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Turkey Pro-Arab Stand in the New Millennium: A Comparative Study

Yeni Milenyumda Türkiye Yanlısı Arap Duruşu: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Çalışma

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Abstract: Turkey's policy has become more interested in the Islamic roots of Turkey. Furthermore, global changes have once again brought Turkey's attention to the Arab and Islamic worlds. The relationship between Turkey and the Arab World is old as one can remember. Geographical proximity and cultural ties are among the prominent factors that enhanced the relationship between Turkey on the one hand, and the Arab World on the other hand. The relationship between Turkey and the Arab World becomes more complicated when secularism adopted as a doctrine by modern Turkey. Furthermore, the Arabs during the 1950s and 1960s split into many independent states with different political and ideological orientations. Nevertheless, the focus of this paper is not to describe and analyze the historical-cultural ties between Turkey and the Arab World. Instead, the focus will be on the Turkish support of Arab causes in the United Nations General Assembly "UNGA" in the twenty-first century, a subject requires more methodological attention.

The emergence of the Turkish new foreign policy paradigm has resulted in changing its position towards Arab issues, which has shifted from neutrality and indifference to leadership and pro-Arab causes. The data of this study confirmed that Turkey largely supports Arab issues related to the Palestine issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict during the third millennium. However, when it comes to Arab issues of a controversial nature, such as human rights and the Arab-Arab conflicts, Turkish support becomes less clear. Therefore, the environmental changes surrounding Turkey have resulted in increased support for Arab issues in the third millennium, a link that was missing in the context of the traditional Paradigm of Turkish foreign policy.

Structured Abstract: Background: Turkish-Arab relations have entered a new phase since the 1990s. As a result of noticeable changes in the internal and external environments, Turkey has adopted a new foreign policy paradigm, generally reversing the traditional framework, which limited Turkey's foreign policy options to two main constituencies, the first being North Atlantic Treaty Organization "NATO" and the second being Europe. The early Turkish position on the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, whether in the Security Council "SC" or the General Assembly "GA", has been neutral since the founding of the United Nations "UN" on June 26, 1945.(Aral, 2004: 138) As far as the position of Turkey on the Arab issues since the late 1990s and 2000s is concerned, remarkable changes are noticed.

Objective: To describe, analyze and compare the Turkish support for the Arab issues in the third millennium. Accordingly, this study assumes that Turkey's support for Arab issues has resulted in the surrounding environmental changes in internal and external levels. Turkey's policy has become more interested in the Islamic roots of Turkey. Furthermore, global changes have once again brought Turkey's

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attention to the Arab and Islamic worlds. (See Altunisiki, 2011) Thus, the main objectives of this study, it is to describe, analyze and compare the impact of environmental changes upon the voting behavior of Turkey on the Arab issues in the new Millennium.

Methods: There are set of questions that embody the problem of this study, *How and why Turkey becomes suddenly more concerned with the Arab and Islamic Words after being ignored for a long time? Are Turkey and other neighboring counties to the Arab World vote consistently on the Arab issues generally, and Palestine cause particularly? Is Turkey establishing with other pro-Arab countries a voting sub-group within the UNGA in the new millennium? Is Turkey playing a leadership role within the Islamic World?* The previous questions lead us generally to develop the following hypothesis: "*Environmental changes both internally and externally since the late 1990s and early 2000s have contributed to the emergence of a pro-Arab stand that reflects a new Paradigm of Turkish foreign policy towards the Arab World*." Thus, it is expected that the Turkish support for the Arab issues in the UN level will be shifted from neutrality into a supporting position. While the environmental changes in Turkey since the late 1990s will be treated as independent variables, Turkish support for the Arab issues will be dealt with as the dependent variable.

The significance of this study stems from the connection between foreign policy and voting behavior on the one hand, (See Rai, 1972; and Aral, 2004) and the use of quantitative methods that will enable us to measure the level of Turkish support for the Arab issues on the other hand. In order to measure the level of the Turkish support of Arab causes in the UN General Assembly "UNGA", certain methodological steps are taking:

Firstly, the examination of the UNGA records showed that there are nineteen Arab issues in the year 2000 and seventeen cases in 2019 (N = 36). Thus, the voting behavior on these thirty-six cases will demonstrate generally the level of Turkey support for the Arab issues in the UNGA during the new millennium. While the year 2000 represents the beginning of the twenty-first century, the year 2019 is the recent year of voting data.[i]

Secondly, Issues that were approved without a vote are not considered by this study for methodological reasons, because they reflect an international consensus. The Arab issues of the international agreement were eight in 2000 and two cases in 2019; and thus, there are ten issues excluded from the analysis for methodological reasons.[ii]

In order to examine Turkey and other selected countries voting behavior on the sixty-three Arab issues, the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences known as "SPSS" was used, e. g., cross-tabulations, correlation coefficients, factor analysis.[iii] Finally, the Arab issues reflect different sub-categories, such as the rights of Palestine people for self-determination, the Golan Heights, nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, Jerusalem, and Jewish settlement in occupied Palestine. The continuity of Turkish support to the Arab issues requires a recent examination of the UNGA. The UN website includes the most recent data on voting behavior patterns. Comparing the year 2019 with previous years, e. g., 2000, will show the level of voting consistency that was exhibited by Turkey and other selected countries as well. The description and analysis of the Turkish support for Arab issues will be generally requiring the examination of the following themes:

- Turkey position towards Arab issues: Background
- Arab dimension within the UNGA
- Turkey and Voting Cohesion on the Arab Issues
- Turkey and Voting Sub-Groups on the Arab Issues
- Turkey Regional Leadership Role
- Conclusion

Results: Europeanism and Atlanticism are not any longer the only circles of Turkey's foreign affairs. Third and fourth circles, e.g., Arab and Islamic worlds, are strongly emphasized by contemporary Turkey since the late 1990s in general and the early 2000s in particular.

Conclusion: The results of this study confirm, by and large, the underlying hypothesis that indicates Turkey's full support of the Arab issues in the Third Millennium. Internal and external ecological elements, such as geopolitical and economic elements affect the process of enlarging Turkey choices into four circles

instead of two choices, Europeanism, Atlanticism, Arabism, and Islamism. Turkey's foreign policy in the new Millennium is no longer characterized as a closed political system, but instead, it is more dynamic and responsive to the changes in the surrounding environment "open political system". However, further research in this regard is requiring in order to examine thoroughly Turkey position towards Arab cases.

Keywords: Environmental Factors, Neighboring Countries, Arab Issues, Index of Agreement, Voting Sub-Groups, and Voting Distinctiveness.

Öz: Türkiye'nin politikası, Türkiye'nin İslami kökenleriyle daha fazla ilgilenmeye başladı. Üstelik küresel değişimler bir kez daha Türkiye'nin dikkatini Arap ve İslam dünyasına çekmiştir. Türkiye ile Arap Dünyası arasındaki ilişki hatırlanabileceği kadar eskidir. Coğrafi yakınlık ve kültürel bağlar, bir yandan Türkiye ile Arap Dünyası arasındaki ilişkiyi güçlendiren önemli etkenler arasındadır. Türkiye ile Arap Dünyası arasındaki ilişki, laikliğin modern Türkiye tarafından bir doktrin olarak benimsenmesiyle daha karmaşık hale geliyor. Dahası, 1950'ler ve 1960'larda Araplar, farklı siyasi ve ideolojik yönelimleri olan birçok bağımsız devlete bölündü. Bununla birlikte, bu makalenin odak noktası, Türkiye ile Arap Dünyası arasındaki tarihi-kültürel bağları tanımlamak ve analiz etmek değildir. Bunun yerine, yirmi birinci yüzyılda Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulu "UNGA" da Arap meselelerine Türk desteğine odaklanılacak, bir konu daha metodolojik dikkat gerektiriyor.

Türk yeni dış politika paradigmasının ortaya çıkışı, konumunu tarafsızlık ve ilgisizlikten liderliğe ve Arap yanlısı nedenlere kayan Arap sorunlarına doğru değiştirmesine neden oldu. Bu çalışmanın verileri, Türkiye'nin üçüncü milenyum boyunca Filistin meselesi ve Arap-İsrail çatışmasıyla ilgili Arap meselelerini büyük ölçüde desteklediğini doğruladı. Ancak konu insan hakları ve Arap-Arap çatışmaları gibi tartışmalı nitelikteki Arap meselelerine gelince, Türkiye'nin desteği daha az netleşiyor. Bu nedenle, Türkiye'yi çevreleyen çevresel değişiklikler, geleneksel Türk dış politikası paradigması bağlamında eksik olan bir bağlantı olan üçüncü milenyumda Arap sorunlarına verilen desteğin artmasıyla sonuçlanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çevresel Faktörler, Komşu Ülkeler, Arap Meseleleri, Anlaşma Endeksi, Oy Verme Alt Grupları ve Oylama Farklılığı.

Turkish Position towards Arab Issues: Background

States are constantly adapting to environmental changes and Turkey is no exception to this rule. Turkey has witnessed internal environmental changes that eventually contributed to a more open foreign policy and understanding of its neighbors. The dramatic global changes since the 1990s have also contributed to the emergence of a new Paradigm of Turkey foreign policy in general[iv] and Turkish position towards the Arab world in particular.[v] A review of the literature reveals that internal and external environmental factors affect the foreign policy of the contemporary political systems, and Turkey's foreign policy is not an exception. (See in this regard, Riggs; 1961, and 1964)

Until the last decade of the twentieth century, Turkey's foreign policy focused on two main areas: Atlanticism and Europeanism. (Del Sarto and Tocci, 2008) Turkey's foreign policy de-emphasized the Arab and Islamic worlds until the late twentieth century. Turkey, by geography and history, is an important partner of the Arab world, but its foreign policy since the end of the World War II (1939-1945) has focused on an alliance with the West for ideological considerations that is beyond the framework of this study. (See Robins, 1991; Fuller and Larrabee, 2007)

Thus, Turkey's foreign policy in the third millennium reflects a new Paradigm as it has expanded its options to include a third circle that includes the Arab countries and the Islamic World. Turkey's foreign policy options today have become more interactive and integrated into its surrounding environment. The literature of international relations indicates that Turkey's foreign policy of isolation does not necessarily mean that there are no interests in the Arab World. Turkey has oil and commercial interests and is eager to promote democracy, transparency and gender equality. Although Turkey's foreign policy is characterized by ideological tendencies during the

period of isolation, this does not necessarily mean that Turkey's policy is not concerned with its Arab neighbors. But Turkey's association with the West during its isolation was an obstacle to its adoption of an independent foreign policy toward the Arab World. (See Danforth, 2009)

Turkey, of course, did not exploit its historical and geographical links with the Arab World until the early 1970s, as a result of its association with the West. Turkey became more eager to balance its Western and Arab interests during the era of Turgut Ozal, who was the prime minister (1983-1989) and later the President of the Republic (1989-1993). Turkey's foreign policy, however, has not yet taken a pro-Arab stance in the 1980s as a result of its strong association with the West, which has made it adopt a neutral stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict. (Laciner, 2003, Sozen, 2010)

If the arrival of Turgut Ozil embodied the existence of internal environmental changes, the emergence of the New World Order and globalization after the collapse of the Eastern Communist bloc in the late 1980s and the early 1990s has, in turn, contributed to changing the external environment of Turkish foreign policy. After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Turkey was preoccupied with its internal affairs, which contributed not to play an effective regional role in keeping with its regional status in the post-cold-war world. Turkey's quest for an effective regional role has worried the European side, which aspires to play an important role in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Turkey generally has the elements of mediation, as a result of its status among the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. (See Allessandri, 2010)

The new paradigm of Turkey’s foreign policy was evident and crystallized at the beginning of the new millennium. Turkey explicitly objected to the United States of America “USA” use of its territory during the invasion of Iraq in the year 2003. Turkey has also played the role of mediator between the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict since 2006. Turkey's means of mediation thus enjoyed advantages not even enjoyed by the USA and the European Union “EU”. (Sozen, 2006; and Danforth, 2009)

The change in the internal and external environmental conditions of Turkey's foreign policy has paved the way for Turkey to strengthen and develop its relations with its neighbors; thus, filling the gap in this regard. Turkey's lack of interest in strengthening its relations with its Arab neighbors in the framework of the classic Paradigm has made some of them describe the new option aimed at developing and strengthening Arab-Turkish relations as starting from scratch knowing as "Zero Problem with Neighbors Policy." (Murinson, 2006; and Tol, 2013) Turkey, however, managed to fill the gap with a new Paradigm and became one of the most prominent regional powers in the region.

As with the classic paradigm of Turkish foreign policy toward the Arab and Muslim Worlds, the new Paradigm has both supporters and opponents. The supporters of the new paradigm stress the success of Turkey's policy of openness to its neighbors and Islamic surroundings. (Constantinides, 1996) Furthermore, the opponents point to the need to uphold the principles of the modern Turkish state. (Rubin, 2004) Irrespective of the arguments made by supporters and opponents of the Turkish policy of opening up to the Arab World, it can be emphasized that the environmental conditions that surrounding Turkey today are naturally different from sixty years ago. Foreign policy in our modern world - and Turkey is no exception to this rule - is constantly adapted to its internal and external environment, so that it can achieve its minimum national interests. (Cem, 2003)

The concept of national interest has expanded within the framework of the new paradigm of Turkey foreign policy, extending to geopolitical, economic and diplomatic dimensions as well as the promotion of cultural ties. (Akram, 2009 and Robins, 2007) Turkey's role in the Arab world has become unprecedented, and its contacts with both the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) have increased. Turkey’s role is extended to mediation among the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, contribution to peacekeeping forces in

Lebanon, and strengthening of strategic cooperation with its neighbors, e.g., Iraq and Iran. The new aspects of Turkey's role in the Arab and Islamic World are naturally due to both internal and external environmental changes.

Ecological changes surrounding Turkey are not confined to the geopolitical dimension, but they have extended to include both the internal and external economic environment. The growth of the economy and the increasing challenges of globalization have prompted Turkey to seek new markets for its growing exports. Turkey was keen to establish a free trade zone within the framework of the Barcelona Process.

Recent data indicates that "exports were $11.278 million with an 18.1% increase, and imports were $15.586 million with a 15.9% increase compared with January 2016." Furthermore, more recent data indicate that trade between Turkey and Arab states has increased 250 percent in 2019 ($250 billion) compared with 2009 ($20 billion). [vi] The level of increase in trade between Turkey and Arab states is still limited compared with non-Arab trade partners, e.g., Russia, the EU, and China. The Data of Figure one indicates the following points:

1. The Turkish GDP has increased more than five times in the year 2016 ($857.7 Billion) compared with the year 1990 ($150.7 Billion). However, the GDP has dropped noticeably from ($950.579 Billion) in 2013 into ($771.35 Billion) in 2018.[vii] The Turkish economic growth during the years 1990-2016 means more exports to its major trade partners including four Arab states plus Israel. Nevertheless, while Turkey's trade with Iraq, the UAE, and Israel has increased significantly,[viii] trade with Saudi Arabia and Egypt has slightly declined in 2017 compared with 1990. Thus, the data in Figure one indicates that the levels of intern-trade between the two sides have increased significantly.


2. While Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq are among the most prominent Arab countries exporting to Turkey during 2009, Iraq, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt are considered to be among the most Arab countries imported from Turkey. While Turkey exports from the Arab countries are concentrated mainly on oil and its derivatives, Turkey exports to the Arab countries include food, industrial and textile products.

3. While Iraq is among the top five countries that import from Turkey during the years 2014-2018, none of the Arab states are among the main five exporters to Turkey in the same period. Turkey exports to Iraq during 2014-2018 reached ($8.351 million), or around 5% of the total Turkish exports.[ix]

4. Turkey pragmatic (or real politics) foreign policy is reflected in the level of export to Israel, which is considered among the thirteen trade partners of Turkey. The Turkish exports to Israel have increased around five folds in the year 2016 ($223,155 million) compared with 1990 ($46,494 million). As we will notice that trading partnership does not mean necessarily the existence of Turkey pro-Israeli stand in the new Millennium.

5. The trade partnership between the Arab states and Turkey enhances their political relationship since the beginning of the new millennium. Turkey's economic, trade and political interests have increased significantly in the age of globalization, prompting Turkey to adopt a new paradigm for its foreign policy in the Middle East region in general and the Arab World in particular.

Figure 1: Turkey Main Trading Partners in the Middle East region: Exports



	Egypt	Israel	Saudi Arabia	the UAE	Iraq
1990	160.096	46.494	338.381	75.406	214.478
2016	243.809	186.426	262.136	285.673	462.678
2017	156.507	223.155	225.417	655.177	683,789

Data Source: *The Turkish Statistical Institute*, Ministry of Customs and Trade, Republic of Turkey, Press Release, No: 24822 (February 28, 2017). http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=24822

Arab dimension within the UNGA

The agenda of the UNGA includes Arab issues each year due to the weight of the Arab World in global politics. The LAS was established (on March 22, 1945) before the foundation of the UN itself (on June 26, 1945). Thus, several Arab independent countries were among the establishing fathers of the UN.[x] The data of the UN indicates that the Arab issues reflect a considerable portion of different UN institutions, especially the GA and the SC. The Arab issues in the UNGA might be described and analyzed on quantitative and qualitative levels.

Quantitatively, while the average number of issues before the UNGA reached in the year 1990 two hundred and eighty-five issues, they declined into two hundred and sixty-eight issues in 2019. However, the average number of issues before the UNGA reached in the period (1990-2017) around two hundred- ninety cases. As far as the Arab issues before the UNGA are concerned, they reflect different numbers in different years. Thus while the average number of Arab issues before the UNGA reached in the year 1990 thirty issues, then they declined into twenty cases in 2017, and finally they have risen into thirty-three issues in 2019.

While the ratio of Arab countries (N=21) to the total number of the UN members (N=194) reached 10.82 percent, the average of the Arab issues to the total cases before the UNGA in 1990 and 2019 reached also 9.47 and 7.1 percents, respectively. Thus, it is noticeable that the average number of Arab issues before the UNGA matches the weight of the Arab group number in the world organization. However, the marginal decline of Arab issues in the UN agenda is due mainly to a variety of cases before the UNGA.

Qualitatively, the agenda of the UNGA has developed in terms of scope; therefore, it is covering new aspects of global politics. The main concern of the UN in the post World War II (1939-1945) was on de-colonialization and the right of people to self-determination. Since the 1970s, the agenda of the UNGA has extended noticeably and it includes new issues, such as human rights, economic development, gender, and environment. The Arab issues before the UNGA witnessed also a qualitative development. When the Arabs achieved their political independence since the 1950s, Arab issues have developed in scope and become more concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine case.

A review of the UN literature reveals that the Arab states exhibited a coherent voting behavior as far as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine cases are concerned. While the Palestine issues reflect common interests' cases, other issues may represent partial or divergent interests, e.g., human rights in a particular country. Consequently, Arab states do not necessarily show a consistent position towards partial and divergent issues, such as human rights and conflict of interest among big powers.

Turkey and Voting Cohesion on the Arab Issues

While the focus in the last section was on the Arab dimension within the UNGA, the attention in this section will shift into Turkey's voting behavior on Arab issues from a comparative point of view.[xi] The data of Figure Two indicates the level of agreement[xii] of Turkey as well as the five permanent members of the SC, and the neighboring countries.

The examination of Figure Two leads us to the following points:

1. By comparing the data of Figure Two with the literature that examined also the Turkish support of Arab issues in the years 2002-2017, (See Dal and Kursun, 2017: 6) it might conclude that Turkey stands in this regard is consistently pro-Arab issues in the first two decades of new Millennium. The voting records of Turkey during the years 2000, and 2019 are highly pro Arab issues, and it is expected to be continued in the future due to mutual common interests of both parties. Turkey's index of agreement exceeds 95 percent, which means a consistent support of Arab causes in general, and Palestine issues in particular.

2. The data of Figure Two demonstrates that many other neighboring states exhibited the highest level of voting solidarity towards the Arab issues, e.g., Cyprus, Malta, Russia, and China. The voting patterns of Turkey, Russia, China, Malta, Cyprus, and Ethiopia were mostly consistent with the twenty-one Arab countries. Turkey, Russia, China, Cyprus, Malta, and Arab states voted with "yes" on all the Palestine issues that were examined by this study. While socio-cultural and geopolitical ties were behind the Turkish-Iranian support for the Arab issues, common interest resulted in the Chinese-Russian solidarity with the Arab World and other developing states.

3. Despite the strategic relations between many Arab states and the USA, it exhibited the lowest level of support for Arab issues (15.3 percent). American stands are almost consistent with Israeli voting behavior since 1948. Internal elements, e.g., the influence of the American Jewish community; and external factors, e.g., strategic partnership, are behind the American unlimited support to Israel.

4. Although Turkey involved in diplomatic and economic relations with Israel, its support to the Arab causes is obsolete. The data of Table Two shows that Turkey's voting behavior on the Arab issues in the UNGA is an anti-Israeli position. While Israel rejected most Palestine issues,[xiii] Turkey supported all the Arab issues that examined by this study.

5. Despite Turkey membership in the NATO, its position from the Arab issues is highly contradicting with the USA in particular and different from the EU members in general. The data of Figure Two indicates that the support of the USA to Israel is almost obsolete on the one hand, and France and the UK are more pro-Arab issues on the other hand. However, the American negative position from the Arab issues is consistent since the admission of Israel in the UN in 1948. The USA, Israel, and a few mini-states vote distinctively against the rest of the UN members as far as the Palestine issues are concerned.[xiv] In 2019. Few countries such as Australia, Canada, Guatemala, Honduras, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, and the Solomon Islands usually support Israeli-American positions in the UNGA. (See Kashiem, 1988; Dal and Kursun, 2017: 5)


6. The status of Russia, as a traditional supporter of the Arab issues in the UNGA, is consistent and cohesive at the same time. The Russian voting patterns are most consistent with the majority of Arab countries. However, Russia and Arab states may behave differently on divergent

matters, such as human rights and nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Sometimes rejection, abstention or non-votes are optimal choices for Russia and other countries, which have strong ties with the Arab World and Israel as well.

7. Some neighboring countries for the Arab World, such as Turkey and Ethiopia, are more supportive of the Arab causes than Iran, which its index of agreement reached 88.88 percent (See the data of Figure Two). Ethiopia abstained on sex Arab issues regarding the rights of human rights in Syria, Golan, Palestine, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East region (See for example A/RES/74/169). Ethiopia, as a southern neighbor to the Arab World, adopted a neutral position due to geostrategic elements and balance of interest in the region.

8. Israel and the USA are consistently voting distinctively against the majority of the UNGA as far as the Arab issues are concerned. The USA opposed most of the Palestine issues included in the analysis; and thus, it votes consistently with the Israeli's position. While the Arab issues are supported by Turkey and the vast majority of the UNGA, the USA with a limited number of countries opposed them. The Arab states used to vote distinctively during the 1960s, due to substantial influence that the USA enjoyed at that time. But, when many developing countries achieved political independence since the late 1950s, the balance of voting has shifted in favor of Arab states. Consequently, the USA and its limited alliance consistently vote distinctively whenever the Arab matters are involved. A correlation test, shows that the USA is only strongly associated (.846) with the Israeli stance from Arab issues at a significant level (.000)

Figure 2: The Index of Agreement regarding the Arab Issues in the New Millennium



Data Source: The UN General Assembly Voting Data.
https://www.un.org/en/ga/documents/voting.asp

Turkey and Voting Sub-Groups on the Arab Issues

Review of the literature generally refers to the support of Turkey and the developing countries for Arab causes. In this context, it is noted that the developing world has been colonized; and therefore, their positions are hostile to the occupation and supportive of the rights of peoples to self-determination. The Palestinian cause and other issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, to a large extent, have the support of the developing world. The contemporary foreign policy aim is to establish sustainable Turkish-Arab solidarity and strategic alliance that reflects socio-cultural and geostrategic strong ties between the two sides. However, Bekdil considers the Turkish objective of creating sustainable Turkish-Arab solidarity is a mission impossible. (Bekdil, 2017) Nevertheless, a review of the literature reveals that politics is not always a zero-sum game, but it is a long bargaining process that interacts and responds to internal and external environmental changes. (Burchill, 2001:293-295)

Since there are limited studies that have examined Turkey's voting pattern towards the Arab issues in the twentieth-first century; thus, the focus of this study will be on the early and late years of the new millennium. Thus, comparing the data of various years will enable us to examine the voting patterns of Turkey in the new Millennium from comparative views. The data of Table One refers to the loading of Turkey and fourteen other counties during the years 2000 and 2019. By using the Q-technique of factor analysis, Turkey was weakly loaded with the European Union "EU" factor (-0.035) on the one hand, and positively highly loaded with the Chinese-Russian factor (0.851) on the other hand.[xv] Turkey's objective to join the EU does not mean necessarily following the European stand from Arab issues.(See Yuvaci and Kaplan, 2012) Furthermore, the Turkish-American membership in the context of NATO did not make Turkey share the negative position of the USA (-0.694) towards Arab issues. While the data of Table One shows that the USA's score is negative on factor two (-0.694), and Turkey's loading is positive (0.851); therefore, Turkey opposes consistently the American pro-Israeli stand in the UNGA. (See Kashiem, 2018)

Table 1: Voting Sub-Groups on the Arab Issues in the years 2000 and 2019

	European Factor	**Chinese- Russian Factor**	**Cyprus-Maltese Factor**
Germany	**.970**	-.076	.065
France	**.962**	-.069	.178
Italy	**.962**	-.069	.178
Greece	**.929**	-.075	.064
Spain	**.928**	-.070	.187
The UK	**.860**	-.073	.486
China	-.052	**.956**	.008
Russia	.116	**.901**	-.034
Israel	.119	**-.887**	.029
Turkey	-.035	**.851**	.031
The USA	.186	**-.694**	.056
Iran	-.151	**.647**	-.043
Ethiopia	.336	**.540**	.437
Cyprus	.228	-.047	**.960**
Malta	.228	-.047	**.960**
% of Variance	42.70%	28.95%	11.10%

Data Source: Same as Figure Two.

The data of Table One refers to the existence of UN sub-groups when the Arab issues were involved during the years 2000 and 2019. Since the majority of the EU members vote identically on Arab issues; therefore, the European factor was dominant and explained by itself 42.70 percent of the total variance. The enlargement of the EU into 27 countries increases its weight as a cohesive voting group. However, some EU members adopt more pro-Arab stands than others; and thus, Cyprus (0.960) and Malta (0.960) were for example less loaded with the EU factor compared to other European member states. Generally, the EU lacks a united foreign policy; therefore, the positions of England (0.860), Spain (0.928), Greece (0.929), Malta (0.960), and Cyprus (0.960) towards the Arab issues are not necessarily identical.

Furthermore, despite Turkey's objective to join the EU membership, it's loading with the European factor is very low (-0.35), which means that its policy is independent of the EU regional and global orientations and pro-Arab issues at the same time. The data of Table One shows that Turkey (0.851), China (0.956), and Russia are highly loaded with factor two; thus, it may be called the Chinese-Russia-Turkish factor, which explains by itself more than one quarter (30 percent) of the total variance. The USA's negative loading with factor two (-0.694) is a result of its consistent pro-Israeli stand and anti-Palestine cause. However, Turkey did not vote on a controversial

decision regarding human rights in Sudan in the year 2000. While Turkey did not vote on the issue of human rights in Sudan, the majority of Arab states rejected it. However, Turkey's support of Arab issues regarding conflict with Israel and Palestine case is highly pro-Arabs.

As a result of the American distinctively voting pattern regarding the Arab issues, the southern European countries were very weakly loaded with the Chinese-Russian factor, which means there is a European independent position towards the Arab issues. The positive loading with factors two and three, means also that Turkey (0.851), Russia (0.901), Malta (0.960), and Cyprus (0.960) are more pro Arab issues on the one hand, and anti-Israeli-American stands from the Arab matters on the other hand. The conflict between the distinctive American pro-Israeli alliance and the pro-Arab issues group has increased noticeably in the new Millennium. Thus, the conflict dimension within the UNGA is limited, but certainly not eliminated.

Turkey Regional Leadership Role

The previous data analyses indicate that Arab issues are supporting by developing and developed countries alike. Certainly, Turkey is pro-Arab causes particularly since the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Several reasons are explaining the Turkish support of the Arab issues, such as pan-Islamism, Turkey regional leadership role, economic ties, and the nature of issues before the UNGA. Historically, Turkey led the Islamic World during the Ottoman period. Despite secularism adopted by modern Turkey, Islam is affected by politics. In this regard, Turkey is among the leading countries in the Organization of Islamic States "OIS". According to Keohane's theory, there are three crucial elements in determining to what extent a small or medium-size state will emerge as a leader in regional and global organizations as well, namely, political position, prestige, and the quality of its diplomacy. However, the effectiveness of these three elements is also conditioned by the type of issue being discussed by regional and global organizations members' attitudes at that moment. (Keohane, 1966, 1967, and 1971)

By assessing these three elements, Turkey stands as a prominent Islamic leader within the framework of regional and global organizations. As regards Turkey, its political position within the OIS and the UNGA gave it an influential position in regional and global arrangements. Of course, there are other regional Islamic powers compete with Turkey's leading position, especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In short, Turkey's regional and global role does not necessarily contradict with others, because contemporary diplomatic relations narrow down geopolitical differences among rivals. Turkey's democratic and economic development models are other elements that enhance its leadership on regional and global levels. Recent data indicate that Turkey is among the leading economies that achieved a higher level in terms of GDP development.[xvi]

Furthermore, Turkey's influence in a particular matter on the regional and global levels depends also on its prestige. Turkey's prestige is based on its democratic political system, the popularity of its leadership, (See Kesgin, 2020) and its foreign policy attitudes. Modern Turkey, as a democratic republic, developed economy and open diplomacy gained a high level of prestige that enable it to be among leading regional powers in the new Millennium.

Finally, Turkey's diplomatic delegations in regional and global organizations are noticeably active. Turkey enhances its missions in the UN and the OIS, as well as Turkish embassies around the world, with well-skilled diplomats, and political experts to help advance Turkey and other Muslim countries as well.[xvii] Turkey's diplomatic success is due to its historical heritage and democratic and economic model for other developing countries. Turkey, as soft power, rationalizes its human and natural resources to play a leadership role on sub-regional, regional and global levels.

Nevertheless, the new Turkey role in regional and global politics does not necessarily give up Europeanism and Atlanticism for the sake of Arabism. The New Turkish paradigm of foreign

policy reflects a balance of interests that take into consideration internal and external factors as well. In this regard, Kalin (2012) said that: “As Turkey engages new regions and emerging actors as well as countries relations with its old allies, it develops new capacities for the various elements of soft power and strategic communication in regional and global contexts.” (Kalin, 2012)

However, Turkish regional and global influence in the new millennium is also dependent on the specific nature of the issue considered. It has much influence on issues involving Islamic and Arabic matters. In short, Turkey's influence derived from its political leadership positions as a member of many regional and global organizations, its prestige, and its diplomatic skills around the world.

Conclusion: Results

Europeanism and Atlanticism are not any longer the only circles of Turkey's foreign affairs. Third and fourth circles, e.g., Arab and Islamic worlds, are strongly emphasized by contemporary Turkey since the late 1990s in general and the early 2000s in particular. This study examined quantitatively the level of Turkish support regarding Arab issues and reached the following results:

1. Arab and Muslim worlds reflect new dimensions of contemporary Turkey. Thus, Turkey's new paradigm of foreign policy added new circles that reflect the historical background and socio-economic strong ties.

2. Turkey's support of the Arab issues is depending on the nature of decisions before the UNGA. Issues of divergent agreement, e. g., human rights in a particular Arab state, reflect different voting patterns among the Arab states and Turkey as well.

3. Turkey's support of the Arab issues regarding Palestine's case and other Arab Israeli issues is obsolete, and thus its voting pattern in the UNGA is consistent with the majority of Arab states.

4. The Arab World neighboring countries are generally supporting Palestine's issues, due to mutual interests and geographical proximity.

5. The Arab states' neighboring countries do not adopt necessarily the same policies towards the Palestine case and other Arab Israeli issues, e.g., Iran, the European Mediterranean countries, and Ethiopia's positions towards Arab matters.

6. Despite Turkey's objective to join the EU membership, its position towards Arab issues is independent of the European stand in this regard.

7. The EU lacks a unified foreign policy towards Arab issues; therefore, Cyprus and Malta are for example more pro-Arab issues compared to the rest of the EU members.

8. Despite Turkey's national interest and membership in NATO, its position from Arab issues is anti-Americanism.

9. The big five global powers adopt different stands from the Palestine case and other Arab Israeli issues. While China is consistently pro-Arab causes, the USA is extremely anti-Arab issues. Furthermore, Russia, France, and the UK are less supportive of Arab causes; therefore, they are either abstained (e. g., Russia) or oppose (e. g., the UK) some Arab issues.

10. The European countries' strategic ties with the USA do not mean necessarily adopting the same stands towards the Arab issues; thus, the EU members' positions are independent of the American stand on the one hand, and they are more pro-Arab cases on the other hand.

11. The American anti-Arab issues and unlimited support of Israel resulted in a higher level of voting distinctiveness (voting against the majority) by the USA since the late 1940s generally, and early 2000s particularly.

12. Turkey's consistent support of Arab issues enables it, among other elements, to play a leadership role on bilateral, sub-regional and regional levels.

The results of this study confirm, by and large, the underlying hypothesis that indicates Turkey's full support of the Arab issues in the Third Millennium. Internal and external ecological elements, such as geopolitical and economic elements affect the process of enlarging Turkey choices into four circles instead of two choices, Europeanism, Atlanticism, Arabism, and Islamism. Turkey's foreign policy in the new Millennium is no longer characterized as a closed political system, but instead, it is more dynamic and responsive to the changes in the surrounding environment "open political system".

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Footnotes

[i] The focus of this study is on the years 2000, and 2019, due to several reasons, such as the continuity of the Turkish political system, and methodological limitations, e. g. the case study method.

[ii] - Non-controversial decisions usually are taken without votes in the UN organs, such as the UNGA resolution (A/RES/74/117) regarding Assistance to the Palestine people.

[iii] - The basic assumption of factor analysis is that inter-relations among a variety of separate variables produce factors which share some elements in common. A factor analysis examines a variety of variables to distinguish the various patterns of relationships among them. A set of variables that are closely related to each other, and which does not have a relationship with other variables in other groups, is called a factor. (Hofferbert, 1969: 868)

[iv] - According to Sozen (2010), the Turkey new paradigm of foreign policy focuses on five goals: "balance between security and freedom; zero problems with neighbors; multidimensional and multi-track policies; a new diplomatic discourse based on firm flexibility; and rhythmic diplomacy."

[v] - The term "paradigm" is developed by Thomas Kuhn in his famous book that entitled the structure of scientific revolution. In this regard, the concept of paradigm means that the existence of a new model of foreign policy that reflects dramatic changes compared with the past. For more details, see (Kuhn, 1964)

[vi] - See *The Turkish Statistical Institute,* Ministry of Customs and Trade, Republic of Turkey, Press Release, No: 24822 (February 28, 2017), retrieved at http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=24822

[vii] - See the World Bank data, retrieved at, https://data.worldbank.org/country/turkey

[viii] - Although the special ties with Israel worried Arab countries in the late 1990s, Turkey has succeeded in balancing its relationship between the two parties. Turkey image among the Arabs has been shifted from negative into positive attitudes in the new millennium; thus, Turkey is playing a leadership role in the Arab and Islamic worlds. (See Bengio and Ozcan, 2001; and Salem, 2011)

[ix] - See World Bank data at https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/TUR/Year/LTST/Summary

[x] - Seven Arab states have signed the Pact of the LAS on March 22, 1945, Syrian Republic, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Yemen.

[xi] - There are numerous empirical studies on Turkish foreign policy used empirical methods and emphasized the impact of environmental factors in this regard. (See Cakir, 2017; Kuski, 2019; and Kasgin, 2020)

[xii]- According to Lijphart (1963), the level of voting cohesion is calculated as follows: $IA = \frac{f + 1/2\, g}{t} \times 100$,

where t equals the total number of votes under consideration, f equals the unanimous votes exhibited by states, and g equals the number of votes on which states were in partial agreement, e.g., in case of abstention, and non-voting behavior. To exhibit a high level of support, the IA must be 80% or above.

[xiii] Israel abstained on one procedural resolution regarding the Palestine case (A/Res/55/126), and agreed on four issues regarding human rights in Sudan, Iraq, and Syria (A/Res/55/116, 115; and A/Res/74/169 and 163).

[xiv] - The higher the correlation coefficient is, the greater the distinctiveness or voting isolation on the Arab issues are exhibiting. For example, the value of the correlation coefficient between the USA on the one hand, and the UK (.191), France (.171), and Russia (.149) on the other hand, is weak, which means that their positions are not distinctive when the Arab issues are involved.

[xv] - There are three elements determine the correlation of Turkey and other neighbouring countries into a factor: voting cohesion, distinctiveness, and the recognition of a generalized cleavage in the UN.

[xvi] - The level of Turkish economy average annual growth (6.7%) during the years 2010-2015 (and 7.4% average annual growth in 2017) is considerably high in global standards.

[xvii] - The Diplomatic Academy in Turkey is established officially in 1967 to train skilled diplomats that represent the republic abroad. See this link, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/about-the-academy.en.mfa (Accessed on April 29, 2018)