all of the associated Western-centrisms. There

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is a pre-World War II literature that can be broadly classified as war studies, military and grand strategy, and geopolitics. 'Security' became its watchword (Yergin 1978), both defining it and setting it apart from older disciplines such as War Studies and Military History. Security evolved as a unifying notion for an increasingly diverse range of research programs.

Since the end of World War II, four central questions have guided debates in the field of Security Studies (see Buzan and Hansen 2009, 10-13). The first issue is whether to elevate the state to the status of 'referent object.' Security is about establishing anything that requires protection: a nation, a state, an individual, an ethnic group, the environment, or the planet itself. Whether as 'national security' or subsequently as traditionalist 'international security,' the nation/state served as the analytical and normative reference point. International security was not intended to supplant state security with the security of humanity, or of individuals or minorities within or across state borders. Securing the state was viewed as the most effective method of protecting other referent objects instrumentally. 'National security' should have been renamed 'state security,' but what the Cold War idea of 'national security' actually involved was a fusion of state and country security: the nation backed a strong state, which in turn reciprocated by loyally preserving its society's values and interests.

The second point to consider is whether to include both internal and external threats. Because security is inextricably linked to state discourse, it is also about situating threats in relation to territorial borders. Wolfers characterized 'national security' as an 'ambiguous symbol' and compared the post-1945 political atmosphere to the interwar American economic slump, arguing that the 'shift from a welfare to a security interpretation of the symbol "national interest" is reasonable. Wolfers remarked at the start of the Cold War, 'Today, rather than depression and social reform, we are living under the influence of Cold War and external aggression' (Wolfers 1952, 482). 'National security' has evolved away from internal economic concerns and toward exterior challenges posed by ideologically opposing, and so presumed hostile, states (Neocleous 2006). As this transition became institutionalized, the concept of 'international security' began to coexist with, but not replace, the concept of 'national security,' and eventually played a larger role in naming the subject, thus International rather than National Security Studies.

Thirdly, should security be expanded beyond the military sector and the use of force? Because 'Security Studies ' was developed during the Cold War, and the Cold War was so predominately about the military capabilities of adversaries, friends, and Self, the term 'national security' became practically synonymous with military security. This is not to say that other capacities were

overlooked, such as the requirement to combine economic vitality, political stability, energy supplies, research and technology, as well as food and natural resources. These were to be incorporated because they had an effect on 'the use, threat, and control of force,' and hence on military security, rather than because they were to be deemed separate security concerns (International Security 1976, 2).

Fourthly, is security irrevocably linked to a dynamic of risks, dangers, and urgency? 'National security' evolved amid a political atmosphere in which the US, and the West more broadly, perceived themselves as threatened by an adversarial adversary. As Herz (1950) defined the security dilemma, 'security' referred to attacks, enslavement, domination, and – when taken to its logical conclusion - annihilation. This would encourage groups to develop further capabilities, so making their adversary insecure and driving both parties to participate in a 'vicious spiral of security and power build-up' (Herz 1950, 157). Security was concerned with the extreme and extraordinary, with those situations that would not only cause annoyance, but would also threaten to destroy one's society (Williams 2003). This appeared quite plain sense to the mainstream of Security Studies during the Cold War: the Soviet Union posed a clear threat, and nuclear weapons were justified to dissuade the Soviet Union from initiating a first attack.

The Cold War: The Dominance of Realism/Neo-Realism

Since the beginning of the Cold War realist approaches to security have dominated Security Studies. Much of the thinking and writing on the subject is based on a limited definition of 'security.' As with hanging, practical considerations of imminent risk naturally focused the attention of security experts and decision makers on physical survival threats. Interstate conflict was a focal point of energy, particularly the East-West rivalry and the US-Soviet nuclear balance. These worries were later expanded to the developing countries as part of the superpower struggle's continuation (Kolodziej 1992).

As the Cold War matured, the gradual ascendancy of realist approaches to international relations over previous idealist and legal conceptions of international security, which were particularly strong in the US, provided a normative justification for a state-centric approach to international policies and security (Morgenthau 1985). With Europe as the central objective, the East-West conflict was seen simply as a continuation of millennia of state competition for regional and global control. This state-centric perspective on war was then further limited in the 1960s, as analysts shifted away from what Hans Morgenthau termed *Politics among Nations* and toward assessments of

deterrence as the central strategic idea justifying the Cold War and regional wars (Schelling 1963). Using microeconomics, systems analysis, and game theory as a starting point, deterrence was examined as a strategic notion that lends itself to rigorous, logical study (Kolodziej 1992).

The most salient elements of the Cold War agenda were gradually characterized as a special problem in deterrence (Kolodziej 1992, 1). The East-West conflict and its complex and widely divergent regional stakes have frequently been reduced to competitors' and allies' commitment tactics and to studies of nuclear and conventional stability (Freedman 1990). The state-as-actor morphed into the state-as-unitary actor, whose behaviour was thought to be guided by power maximization considerations. A strategy was developed in conjunction with the use of threats to sway rivals' behaviour in desired directions. Extensive arguments between different schools of nuclear deterrence and esoteric conversations between experts over the relative benefits of various nuclear weapons systems in maintaining the balance of terror dominated strategic research and policymaking. Of course, conventional deterrence and the balance of power in regional confrontations remained critical issues. The avalanche of literature about the center front's stability in Europe is instructive (Butterworth 1989). What is significant for this perspective is that threat manipulation and force projection have become the major, virtually exclusive, concerns of security studies. While the topic was undoubtedly urgent and extensive, the issues highlighted were necessarily constrained, technical, and managerial in nature (Chimbala 1991).

The late 1970s rise of neo-realism further narrowed the intellectual and normative viewpoint of Security Studies (Waltz 1991). The broad normative concerns of conventional realist thought were downplayed in an attempt to establish a scientific foundation for the realism worldview (Waltz 1979). By design, Security studies shifted away from an explanation of what states really did in the name of security and toward a study of their behaviour that, based on deductive reasoning, professed to be consistently relevant across time and historical context. Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes all expressed their rich and historically informed realism in proto-scientific propositional language. A lean set of assumptions now established the security dilemma: nation-states inhabiting an anarchic environment, each seeking survival, and guided by a structure defined by the distribution of military capabilities across units (Waltz 1979).

The theory was intrinsically provable, as its assumptions could always be proved through selective observations that corresponded to its predicted state behaviour. Deviations from expected norms - for example, democratic restraints on state power maximization or bandwagoning and concert

formations rather than balancing - were not so much denied as disregarded as of minor or irrelevant theoretical interest. Subtle changes were made to the delicate causal and sequential relationship between theory and observation. Rather than the converse, theory validated observation (Kolodziej 1992).

In short, throughout the Cold War, realist/neo-realist approaches to security dominated Security Studies. However, with the end of the Cold War, the landscape of international political environment changed dramatically, and the realists' dominance in this field of study began to be questioned. Some scholars have also interrogated even the fundamental concept of 'security,' while others have questioned the realist dominance in Security Studies and offered alternative perspectives.

The Post Cold War: Traditionalists vs. Wideners-Deepeners

The end of the Cold War is normally considered as the start of a fundamentally new political environment in world politics both in a real as well as in a theoretical sense. This has been particularly acute within Security Studies, where demand to redefine its central concept, 'security,' has become a preoccupation during that time. As a result, several academics have reconsidered what is, and what *should* be, included within this concept and whether a broader definition constitutes a more accurate depiction of reality (Tarry 1999).

The primary source of contention was the growing movement among scholars to broaden the definition of Security Studies beyond 'the study of the threat, use, and control of military force' (Walt 1991, 212). Realists strongly maintained that the security landscape had not changed sufficiently to require an adjustment to Waltz's definition, and thus argued for continuing to approach security through the lens of the nation-state and interstate war, ostensibly for the sake of conceptual clarity and theoretical parsimony (Mearsheimer 1995). However, the wideners have augmented the military threats that dominated classical studies in this topic with economic, societal, political, and environmental risks (Buzan 1991). The deepeners, frequently the same individuals as the wideners, are concerned with expanding the traditional state-centric view of security by explicitly introducing the concept of five levels of depth: international systems, international subsystems, units, subunits, and individuals (Buzan et al. 1998).

To those attempting to broaden the definition of security, the military state-centric agenda presented analytical, political, and normative difficulties. The peaceful end of the Cold War, the increase in intra-state conflict, Western

cultures' dread of immigration, the deteriorating environment, and the escalation of the HIV/AIDS epidemic all indicated that traditionalism was incapable of meeting the post-Cold War. Wideners and deepeners contended that the 1990s lacked a defining military event or defining Great Power conflict that traditionalists could say should take center stage. Thus, the post–Cold War landscape was defined by discussion not only between traditionalists and the widening–deepening division, but also within the widening–deepening camp (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 187).

In essence, widener–deepeners argued for broadening the referent object beyond the state, expanding the idea of security beyond the military, emphasizing both internal and transnational concerns, and allowing for a modification of the Realist logic of international security. While they were unified in their opposition to military state-centrism, the widening–deepening stance was comprised of such disparate methods that nearly as much time was spent debating disagreements within the widening–deepening position as on the traditionalist–expansionist divide. Thus, a significant feature of intra-widening debates in the 1990s and 2000s was the rapid growth of labels indicating a distinct widening–deepening perspective: Constructivism, Human Security, Postcolonialism, Critical Security Studies, and the Copenhagen School are added to post-structuralism and Feminism (see Buzan and Hansen 2009, 187).

In terms of driving forces, widening–deepening debates were influenced by great power politics inasmuch as the Cold War's demise altered both the security agenda and the actors who could engage in it, allowing for a longer list of events to have an impact on Security Studies debates. When it comes to methods, technology played a large role in some, such as Poststructuralism's preoccupation with the impact of new media technology but played a lesser role in others. Internal intellectual arguments had the most influence. This impulse had a number of effects, not the least of which was that it made the discussion of schools and labels, rather than events or technologies, the organizing dynamic (see Buzan and Hansen 2009, 188).

These school conversations were influenced in three ways by internal academic debate dynamics (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 188). Firstly, they were affected by intellectual and methodological conflicts in international relations, as was the convergence of negative peace researchers and strategists. Secondly, there was a significant difference in the extent to which specific broadening–deepening approaches emerged from the Peace Research agenda of the 1970s and 1980s or were introduced to 'Security Studies' via IR debates or social and political theory. Thirdly, there was a distinction in the degree to which they emphasized and discussed the concept of security.

These strategies incorporated both broadening and deepening. That segment of the expanding debate comprised the mostly empirical recommendations for tackling economic and, particularly, environmental challenges as part of international security in the 1970s and 1980s.

Since the late 1980s, broadening and deepening have been entwined in the explicit arguments concerning the notion of security that have become popular within Security Studies, paving the way for a far more in-depth discussion of this term than occurred during the Cold War. The manner in which schools broadened and widened security–or did not–introduced a broader agenda centered on economic, environmental, sociological, and regional security, as well as a deepening of the referent object outside the state. While there was an earlier literature on environmental security, for example, there was no such thing as an environmental security school; rather, there were numerous ways in which environmental security was included into or excluded from various methods. Regarding broadening, it is worth noting that broadening security requires considering distinct non-military sectoral dynamics as phenomena. Economic issues, energy supply, food and natural resources all have an effect on the military force, which widens the list (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 189).

As a leading scholar in Security Studies and proponent of deepener-widener, Buzan (1983; 1991) in *People, States, and Fear,* has also examined the meaning of security by focusing on the question of how states and societies pursue freedom from threat in the context of competitive relations across the political, economic, military, societal, and environmental landscapes. He focuses the analysis on the interplay of threats and vulnerabilities, the policy consequences of overemphasizing one or the other, and the existence of contradictions within and between ideas about security. Buzan strongly argues that 'the national security problem cannot be understood without reference to factors at all three levels of analysis—individual level, state level, and international level.' Although the term 'national security' suggests a phenomenon on level 2 (state level), the connections between that level and levels 1 (individual level) and 3 (international level) are too numerous and too strong to deny. The concept of security binds together individuals, states and the international system so closely that it demands to be treated in a holistic perspective. His thought-provoking book was clearly a solid challenge to the dominance of realism and provoke the rise of alternative approaches to Security Studies.

Constructivist Perspective

Social Constructivism as an approach to international relations encompasses a diverse spectrum of ideas. However, conventional constructivism provides analysis that essentially criticizes traditional Security Studies, most notably Neorealism, at a number of grounds. One collection of publications examined international norms, focusing on those that appear to contradict Neorealism and Neoliberalism's idea that states are rational, self-help players in an anarchic environment. These studies were frequently framed around a Realist conundrum: why do nations accept limits on their ability to conduct warfare, such as providing help to the wounded in accordance with the Geneva Conventions (Finnemore 1996)? Why are chemical weapons rarely employed, despite the fact that they are potentially effective, and militaries are willing to use them (Price 1995)? Or why is assassination of political and military leaders seen inappropriate, despite the fact that it may be more effective, simple to carry out, and morally preferable than waging war against an entire army or populace (Thomas 2000)? These concerns cannot be addressed by Realist materialist explanations, but only through an ideational investigation of the origins and growth of standards. Richard Price (1995) contends that the prohibition of chemical weapons during the Second World War was linked to a constitution distinguishing between 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' states. Whereas the 'civilised' found chemical weapons morally repugnant, it was their own (manufactured) 'civility' that permitted them to deploy chemical weapons against 'non-civilised' peoples.

A second body of constructivist work advanced from the level of the international system to the level of nations or institutions' foreign policies. Additionally, these studies identify events that cannot be described by Neorealist theories at the level of the international structure, suggesting that they require an explanation at the level of foreign policy and the inclusion of an ideational component. For instance, analysis of French military doctrine, the choice between offensive and defensive doctrines can be explained only by a mix of civilian worries about the military's power and the military culture itself (Kier 1995, 68). Using constructivist perspective on the study of Japan foreign policy, Katzenstein and Okawara (1993) also argue that because the international framework has changed, but Japan's perception of security has not, domestic considerations must be considered (Berger 1993; 1996). Turning from states to international organizations, Risse-Kappen (1996) also powerfully argues that neorealism's failure to account for NATO's post-Cold War survival is due to the theory's omission of ideational factors such as values and identity. Rather than being built in response to an external threat and

hence doomed to disintegrate when the threat faded, NATO was founded on a set of democratic, liberal values that would ensure the institution's longevity.

Thirdly, Critical Constructivism emerged in the latter half of the 1990s, distinguishing itself from Conventional Constructivism by focusing on discourses and the connections between the historical and discursive construction of identities on the one hand, and security measures on the other (Katzenstein et al. 1998, 677). According to Critical Constructivists, Conventional Constructivism still reified the state as the object of analysis, implying a normative preference for the state as the preferred referent object for security (Zehfuss 2001). Critical Constructivists resisted Conventional Constructivism's growing embrace of positivism epistemologically (Laffey and Weldes 1997).

The Constructivists did not expressly call for an expansion of the referent object outside the state or for a theory that transcended the military-political sphere. This is not to argue that Constructivism cannot be critical: demonstrating the capacity to transcend the Realist vision of security politics and interstate relations is at the heart of the Security Studies field's fundamental normative arguments. However, Constructivism's scope is narrower than other theories that expressly address the issue of security. This section discusses the latter, particularly those that argued for a need to expand the referent outside the (Western) state: postcolonial approaches (to which some Critical Constructivists contributed), Human Security, Critical Security Studies, and Feminism. This expansion of the referent object resulted in an expansion of the sectors or areas to which security analysis should be applied, including development, the environment, economics, and social-welfare concerns.

Post-Colonialism

Since the 1970s, 'Security Studies ' has focused on the status of the [Western] state. Mohamed Ayoob (1984) emphasized the Third World's particularities while emphasizing the importance of a strong state and retaining it as the referent object. Critical Peace Researchers, on the other hand, applied Marxist and *dependencia* ideas to their examination of the Liberal international order's economic, political, and cultural exploitation. In the 1990s, calls for a critical examination of the Western-centric view of the state at the heart of 'Security Studies ' increased in frequency, and an explicit Post-colonial 'Security Studies ' perspective crystallised. This was partly as a result of the emergence and growth of post-colonialism in the social sciences and humanities more broadly (Said 1978; Spivak 1999), and partly as a result

of the overlap between post-colonialism and other broadening approaches that drew on one another to generate critical momentum.

Post-colonial theory encompasses a diverse range of perspectives (Grovogui 2007), and one body of Post-colonial Security Studies drew parallels with social theory and historical sociology, and thus with Critical Constructivism, in emphasizing the importance of Third World-specific security conceptualisations. Krause (1996), for example, that the state-centric definition of security supported by orthodox Realist methods was founded on a specific European history of state development. The European state was founded on an external threat-oriented understanding of security and based on a 'strong identification of the state's security with the security of its citizens (Krause 1996, 320). This view of security indicates that state-centric conceptions of security do not provide an analytical or normative framework for identifying the hazards that regimes may pose to their own citizens.

Post-colonialism maintains that the non-Western state has taken a different path but rejects the label of 'failed' or 'underdeveloped'. The 'failed' state as being deficient in several areas in comparison to the West and hence in need of 'catching up'. Post-colonialists claim that these 'failures' are the 'after-effects of the unequal encounter with Western colonialism' (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006) and that the West and the rest of the world have a repeating economic, social, and military imbalance. This branch of Postcolonial Security Studies emphasizes 'the material and ideological conflicts of historically placed agents in a neoliberal international system' (Agathangelou and Ling 2004, 518), which is consistent with both critical IPE and Marxist Peace Researchers' perspectives.

Human Security

Post-colonial perspectives emphasize the peculiarities of the non-Western state, global economic structures, and thus development difficulties. The United Nations Development Programme's notion of 'Human Security' (1994) provided a more straightforward enlargement of security to incorporate development. Human Security, like Common Security in the early 1980s, benefits from a strong institutional foundation and integrates political-activist and scholarly aims. The original UNDP model favored a multidimensional approach to security. Beyond territorial defense, national interests, and nuclear deterrence, the 'logic of security' should encompass 'universal concerns and conflict prevention, but most importantly, a concerted global effort to alleviate poverty and underdevelopment (UNDP 1994, 22).

For the sake of human security, the referent object must be shifted away from nation-states and toward 'people.' To be 'people-centred' was to be 'interested with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their numerous options, how much market and social opportunity they have – and whether they live in conflict or peace' (UNDP 1994, 23). This entailed a dramatic expansion of the types of risks and sectors to which security applied, including food, health, the environment, population growth, gaps in economic opportunity, migration, drug trafficking, and terrorism.

Human Security as conceptualized by the UNDP is perhaps the most expansive enlargement of the notion since Galtung began structural violence, as it attempted to incorporate development and North–South issues. Human Security, regrettably, has also been criticized for being so wide that it becomes intellectually and politically meaningless (Special Section of Security Dialogue 2004). As Roland Paris rightly puts it, 'if human security means almost anything, it means virtually nothing' (2001, 93). Other critics dispute the idea of adding 'security' to what they believe is basically a human rights agenda (Buzan 2004) and point out how easily regimes adopt Human Security rhetoric without changing their behaviour (Booth 2007, 321–7).

Critical Security Studies

Human Security was also adopted by Critical Security Studies, which shared the former's emphasis on 'people' rather than states and envisioned a more just and peaceful world order. Although statistically small, Critical Security Studies has achieved a surprising degree of institutionalization within the European Security Studies community. Critical Security Studies is sometimes defined as the work of Booth and Wyn Jones and their Aberystwyth students and colleagues that is inspired by the Frankfurt School (Booth 1991; 2007). Critical Security Studies has had a considerable impact on the expanding debates because it was the perspective that most openly embraced the Frankfurt School legacy of Critical Theory that was a part of Peace Research in the 1970s. This occurred, however, not as a result of a deliberate engagement with the latter literature, but rather as a result of a reading of the Frankfurt School.

Critical Security Studies maintained that 'individual humans are the ultimate referent for security,' because states are unreliable providers of security and too heterogeneous to support a 'complete theory of security' (Booth 1991, 319–20). According to Wyn Jones (1995, 309), Critical Security Studies entails 'centering our agenda on the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the current world system is a source

of insecurity rather than security.' Additionally, Critical Security Studies ' vocal advocacy for an individual referent object is connected to an empirical–political assessment of interstate war as far less real and threatening than 'environmental security, food security, and economic security,' and to a view of the majority of states as generating insecurity rather than stability and prosperity (Wyn Jones 1995, 310).

Feminist Perspective

Feminist Security Studies is subdivided into sub-approaches that employ a variety of referent objects, epistemologies, and techniques. With the exception of typical military-state-centric methods that ignore gender and security, Feminist Security Studies can be viewed as a microcosm of Security Studies itself. The most pressing issues on the post-Cold War Feminist Security Studies agenda included the following: first, how to further develop the standpoint Feminist approach associated with J. Ann Tickner and Cynthia Enloe, particularly how to address issues surrounding its epistemology of experience; second, how to integrate a new set of events; and third, how to respond to Constructivism and quantitative Feminism.

In terms of whatever conceptualization of security is used and how it is introduced in most textbooks, the Tickner method has been the most common within Feminist Security Studies (Pettman 2005). This approach shares significant similarities with Critical Security Studies and Human Security in that it advocates for expanding the referent object to include 'women' and nonmilitary security sectors (Hoogensen and Rottem 2004). According to Tickner, feminists use a 'multidimensional, multilevel approach' committed to 'emancipatory conceptions of security' that strive to 'understand how violence, both physical and systemic, undermines the security of individuals and groups at all levels (Tickner 2001, 48). As a result, feminist analysis has 'usually followed a bottom-up approach, studying the microlevel impact of conflict' (Tickner 2001, 48), expanded the referent object and the sectors to which security applies.

The appeal of an experience-based epistemology for Feminist Security Studies is that it includes subjects who have been marginalized by state-centric – and other collective – notions of security, such as victims of wartime rape or sex trafficking (Jackson 2006). However, the shortcoming of an experiential epistemology is that it is founded on perspective feminism's idea of women as constituting a distinct subject from 'men'. As a result, numerous feminists developed diversity feminism, which views identity as shaped not only by gender but also by ethnicity, class, and race (Dietz 2003, 408). This increased

the diversity of gendered referent objects and experiences available, but also raised the challenge of uniting a feminist movement and consciousness across diverse experiences. The issue was that 'Feminist epistemology in the sphere of international security must either decide to exclude all "women's experiences" or acknowledge, as other fields have, that judgment and selection are necessary, even within the feminist perspective' (Grant 1992, 95).

The Copenhagen School: Securitization

Jahn et al. (1987) note that Barry Buzan and Ole Waever's work on regional security complex theory, European security, and the relationship between regions and global security are at the heart of the Copenhagen School. In terms of the expanding–deepening debate, most distinctive contributions of this school have been the ideas of 'societal security' and 'securitisation.' In keeping with the gap between the US and Europe in terms of the degree to which the issue of security is overtly addressed, the Copenhagen School has received far greater attention in Europe than in the US, despite the fact that it is increasingly being applied to non-Western countries (Jackson 2006).

In addition, the notion of 'societal security' was introduced in *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (Waever et al. 1993) and was initially conceived in reaction to a series of national crises, most notably in Yugoslavia, but also in Transylvania and the former Soviet Union (Roe 2005). It added a distinct sectoral dimension to the earlier broadening literatures of the 1980s, which were primarily concerned with economic and environmental issues. Increased integration inside the EU posed a challenge to national constituencies fearful of losing political sovereignty as well as cultural autonomy in Western Europe, and immigration was also portrayed as a threat to national identity.

'Social security' was described as 'a society's capacity to retain its core character in the face of changing circumstances and potential or real dangers' (Waever et al. 1993, 23). While the state was the reference point for political, military, environmental, and economic security, the reference point for societal security was 'society' (Waever et al. 1993, 26). This paved the way for the study of 'identity security,' highlighting instances in which the state and society diverged, such as when national minorities faced challenges from 'their' state, or when the state or other political actors mobilized society to combat internal or external threats.

The Copenhagen School clearly defined this as a position in the midst between conventional state-centrism on the one hand and similarly traditional appeals for 'individual' or 'global' security on the other. The term 'societal

security' constrained the conceivable referent object to two collective units, the state and society, while excluding the individual and the globe. According to Waever, 'it appears sensible to remain conservative along this [referent object] axis, recognizing that "security" is significantly influenced by person and system dynamics, but not by propagating ambiguous concepts such as individual and global security' (Waever 1995, 49).

Security 'contextualizes the issue as a distinct type of politics or as something above politics' and thus a spectrum of public issues can be defined, ranging from non-politicised ('the state does not deal with it and it is not made a subject of public debate and decision') to politicized ('the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance') to securitised ('the issue is no longer debated as a political question, but is dealt with as a security issue') (Buzan et al. 1998, 23). Securitising actors are described as 'actors who securitize matters by proclaiming something – a referent object – existentially threatened', while referent objects are defined as 'things that are perceived to be existentially threatened and have a genuine claim to survival' (Buzan et al. 1998, 36).

This appears to be a highly open conception of security, but the Copenhagen School deliberately positioned securitisation as a means of containing excessive security broadening, thus responding to a critical conservative critique of the wideners (Buzan et al. 1998, 1–5). While securitisation theory was theoretically available to anybody, in practice the most common securitising actors are 'political leaders, bureaucrats, governments, lobbyists, and pressure organizations,' with referent objects typically middle-range collectivities (Buzan et al. 1998, 40–41). Recently, the School has extended its thinking beyond the middle-range referent object to macro-securitisations, which seek to structure world politics on a broader scale (Buzan and Waever 2009).

At least in Europe, 'securitisation' has been a fairly effective idea. As a result, it has drawn criticism, particularly from those who urge a more radical broadening of the concept of security. Critical Security Studies has been one of the most significant challengers, arguing that the Copenhagen School does not go far enough in the direction of 'real people in real places,' that it conflates security and survival, and that it is state-centric, elite-centric, discourse-dominated, conservative, politically passive, and neither progressive nor radical (Booth 2005, 271). Because the Copenhagen School is a constitutive, non-causal theory, criticism has focused on the school's analytical, political, and normative implications rather than on its ability to explain phenomena in a positivist (American) social science sense.

Poststructuralism

During the Cold War, poststructuralism was already a unique position in Security Studies. Poststructuralism was harsh on Security Studies for adopting a state-centric military notion of security without questioning its historical, normative, and political implications. Yet, like Realism, Poststructuralists saw themselves as owed to the Classical Realist heritage and claimed that state sovereignty and security were not easily transformable.

Due to the connections between Poststructuralism and Realism, whilst Constructivists arrived to security mostly through general international relations debates, Poststructuralists have been active in peace and security debates since the early 1980s. Although it was critical of Western security policy, Cold War Poststructuralism always retained the potential of rethinking security, and hence was not confronted with the crisis of traditional approaches following the Cold War's end. However, if not a 'meta-event,' the Cold War's conclusion was a constitutive event that called into question some of its key analytical assumptions.

The primary issue that Poststructuralism tackled following the Cold War was whether nations required adversaries. Campbell's analysis of American discourses of danger from 'its' discovery through the conclusion of the Cold War served as the major book in this argument. Campbell's 1992 book Writing Security explicitly emphasized the importance of the Other – that is, the construction of states, groups, and other non-Selves – arguing that, while state identity could theoretically be constituted through relations of difference, the pressure to transform difference into radical, threatening Otherness was overwhelming in practice (Connolly 1991, 64–65; 209–210).

Campbell's idea (1992) had the flaw of reifying state identity ('the state need enemies') and effectively adopting Realism's view of the state ('the state is surrounded by prospective adversaries'). Both approaches presupposed an ontological inseparability of states and adversaries, as well as a monolithic and frightening Other (Hansen 2006, 38–39). The methodological difficulty with assuming state identity as radical Otherness was that if this were assumed to be the only possible form of identity for states, this would be what was identified in empirical studies, despite the possibility of less radical forms of identity, such as being 'Nordic' (Hansen 2006, 38–41). Because the Poststructuralist conception of security is contingent on the production of identity, once identity is established, security is established as well, and Poststructuralism is unable to escape Realist security.

Final Remarks

This article has explored the rise and development of Security Studies from its inception until the end of the Cold War. Security Studies developed out of post-World War II arguments about how to defend the state from external and internal threats. This article has shown that, as a subfield of international relations, Security Studies was dominated by realist paradigm throughout the Cold War. By the Cold War's end, the concept of 'security' had become a source of disagreement between traditionalist versus 'wideners' and 'deepeners.' Not only has the fundamental concept of 'security' been questioned, but a variety of alternative theoretical approaches, including as constructivism, critical theory, feminism, human security, and postcolonialism, have also arisen to challenge the dominant (realist/liberal) paradigm. Finally, it also has shown that significant differences existed in how those alternative approaches defined referent objects, the sectors to which security can be applied, and their epistemological foundations. The basic idea of this paper is mainly derived from Buzan and Hansen (2009) in *The Evolution of International Security Studies*

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to examine the history and development of Security Studies from its inception through the end of the Cold War. Security Studies developed out of post-1945 arguments about how to protect the state from external and internal threats. Throughout the Cold War, Security Studies as a subfield of international affairs was dominated by a realist perspective. By the end of the Cold War, the fundamental concept of 'security' had become a point of disagreement between traditionalists versus 'wideners' and 'deepeners. Not only has the core concept of 'security' been contested, but a range of other perspectives, including constructivism, critical theory, feminism, human security, and postcolonialism, have developed to critically challenge (realist/liberal) paradigm. There were major distinctions in how the contesting perspectives defined referent objects, the sectors to which security can be applied, and the epistemological foundations of their respective perspectives. The basic idea of this paper is mainly derived from Buzan and Hansen (2009) in The Evolution of International Security Studies.

KEY WORDS

Security; Security Studies; Cold War; post-Cold War; Contending Approaches.

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