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ARAŞTIRMA MAKALESİ – RESEARCH ARTICLE

GREEK NATIONALISM VERSUS EUROPEANIZATION: FROM ETHNIC TO CIVIC NATIONALISM?

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ABSTRACT

Since its emergence in the 19th century, ethnic nationalism has had a significant impact on both state policies and the social sphere in Greece. The Greek Church and education system played a significant role in the consolidation of ethnic nationalist understanding in society and the state apparatus. The constitution also recognizes orthodoxy as an integral part of Greek identity, which makes non-Orthodox Greek citizens a secondary citizen. Also, Article 19 of the Greek citizenship law, which was in force until 1998, divided Greek citizens into two categories: "Greeks" and "non-Greeks". Since the 1990s, this ethnic nationalist approach has been criticized by Greece's Western European partners and European institutions. In the same period, Greece underwent a rapid Europeanization process and there were positive developments in minority rights such as the abolishment of Article 19. This study aims to analyze the impact of Europeanization in Greece on ethnic nationalism, which is decisive at the state and social levels. In doing so, it is to analyze the relationship between Greek nationalism and Europeanization within the framework of Kohn's classification of ethnic-social (civic) nationalism. This research aims to answer the question of whether there is a shift from ethnic nationalism to a civic (inclusive) understanding of nationalism in Greece due to the Europeanization efforts since the second half of the 1990s.

Keywords: Ethnic Nationalism, Civic Nationalism, Europeanization, Minority Rights, Article 19

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YUNAN MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİ AVRUPALILAŞMAYA KARŞI: ETNİK MİLLİYETÇİLİKTEN SİVİL MİLLİYETÇİLİĞE BİR DÖNÜŞÜM MÜ?

ÖZ

Yunanistan'da etnik milliyetçilik, 19. yüzyıldan bu yana hem devletin yürüttüğü politikalarda, hem de toplumsal alanda önemli bir etkiye sahip olmuştur. Yunanistan Kilisesi ve eğitim sistemi etnik milliyetçi anlayışın toplumda ve devlette yerleşmesinde büyük rol oynamıştır. Ortodoksluk, Yunan kimliğinin ayrılmaz bir parçası olarak anayasa tarafından tanınmış ve bu tanımlama Ortodoks olmayan Yunan vatandaşlarını ikincil vatandaş haline getirmiştir. Yunanistan vatandaşlık yasasının 1998'e kadar yürürlükte kalan 19. Maddesi Yunan vatandaşlarını "Yunan ırkından olan" ve "Yunan ırkından olmayan" olmak üzere ikiye ayırmaktaydı. 1990'lardan itibaren bu etnik milliyetçi anlayış Yunanistan'ın Batı Avrupalı ortakları ve Avrupa kurumları tarafından eleştirilmeye başlanmıştır. Aynı dönemde hızlı bir Avrupalılaşma sürecine giren Yunanistan'da azınlık haklarında olumlu gelişmeler yaşanmış ve 19. Madde kaldırılmıştır. Bu çalışmasının amacı, Kohn'un etnik-toplumsal (sivil) milliyetçilik sınıflandırması çerçevesinde Yunan milliyetçiliğinin Avrupalılaşma ile ilişkisini analiz etmektir. Bu çalışma, 1990'ların ikinci yarısından itibaren, Avrupalılaşma çabaları sayesinde, Yunanistan'da etnik milliyetçilikten sivil milliyetçilik anlayışına geçiş olup olmadığı sorusunu cevaplamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Etnik Milliyetçilik, Sivil Milliyetçilik, Avrupalılaşma, Azınlık Hakları, 19. Madde

Introduction

There are several studies delving into the Europeanization of Greece. Ioakimidis, Kazamias and Featherstone argue that the Europeanization in Greece happened as a process of modernization as it is also suggested in this study.[1] Economides, in his work "The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy", regarded the period since 1996 as the "period of post-rehabilitation"

[1] Kevin Featherstone, "Europeanization' and the Centre Periphery: The Case of Greece in the 1990s", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1998, pp. 23-39; Kevin Featherstone, "Introduction: Modernisation and the Structural Constraints of Greek Politics", *West European Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2005, pp. 223-241; Alexander Kazamias, "The quest for modernization in Greek foreign policy and its limitations", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1997, pp. 71-94; Panagiotis C. Ioakimidis, "The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment", (eds.) Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias, *Europeanization and the Southern Periphery*, Frank Cass, London 2001. See also, Gizem Çakmak, *Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy: Progress, Challenges and Strategies*, Yeditepe University Institute of Social Sciences, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Cemil Oktay, Istanbul 2012.

in which Greek foreign policy was normalizing.[2] Susannah Verney focuses on the shift in Greek Foreign Policy since 1996 by calling the period as a "new era".[3] Wong, in his study, categorizes the different approaches to Europeanization, and the fourth school of thought in Wong's classification is the Modernization School. Wong states that this type of Europeanization means political, economic, and social modernization set in motion by prospective membership in the European Union. Wong, while making his classification, puts Greece in this category with Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. He argues that this sense of Europeanization is often applied to economically less developed states on the geographical 'periphery' of Western Europe as they are being brought into the 'core' through EU membership. This applies to the adaptation of a Western European state model and involves the firm anchoring of democratic institutions and market economies. Europeanization in this context is akin to 'Westernization', which means adapting Western values to their system. In this type of Europeanization, there is a perception of the 'other' in the first stage, with European rules, norms, and values belong to Western Europe. The Enlargement processes may fall into this category as the candidates, and new members belong to the 'periphery' and Europeanization somehow equals modernization and Westernization.

Europeanization also requires a civic understanding of citizenship in where there is an equality between the citizens regardless of their religious and ethnic differences. The Greek case and the impact of Europeanization on Greek nationalism are worth evaluating because Greece has always been a country where the ethnic nationalism prevails. Greek national consciousness was constituted throughout the nineteenth century with reference to the irredentist 'Megali Idea' which aimed to establish a Greek state which would encompass all Greek-inhabited areas. The defeat of Greek Armies by Turks which would later follow the emergence of The Republic of Turkey in 1923, was an important source of disappointment for the Greek nationalists that dreamed of uniting all Greeks. However, the ethnic nationalism which is embedded in national education and the Greek Orthodox Church played a significant role in creating a Greek identity based on the superiority of the Greek race. Since then, Ethnikophrosyni (the national way of thinking or loyalty to the nation) has been institutionalized. This study aims to analyze whether the Europeanization process, which started in 1996, has transformed

[2] Spyros Economides, "The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy", *West European Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2005, pp. 471-491.
[3] Susannah Verney, "Greece: A New Era", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2005, pp. 193-200.

the Greek nationalism into a civic type of nationalism. By doing so, the main focus will be given to the minority issues in Greece, especially on the removal of the Article 19th of Greek citizenship code in 1998.[4]

1. Kohn's Dichotomy: Ethnic and Civic Nationalism

Smith regards nationalism to be 'a distinct ideology of solidarity based on preindustrial roots'.[5] According to Gellner, nationalism is a phenomenon that is a 'distinctly industrial principle of social evolution and social organization'.[6] According to Hass, nationalism is 'the union of territorial and political loyalty irrespective of competing foci of affiliation, such as kinship, profession, religion, economic interest, race, or even language'. Nationalism is "modern" as 'it emphasizes the individual's quest for identity with strangers in an impersonal world, a world no longer animated by corporate identities'.[7] Kerestecioğlu describes nationalism as a movement which is theoretically weak but very influential as a political practice. Different from other ideologies, nationalism has not got its own famous theorists or ideologists. Every nationalism has its own historians, journalists, and intellectual groups.[8] Haas states that nationalism as an academic field has very penetrable boundaries. It overlaps densely with the study of modernization, of modern political ideologies, of economic and social history, and of political anthropology as to suggest redundancy.[9] According to Kerestecioğlu, nationalism is a hollow ideology and it can be filled by whatever the circumstances bring. As it can be filled by everything, the uncertain and ambiguous nature of nationalism is the reason why this ideology has left its mark on the last 200 years. Nationalism has always been a 'coalitions of expressions' and easily added to ideologies like fascism, socialism, liberalism, and conservatism.[10] Hence, it differs according to its

[4] Article 19 of the Greek citizenship Code (Law 3370/1955), which was abolished in 1998, provided the Greek state the denaturalization of its non-ethnic Greek citizens who left the country with no intention of returning.
[5] Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, New York University Press, New York 1979.
[6] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Cornell University Press, New York 1983.
[7] Ernst B. Haas, "What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?", *International Organization*, Vol. 40, No 3, 1986, p. 708.
[8] İnci Özkan Kerestecioğlu, "Milliyetçilik: Uyuyan Güzeli Uyandıran Prens'ten Frankeştayn'ın Canavarına", (ed.) Birsen Örs, *19. Yüzyıldan 20. Yüzyıla Modern Siyasal İdeolojiler*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul 2007, pp. 309-310.
[9] Haas, *op.cit.*, p. 708.
[10] Kerestecioğlu, *op.cit.*, pp. 309-310.

alliances with other ideologies and, it can be stated that there is no single nationalism, there are types of nationalism.

Kohn, in his book, *The Idea of Nationalism*, exposes the evolution of Nationalism by stressing the role of the French Revolution and argue that the Revolution gave a new movement, an expanded dynamic force. According to Kohn, every single historical movement has its roots deep in the past. All political, economic, and intellectual development needs an extended period to be formed, to be grown and to be matured.[11] According to Özkırımlı, many writers have avoided the difficult choice between culture and politics or between objective and subjective factors in defining nationalism and nations respectively, by associating particular types of nationalism with one or another aspect instead of rejecting the choice in the first place or trying to go beyond it. This gave birth to perhaps the most far-reaching distinction in the field, that between civic (variously labeled as political, individualistic, voluntary) and ethnic (variously labeled as cultural, collectivist, organic) nationalism.[12] Hans Kohn's definition of a more "liberal, civic Western" and "illiberal, ethnic Eastern" nationalism has been highly influential in providing a framework for our understanding of different types of nationalism.[13]

During the 20th century, academic studies on nationalism presented that (a) many different features can provide the foundation for national unity and identity, and (b) nations differ in the mix of the traits that form the basis of their unity and identity.[14] As a product of those efforts, simple classification has arisen, and this classification groups nation as "civic nations" based on territoriality and versus "ethnic or cultural". In Western Europe and the US, the civic features and understanding of nationalism prevail, whereas, in Eastern and Central Europe, the elements of ethnic nationalism are dominant. In his famous book, *The Idea of Nationalism*, published in 1944, Kohn stated that in the West, nationalism was primarily political.[15] According to Kohn, civic nations which rely upon rationality rather than myths and stories of a

[11] Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background*, Macmillan, New York 1944, p. 329.
[12] Umut Özkırımlı, *Contemporary Debates on Nationalism, A Critical Engagement*, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2005, p. 24.
[13] Taras Kuzio, "The Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn's Framework for Understanding Nationalism", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 25, No 1, 2002, p. 20.
[14] Stephen Schulman, "Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of Nationalism", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2002, p. 555.
[15] Kohn, *op.cit.*, p. 329.

great fatherland have gone through a process of modernization. According to him, civic nations are opposed to the ethnocultural nations and the way that they construct their identity through myths. He argues that those ethnocultural nations are much more aggressive, irrational as communities, and they lack the social contract that seals the status of modern nations.[16] Kohn designated England, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States as western states.

In civic nationalism, national affiliation is primarily determined by citizenship rather than kinship or ethnic origin. People in these societies have a feeling of belonging to the same community. The person has the opportunity of deciding which nation she/he prefers to belong to and exercises legal equity with the other segments of the nation. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism is presented as nationalism that perceives the nation as a community bounded by genealogical descent. In the Greek case, the application of Article 19 was evidence of the dominant ethnic nationalism as it made a clear distinction between ethnic Greeks (homogeneis) and non-ethnic Greeks (allogeneis).[17]

According to Shulman, Western nationalisms are the product of Enlightenment ideals such as liberty and equality, and they fought against the dynasties and equalized citizenship and the membership of a nation.[18] In the Western model, the state temporally comes before the development of the nation. Kohn refers to Central and Eastern Europe and Asia as the more backward (politically and socially) regions and he argues that nationalism emerged in polities that very unsuccessfully harmonized with cultural or ethnic boundaries such as Ottoman Empire Austria-Hungarian Empire and Russia.[19] According to him, in the regions mentioned above, nationalism fought "to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands".[20] Therefore, in the Eastern case, the nation leads and tries to build up the state. These nations in the East united around a shared and collective culture and heritage and constructed an irrational image of the people rather

[16] Vincent Martigny, "The Importance of Culture in Civic Nations: Culture and the Republic in France", *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2008, p. 543.
[17] Dia Anagnostou, "Citizenship Policy Making in Mediterranean EU States: Greece", *EUDO Citizenship Observatory*, May 2011, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/EUDOComp-Greece.pdf, (06.10.2019).
[18] Schulman, *op.cit.*, p. 555.
[19] Schulman, *ibid.*
[20] Kohn, *op.cit.*, p. 329.

than uniting around the notion of citizenship.[21] Kohn considers France as a western/civic country, whereas Germany is an example of an ethnic society. McCrone agrees on this classification and states that citizenship in France interpreted as a territorial community relying on 'ius soli' - which means regardless of where you ethnically and geographically come from, all residents on French soil could in principle be citizens of the French state. On the contrary, in Germany, citizenship is acquired based on the origin, on 'ius sanguinis' - the law of blood. The French model was state-centered and assimilationist; the German model was Volk-centred and differential.[22] According to Bereketeab, in the German case, the nation preceded the state. In the French case, residence determined citizenship rights; conversely, in the German case, blood, regardless of residency status, determined citizenship rights.[23] Former French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, is an excellent example of the French case. He was born to a family of Hungarian nobles. Germany, on the other hand, is different, having German ancestors (even when this ancestry is dated back several centuries) who are considered German. The French concept of citizenship is open to choice, while in the German case, it is closed.

Kohn's ethnic and civic classification was analyzed and criticized by several scholars. Ignatieff explains the civic nation as a "community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in a patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values".[24] The notion of the liberal state and civic nationalism were frequently associated, while ethnic nationalism is linked to the illiberal types of states. Ignatieff affirms that ethnic nationalism tells people to "only trust those of your own blood".[25] Anthony Smith has contributed to the literature on civic and ethnic forms of nationalism by emphasizing the works of Kohn and Meinecke. Smith, in his book, *National Identity*, defines the standards of the Western model of the nation. According to Smith, components are "historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology".[26] He

[21] Schulman, *op.cit.*, p. 555.
[22] David McCrone, *The Sociology of Nationalism: Tomorrow's Ancestors*, Routledge, London 1998, p. 9.
[23] Redie Bereketeab, "The Ethnic and Civic Foundations of Citizenship and Identity in the Horn of Africa", *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2011, p. 68.
[24] Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 1993, pp. 6-7.
[25] Ignatieff, *ibid.*, p. 9.
[26] Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, University of Nevada Press, Reno 1991, p. 11.

emphasizes the different nature of the ethnic nationalism and argues that the distinguishing feature of ethnic nationalism is its stress on a "community of birth and native culture". In Western conception, an individual had to belong to the same nation but could determine to which he or she belonged. On the other hand, in the non-Western ethnic understanding, there is no place for such freedom. A person remains a member of his/her community of birth, whether he/she migrates or stays in the community, which means a nation was first and foremost a community of common descent.[27] Smith also proposed that a third conception of the nation should be added to the classifications, to analyze current patterns of multiculturalism. Multicultural understandings generally try to mediate civic/ethnic divides by adopting a neutral, disengaged public culture emphasizing universal rights and obligations. At the same time, multicultural approaches understate the superiority of certain shared myths and memories through respecting, if not celebrating, the many vernacular cultures of poly-ethnic states.[28]

Kymlicka criticizes the ethnic-civic distinction (mainly the works of Ignatieff and Pfaff) which argues that ethnic nationalism is the cause of nationalist conflict, because of its ethnic exclusiveness. According to him, nationalist conflict is often caused by attempts by civic nationalists to forcibly incorporate national minorities. As in the case of America, the American government forcefully included Indian tribes, Native Hawaiians, and Puerto Ricans into the American state, and then tried to coercively assimilate each group into the common American culture. Kymlicka also argues that civic nationalism is not necessarily democratic. When the countries in Latin America with multiethnic societies are examined, most of these countries have a non-ethnic, civic understanding of nationalism. However, according to him "there is nothing necessarily democratic about them" and civic nations can be military dictatorships as well as liberal democracies.[29] According to Kymlicka, the only way to develop a shared civic identity, many liberals believe, is to have a common (undifferentiated) citizenship status.[30] Despite the criticisms, these kinds of classifications (ethnic-civic divide) provide us a framework for a better understanding and analysis of different cases of nationalisms. However, as also Smith argues, there are no pure civic or ethnic

[27] Smith, *National Identity*, p. 11.
[28] Anthony D. Smith, "Civic and Ethnic Nationalism Revisited: Analysis and Ideology", *The ASEN Bulletin*, Vol. 1, No. 12, 1996 / 1997, p. 10.
[29] Will Kymlicka, "Misunderstanding Nationalism", *Dissent*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1995, pp. 132-133.
[30] Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 173.

nations. Smith perfectly defines this by indicating the fact that "every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times, it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized".[31] Still, Smith contests that the civic/ethnic distinction "remains valid and useful".[32] Brown also criticizes the civic-ethnic divide on the ground that the distinction between the civic and cultural nationalism is challenging to apply to actual cases of nationalism'.[33] This study aims to apply the conceptual framework of ethnic-civic divide to an actual case, which is nationalism in modern Greece. To do so, the following section will scrutinize the evolution and the roots of Greek nationalism.

2. The roots of nationalism in modern Greece

Since the independence of Greece in 1832, an irredentist type of ethnic nationalism had been dominant in the political sphere in Greece. Almost a century, it was embedded in the Megali Idea, the irredentist idea of uniting all Greeks, which aimed to restore the Eastern Empire.[34] The Greek Church also played a significant role in establishing irredentist aims. According to Fokas, "the consolidation of religious and nationalist aspirations in Greek irredentism; in particular, in the Megali Idea (Grand Idea - the retaking of Constantinople for the Hellenic world), for the redemption of Hellenism in Asia Minor is, of course, another climactic period in the developing links between Orthodoxy and Greek national identity".[35]

The Greek Orthodox Church, since its independence from the Ottoman Empire, has been a staunch ally of right-wing governments and has exhibited a very nationalist and conservative rhetoric. The Church openly, without any hesitation, became an official supporter of the Military regime in

[31] Smith, *National Identity*, p. 11.
[32] Schulman, *ibid.*, p. 558.
[33] The author (Brown) uses the term "cultural nationalism" instead of "ethnic nationalism." David Brown, "Are there good and bad nationalisms?", *Nations and Nationalism,* Vol. 5, No. 2, 1999, pp. 283-284.
[34] Ioannis D. Stefanidis, "Pressure Groups and Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-67", *The Hellenic Observatory The European Institute London School of Economics & Political Science*, 2008 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/5710/1/StefanidisDiscussionPaper6.pdf, (06.10.2019).
[35] Effie Fokas, "Religion in the Greek Public Sphere: Nuancing the Account", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 2, October 2009, p. 358.

Greece between 1967 and 1974.[36] Since the emergence of the Greek state, the Orthodox Church has functioned as the primary supplier of a particular type of nationalism, which is Helleno-Christianity. However, its political involvement and activism had been apparent even further back.[37]

According to the constitution of Greece, the Greek Church is a part of the state. Meti argues that there is an unbreakable tie between the Greek state and the Greek Church, the Law 1566 designates the union of Hellenism and Christianity. Through Orthodoxy and educational reforms, the unique bond between Hellenism and Christianity has been maintained.[38] As Hüseyinoğlu aptly states, 'from official openings of education terms to cultural festivities, from religious oaths taken at the Parliament to the celebration of national holidays, Orthodox Christianity is considerably apparent across Greece'. Article 3 of the Greek constitution openly sets its dominance by stating that "the prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ".[39] The educational system also triggered the imposition of Greek national identity and irredentist claims among Greek youth. The University of Athens, the first institution of higher education in the Near East, played a pivotal role as a cradle of nationalist ideology.[40] Academics, military personnel, and university graduates joined those irredentist societies, and they regarded the irredentist claims as to the unquestionable right of the Greek nation.

The Asia Minor catastrophe, the destruction of the Greek Army by the Turkish National Movement, which would later follow the establishment of The Republic of Turkey in 1923, was substantial sources of frustration for the Greek nationalists that dreamed of uniting all Greeks. After this defeat, the compulsory population exchange was held between Greece and Turkey. With the population exchange, nearly 1.2 million people were sent to Greece, and the demographic structure of Greece changed dramatically. Anatolian refugees were discriminated against and excluded by the Greek nationalists

[36] Nikos Chrysoloras, "Why Orthodoxy? Religion and Nationalism in Greek Political Culture", *Department of Government and Hellenic Observatory, LSE*, 2008, http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/1st_Symposium/NicosChrysoloras1stLSESymposiumPaper.pdf, (06.10.2019).
[37] Chrysoloras, *ibid.*, p. 4.
[38] Bledar Meti, *Greek Nationalism on the scope of the Relationship with Albania*, Author House, Bristol 2010, p. 21.
[39] Ali Hüseyinoglu, "Questioning Islamophobia in the Context of Greece", *IRCICA Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 6, 2015, p. 69.
[40] Stefanidis, "Pressure Groups and Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-67", p. 12.

during the 1930s; they were regarded as a different nation, most of them spoke Turkish, and they were affiliated with Turkish or Eastern culture. During the Metaxas regime, rebetika songs, the music of Asia Minor refugees, were prohibited from being played on state radio because 'this music was imbued with Eastern culture. Furthermore, according to the state officials, rebetika songs were identified with the social margin that lacked the "superior morality" of the "nationally-thinking" Greeks.[41] Koumandaraki argues that the process of constructing a homogeneous Greek nation was a long process that was unachievable until the end of the Civil War. The process relied upon the decisive actions of the Greek governments against the multicultural features of Greek society.[42] Right-wing parties were the defenders of the national unity of the Greek state. They also aimed to create a Greek state that imposes policies of assimilation of ethnic minorities into the national community. These policies were considered mandatory in order to transform Greece into a Western European state.[43]

According to Spyridon, as quoted in Stefanidis, "the superiority of the Greek race is defined by attributing the continuity of Greek civilization from ancient times. The moral and intellectual qualities of the Greek race are defined as "patriotism, piety, a commitment to the defense of liberty, a sense of honor, a manly blend of generosity and bravery, and a penchant for civilizing work but also a propensity to discord and factionalism".[44] Karandonis describes Greeks as 'the strangest peoples on Earth and superior people at that'. They are 'warlike, proud, rebellious people' and can 'easily cross the line from peace to war'. He also states that the 'Greeks are incapable of causing harm to other peoples and deeply sympathized with the victim of the great powers.[45]

Ethnikophrosyni (the national way of thinking or loyalty to the nation) became institutionalized during the Greek Civil War. It functioned as a measure of commitment to national integrity and the 'prevailing social order', which helped to divide Greek citizens into 'ethnikophrones' and

[41] Anna Koumandaraki, "The Evolution of Greek National Identity", *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Vol. 2, No 2, 2002, p. 47.
[42] Koumandaraki, *ibid.*, p. 46.
[43] Koumandaraki, *ibid.*, p. 46.
[44] Archbishop Spyridon, O Tachydromos, 1 May 1954, quoted in Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism, and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece 1945-1967*, Ashgate Publishing, London 2007, p. 42.
[45] Andreas Karandonis I Remember America, 1-2 Athens: To Elliniko Vivlio quoted in, "*ibid.*"

'miasmata[46]. The pro-monarchists in power labeled themselves "Ethnikophrones" (nationally-minded, good guys), who enjoyed the protection of the law and participated in the political and social system with unrestricted citizenship'.[47] In 1949, the encyclopedic dictionary Ilios partly attributed the growth of anti-national creeds, such as Communism, to 'the lack of a more profound national consciousness among certain lower strata[48] Communism was regarded as atheistic, and Christian values were affirmed as antidotes for Communism. During the civil war years, the confluence between the nation and its religion, long regarded as self-evident, took shape in the artificial construct of ellinochristianismos (Helleno-Christianity).[49] It was believed that only the Christian faith could solve the problems of the Greek nation. The revised constitution in 1952 enshrined ellinochristianismos as 'a guiding system of beliefs which national education ought to promote'.[50] Before World War II, young Greeks were taught that modern Greeks should never forget the magnificence and the glory of the Greek Empire and never terminate their ideals of the 'fulfillment of the race', namely the Megali Idea.[51] This creed led Greek governments and the public to form a highly idealized and romantic version of nationalism without considering international realities. The Greek irredentist claims after World War II were the product of the Megali Idea aim to unite all Greeks in an expanded Greek Empire. However, some scholars claim that Greek irredentism after World War II was different from the 19th-century version of irredentism, which consists of aggressive nationalism and expansionism.

According to Koliopoulos and Veremis, unlike 19th-century irredentism, anti-Communist fundamentalism was defensive, exclusive, and parochial.[52] 'Greek claims over Northern Epirus were linked with the support of Enver Hoxha's regime in Albania to the Greek communists during the Civil

[46] The word "miasma" comes from ancient Greek and means "pollution", and it causes illnesses. See: "Ibid", p. 30.
[47] Peter D. Chimbos, "Greek Resistance 1941-45: Organization, Achievements, and Contributions to Allied War Efforts against the Axis Powers", *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 40, 1999, p. 264.
[48] Passas, encyclopedic dictionary Ilios, Vol. 6. (Athens: 1949), p. 36. Quoted in Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism, and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece 1945-1967*, p. 31.
[49] *ibid*., p. 32.
[50] *ibid*.
[51] Stefanidis, *Pressure Groups, and Greek Foreign Policy 1945-67*, p. 13.
[52] John S. Koliopoulos and Veremis Thanos, *Greece: The Modern Sequel: From 1821 to the Present*, Hurst Company, London 2004, p. 100.

War. On the eve of the Paris Peace Conference, Greek territorial claims, as formulated by the first elected post-war government under Tsaldaris, comprised the Dodecanese, Northern Epirus, and the demand for re-adjustment of the Greek-Bulgarian borderline.[53] At that time, Cyprus was an issue to be settled between Greece and 'our great friend, Great Britain'.[54] As a result of the Paris Peace Conference, the Dodecanese Islands were formally united with Greece, and Italy and Bulgaria gave limited reparations. Since the 1950's Northern Epirus question has remained important on the Greek political agenda, after the 1950s, with the emergence of the 'Enosis' campaign, it lost its importance.[55] Enosis, namely the unification of Cyprus with Greece, has become the motto after World War II. This campaign was initiated by the Greek Cypriots, and the Greek Church became their most powerful supporter.[56] In 1950, Archbishop Spyridon, by inviting all Greeks to involve in the liberation and independence of Hellenism, argued that Enosis is the indisputable right of Greeks.[57] Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus acted as the spokesperson of the whole island, ignoring the existence of Greek Cypriot leftists and Turkish Cypriots. In 1954, the conservative government in Greece, headed by Papagos, decided the take the Cyprus issue to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This led to the internationalization of the Cyprus problem, which is still valid today. From that year on, the Cyprus question became the top priority of Greek governments. In 1956, George Papandreou declared the foreign policy objectives of Greece as; 'peace, security, the liberation of Cyprus and Northern Epirus, the protection of the minority of Constantinople, and care for the Greek diaspora'.[58] The public, motivated by the desire of Enosis, started to ask for a more independent foreign policy and assertive attitude toward the United States and other Western allies. According to Couloumbis, the first half of the 20th century

[53] Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation*, p. 57.
[54] Stefanidis, *ibid*., p. 57.
[55] The Cham Albanian Muslim Minority in Northern Epirus was exempted from the Turkish-Greek population exchange of 1923 by transcending the religion criterion after the series of negotiations. The Minority was expelled during the years of 1944-1945 on the pretext of cooperating with the enemy during the Italian-German invasion. However, according to Baltsiotis, the expulsion was an outcome of the state policy of Greece which was embedded in the prevailing nationalistic ideology of the Interwar period. See: Lambros Baltsiotis, "The Muslim Chams of Northwestern Greece", *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 12, December 2011.
[56] Stefanidis, *Pressure Groups, and Greek Foreign Policy*, p. 24.
[57] Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*, Hurst Company, London 1999, p. 259.
[58] Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation*, p. 84.

was dominated by destructive nationalisms, and Cyprus could not be remained untouched. Mainland nationalisms influenced both Turkish and Greek Cypriots and turned to a mobilizing political and psychological force'.[59]

By the late 1950s, both conservative and communist groups were skeptical about the prospect of Greece joining the process of European integration. Conservatives were worried about the fate of Hellenism within a larger European community. Would the Greeks become a people of hoteliers like the Swiss, or butter producers like the Dutch? Could the Greeks safeguard their character, or would they become a more or less Americanized mass?[60] Conservatives claimed that a small Greece should not exchange its national identity and cultural traditions for material gains. The decision of the conservative Karamanlis government to associate Greece with the project of European integration in the late 1950s did not have a tangible impact on public discourse.[61] Only some liberals saw European integration as an opportunity to overcome the shortcomings of Greece's own political culture. In general, the focus was on ellinochristianismos (Helleno-Christian), and national education was used to promote national consciousness among the youth and 'restore Greece as the beacon of civilized humanity'.[62] 'Helleno-Christianity' was also the doctrine of the military junta imposed in 1967. The architects of the coup were mostly colonels; they were rightist officers and extremely anti-communist. They came to power to prevent a communist takeover and defend Helleno-Christian civilization in general. Papadopoulos (the leader of the Junta) launched a slogan that was hung everywhere; 'Greece of the Christian Greeks.[63] They were trying to enforce the national consciousness in society by pointing to the superiority of the Greek nation. Due to the economic recession and international crisis with Turkey over Cyprus, the military rule came to an end, and the junta was replaced with a civilian government headed by Karamanlis. The experiences of the post-World War II period and of the seven years of military rule created the conditions and provided incentive and opportunity for Karamanlis to set the foundations of an independent Greek

[59] Theodore A. Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece, and Turkey: A Troubled Triangle*, Praeger Publishers, New York 1983, p. 27.
[60] Papanoutsos, "Predictions and Scruples' and 'Thoughts about the Future", *To Vima*, 13 November 1958 quoted in Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation*, p. 34.
[61] *ibid*.
[62] *ibid*.
[63] See Rodis Roufos, *Inside Colonels Greece*, Chatto and Windus, London 1972. Part II, Chapter 7.

foreign policy within the parameters of the "we belong to the west" principle.[64] Immediately after the return of Karamanlis from Paris, where he was in self-imposed exile, he focused on full membership in the European Community. With this intention, Greece applied for full membership in June 1975 and became a member in 1981.

3. From Balkans to Europe?

The year 1981 was the critical turning point when Greece became a full member of the European Community, and only ten months after the accession, ironically, the first socialist government in Greece, an opponent of Western and European orientation, came to power. PASOK (*The Panhellenic Socialist Movement)*, before the elections, promised to establish a Greek foreign policy which would be independent in the international affairs. PASOK took an essential responsibility for shaping Greek Foreign Policy in the crucial years of integration with the European Community. Greece's political culture was distinct from the other members that influenced by centuries of Ottoman rule, and it was the first Orthodox country within the Community.[65] Being kept away from the impact of the Renaissance, Reformation, Industrial Revolution and French Revolution that affected the historical development of Western Europe, Greece, with the anti-Western traditions of Orthodoxy, was politically and culturally different compared to the other community members. The EC members were not prepared for an "awkward squad".[66]

In 1981, Greece was economically and structurally unready to be a significant member of the European Community, and there was to be a long path of painful adaptation and integration. In the very beginning, the membership was regarded as "an unavoidable fact of life, 'and the cost of withdrawal was seen as more significant than the membership".[67] According to Couloumbis, 'EC membership in the 1981-93 period helped Greece both

[64] Van Coufoudakis, "Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-1985: Seeking Independence in an Interdependent World- Problems and Prospects", (eds.) Kevin Featherstone and Dimitrios K. Katsoudas, *Political Change in Greece: Before and After the Colonels*, Croom Helt, London 1987, p. 230.
[65] Richard Clogg, "The PASOK Phenomenon", (ed.) Richard Clogg, *Greece: 1981-1989: The Populist Decade*, Macmillan Press, London, 1993, p. 8.
[66] Clogg, *ibid.*, p. 8.
[67] Theodoros A. Couloumbis, "PASOK's Foreign Policies, 1981-1989: Continuity or Change?", (ed.) Richard Clogg, *Greece: 1981-1989: The Populist Decade*, Macmillan Press, London 1993, p. 120.

as diplomatic leverage and as a restrictive mechanism. Cyprus issue can be an excellent example, as Greece seized a position of "conditionality" to persuade Turkey for normalization. Turkey, to maintain better relations with EC and to become a member, should cease its military existence in Cyprus.[68] With time, PASOK realized that membership was inevitable for Greece because the country became more and more dependent on funds coming from the European Union. The flow coming from the community amounted to '4.5 percent of Greece's GDP during 1989'.[69] After the Brussel Summit in 1985, Papandreou announced that the cost of leaving the EC is much higher than staying, and Greece will not withdraw from the European Community.[70] Presenting the situation with a cost-benefit analysis showed that staying in the community would serve Greek national interests.

When Greece in Europe is considered, there are three distinct periods to be taken into account. The first period is between 1981 and 1985, the second period from 1985 to 1995, and the last period starting from 1996 to today.[71] In the first period between 1981 and 1985, particular significant features of European integration were questioned. In the second period, Greece started to enjoy the benefits (mostly financial) of being a member of the European Community but still acted as an irreconcilable partner within the Community. Only after 1996, thanks to the heartfelt modernizers in the office, Greece entered a new era of Europeanization and made a significant effort to became a full-fledged European country, but nationalism still prevails. This study aims to analyze whether the Europeanization process, which started in 1996, has transformed the Greek nationalism into a civic type of nationalism. By doing so, the main focus will be given to some of the minority issues in Greece, mainly on the removal of Article 19th of the Greek citizenship code in 1998.

[68] Theodoros A. Coulombis, "Introduction: The Impact Of EC (EU) Membership On Greece's Foreign Policy Profile", (eds.) Panos Kazakos and Panayiotis Ioakimidis, *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated*, Pinter Publishers, London 1994, p. 191.
[69] John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, "Return to Democracy (1974-2009)", (eds.) John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, *Modern Greece: A History since 1821*, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford 2009, p. 164.
[70] Koliopoulos and Veremis, *ibid.*, p. 164.
[71] The Course of Greece in the European Union, Official Web Site of Greek Embassy in Washington, http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office =1&folder=39&article=50, (02.01.2012).

3. From Ethnic to Civic Understanding of Citizenship? Minorities and the Impact of Europeanization: The Abolition of 19th of the Citizenship Code

According to Greek state, there is only one single official minority in Greece, which is Muslim Minority in Greek Thrace consist of Turks, Pomaks and Roma origin and whose rights are protected by the Peace Treaty of Lausanne (1923). There are also other Greek citizens who consider their identity distinct from the Greek identity such as Vlachs, Arvanites, Slavomacedonians, and Roma.[72] However, the Greek state does not recognize the existence of any ethnic minority in Greece. Even though most of the Muslim minority in Thrace consider themselves to be Turkish, the state emphasizes and puts their Muslim identity forwards, and rigorously denies any claim of the distinct collective identity of the other aforementioned groups. In other words, the Greek state problematizes and refuses to recognize the collective Turkish identification of the minority. The statement of Ioannis Kapsis, then deputy foreign minister in the Papandreou administration in 1980s reveals the official stance of Greece. He argued that "no Turks live in Greece. There are only some Greeks who happen to be Muslim, and happen to speak Turkish to each other".[73]

Turks in the Western Thrace are not the only Turkish/Muslim minority in Greece. There are also the Turks of Dodecanese Islands (mainly settled in Rhodes and Kos) who became Greek citizens after the islands were transferred to Greece with the Paris Treaty of 1947. Their minority rights were not guaranteed by Greece claiming that the islands were under the Italian administration when the Peace Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923. Like in the case of the Turks in the Western Thrace, their distinct ethnic identity is not recognized by the Greek authorities.[74] The denial of ethnic distinct identity is turned to be the official position of Greek state towards its minorities irrespective of their size, language and legal status. For example, The Slavo-Macedonian minority living in Greek Macedonia has been

[72] Nicholas Sitaropoulos, "Freedom of Movement and the Right to a Nationality v. Ethnic Minorities: The Case of Ex Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code", *European Journal of Migration and Law*, Vol. 6, 2004, p. 206.
[73] Richard Clogg, *Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society*, Hurst & Company, London 2002, p. 15.
[74] Ali Dayıoğlu, "The Rights of the Turkish Minority of Rhodes and Kos in International Law", (eds.) Mustafa Kaymakçı and Cihan Özgün, *The Forgetten Turkish Identity of the Aegean Islands: Turkish Identity in Rhodes and Kos*, Eğitim Yayınevi, Konya 2018, p. 68.

subjected to enormous pressure, especially during the 1930s under the Metaxas regime. Slavo-Macedonians found themselves no longer permitted to speak the language that they had learned at home as children. Punishments were often forced on adults who did so in the marketplace; children were physically beaten at school if they spoke any language other than Greek. All kinds of cultural activities (religious ceremonies, rites) could only be held in Greek, their music, dance, and folklore were banned.[75] According to Karakasidou, due to the assimilative efforts of the Greek governments, young people with a fear of trouble, do not feel comfortable talking in their native language anymore, and they are embarrassed to speak it. Thus, the language is slowly fading in the region.[76] Recently, Greek Ambassador Dimitris Karamitsos Tziras protested BBC (British Public Broadcaster) by sending them a letter of complaint, arguing that a BBC article entitled "Greece's invisible minority–the Macedonian Slavs" was inaccurate because no such minority exists.[77] Whether the citizens with distinct identities are officially recognized as minority or ignored by the Greek state, all these communities have been subject to various forms of discrimination due to the rampant ethnic nationalism in Greece.

Greek citizenship law is "ius sanguinis", which means acquiring a mother's or father's nationality irrespective of the birthplace. The law was recognized in 1856 as the first article of the Greek citizenship code. 'The child of a Greek male or female acquires Greek Nationality at birth.[78] Christopoulos, while indicating the homogenization attempts of the Greek state, asserts that since the founding of the state, the inclination has been the achievement of the social-political unification and homogeneity.[79] The legacy of the Civil War and ideological polarization during the Cold War led Greece

[75] Anastasia Karakasidou, "Politicizing Culture: Negating Ethnic Identity in Greek Macedonia", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1993, p. 7. For further reading on the issue, see: Anastasia N. Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2009.
[76] Karakasidou, *ibid.*, p. 4.
[77] Sinisa Jakov Marusic, "Athens Slams BBC over 'Greece's Macedonian Minority' Report", *Balkan Insight*, 26 February 2019, https://balkaninsight.com/2019/02/26/athens-slams-bbc-over-greeces-macedonian-minority-report/, (29.10.2019).
[78] Brown, *op.cit.*
[79] Dimitris Christopoulos, "The Case of the Western Thrace Minority", *Centre for European Constitutional Law, The Rigas Network Databank: Reports on Governance and Minorities in South-Eastern Europe*,
http://www.cecl.gr/RigasNetwork/databank/REPORTS/r20/GR_20_Christopoulos.html, (02.06.2011).

to be a socially divided country since World War II. Minorities were the ones who suffered most from the polarization as Post War governments in Greece saw them as threats to national unity and Greece's territorial integrity. So, they had to be assimilated.[80] Minorities informally were treated as second-class citizens of Greece, especially the Turks/Muslims of the Western Thrace. Article 19 of the Greek citizenship code was a sound example of the "inferiority" of the minorities, according to Greek law. Article 19 (Law 3370/1955) provided state officials the 'discretion to rescind Greek citizenship from non-ethnic Greeks who left the country with no intention of returning.[81] The application of the Article was racially discriminative as it reveals the distinction between ethnic Greeks and non-ethnic Greek citizens.[82] Discriminating its citizens according to their ethnic roots and having a citizenship code legitimizing this understanding was contrary to the European norms which value equality among citizens. To classify the citizens as ethnic Greeks and non-ethnic Greeks is a significant example of ethnic nationalism applied to state apparatus.

The main objective of the induction of Article 19 was the disposal of the communists during the Greek Civil War. However, with time, most probably as a means of reciprocity, it was applied to Turkish/Muslim Minority especially in the 1980s and 1990s. According to Kostopoulos, between 1955 and 1998, almost 60.000 people have lost their citizenship, and 50.000 of them were the members of Turkish/Muslim Minority.[83] Heraclides, who served as an advisor to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1990s, also argues that the Article 19th was used as a tool for reducing the number of the Turkish people in Thrace. He states as follows; "*During a meeting at the Ministry, I insisted on the removal of Article 19th as it was not compatible with Greece's European image. I was told that there is no other way to*

[80] Dia Anagnostou, "Deepening Democracy or Defending the Nation? The Europeanisation of Minority Rights and Greek Citizenship", *West European Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2005, p. 336.
[81] Dia Anagnostou and Anna Triandafyllidou, "Regions, Minorities and European Policies: A state of the Art Report on the Turkish Muslims of Western Thrace (Greece)", *Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)*, 2004, http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/en/2008/10/state%2520of%2520art%2520greece%2520final.pdf, (07.10.2019).
[82] Anagnostou, *op.cit.*, p. 4.
[83] Tasos Kostopoulos, "Counting the 'Other': Official Census and Classified Statistics in Greece, 1830-2001", *Jahrbucher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas*, Vol. 5, 2003, pp. 59-60.

decrease the number of minority members in Thrace, and only in case I could suggest an alternative method, of course, Article 19 could be removed".[84]

"Intent of not returning" to Greece was very often used arbitrarily by the state authorities. The article was applied without satisfactory reason and without negotiating the affected people, and the people who lost their citizenship faced with the reality at the gates while entering Greece. Those people who were stripped of their Greek nationality have no identity card to prove their existence, they have no passport to travel (as they have no identity card), they can not own any property, cannot have driving licenses and cannot even fulfill their fundamental rights and needs like travelling to their homeland to attend their father's and mother's funerals. There have been informal practices that systematically prevent most Turkish/Muslim Minority from owning property, receiving bank loans or driving licenses, and finding employment and, even from making alterations to their own houses. From the late 1980s onwards, minority members started to express their difficulties by working actively under the associations and organizations. Notably, minority members who had already migrated to Germany and Turkey played an important role in focusing the attention of Europe on the Turkish / Muslim Minority in Northern Greece.

Since the 1980s, the Council of Europe has started to criticize Greece due to its discriminative approach towards the Turkish/Muslim Minority of the Western Thrace. The Council and the non-governmental international human rights organizations prepared reports to reveal the unfair conditions of the Minority and the application of Article 19. In 1997, before the removal of Article 19, ECRI (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance) published a report on Greece and demanded Greece's particular attention on minority rights. In the report, Greece was identified as a homogenous country where "the notion of Hellenism" or a strong Greek national identity has historically been emphasized and continues to influence Modern Greek society.[85] Also, it was stated that "ECRI considers that measures to bring the Citizenship Code into line with common European Law should be effected without further delay.[86] While Greece yet to sign the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, in 1998, Greece signed the Framework

[84] Interview with Alexis Heraclides in Athens, 20 October 2019.
[85] Council of Europe, "European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), ECRI's country-by-country approach: Report on Greece", Council of Europe, September 1997 https://www.refworld.org/docid/51bee2e54.html, (22.11.2019).
[86] *Ibid*.

Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM), with ratification still pending.[87] The liberalization of minority rights in Greece is directly related to the growing politicization of the minority members, and activism of the European Institutions since the 1980s. Concurrently, in this period, then Greek governments started to make attempts to improve the country's relations with Europe, as Europe became one of the primary considerations for Greece. Also, starting from early the 1990s, the normative power of European institutions and their standard-setting approaches played a significant role in putting obligations on member states to respect minority rights. However, Mustafa Mustafa, the former Syriza MP in the Greek Parliament, criticizes the exaggerated role of European institutions in the liberalization of minority rights by stating that "no single person came from Europe and asked me what is your problem Mustafa? What we could succeed is the product of our struggle for democracy within the country".[88] Like Mustafa, Christopoulos emphasizes the importance of the active involvement of the minority in Greek politics. According to him, the rapid politicization of the minority in the 1980s and the fact that they no longer voted for the Greek parties became an alarm for the Greek state. Greek officials, trying to understand how such a passive community turned to such an active minority. "They did not want to lose the minority. So, the discourse and the policies have changed with the Mitsotakis government. Eighty percent of the work had done before Simitis came to office. Now, I ask you where is 'Europe' in this story?"[89] As Christopoulos argued, then Prime minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis, to soften the international criticism, in 1991, ended the repressive and constraining actions toward Turkish-Muslim Minority and declared to restore their rights in the framework of "legal equality - equal citizenship" (*ισονομία - ισοπολιτεία*).[90]

Also, in the early 1990s, there were several attempts within Europe to improve the conditions of minorities. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) was utilized in 1992 by the Council of Europe to preserve and improve minority languages in Europe, both historical and regional ones. After 1995, the then Greek governments began to adjust their policies in accordance with the aforementioned European initiatives on minority protection and citizenship. Additionally, The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), which was

[87] Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou, *ibid*., p. 9.
[88] Interview with Mustafa Mustafa in Athens, 18 March 2016.
[89] Interview with Dimitris Christopoulos in Athens, January 2016.
[90] See Christopoulos, *ibid*.

adopted in 1995 by the Council of Europe, was the first multilateral document that defined fundamental principles for safeguarding minorities. The states which signed the treaty agreed to respect the Convention and let European institutions control and monitor them. In 1994, Helsinki Watch (also called Human Rights Watch) issued a report on Greece by indicating its violation of human rights and criticized Greece's denial of ethnic identification of Turkish-Muslim Minority. The discriminative policies of the Greek governments toward the Minorities, especially the practices via the Turkish/Muslim Minority, was emphasized. Problems such as the discrimination in state employment, denial of the ethnic identity, lack of Turkish language teachers and books, election of Muftis were emphasized most.[91] In 1997, Human Rights Watch issued a report on Greece and criticizes Greece for her resistance to recognize the ethnic Turkish identity of the minority in Western Thrace. Also, in the same report, there was a strong emphasis on the discriminative application of Article 19 of the Greek citizenship code.[92] After the removal of Article 19, in 1999, the same organization issued another report on Greece in which the priority was given to the denial of Turkish ethnic identity. However, the report acknowledged the positive steps taken by the government of Prime Minister Costas Simitis including legalizing the presence of more than 400.000 mostly-Albanian migrants and abolishing article 19 of the citizenship law.[93]

Simitis government that came to power in 1996 introduced its priority as the 'full integration with the EU' and accession to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).[94] The Greek government of the time signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) without any significant opposition thanks to the Europeanization spirit that dominates Greece. In 1997, in order to prevent the statelessness and unreasonable deprivation of citizenship, the Council of Europe adopted the European Convention of Nationality, which also adjusts the acquisition of citizenship.[95] The convention aims to protect individual rights and prevent discrimination against minorities. It requires a more inclusive understanding of national

[91] Human Rights Watch World Report 1994 - Greece, *Human Rights Watch*, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca8d1e.html, (06.10.2019).
[92] Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1997 - Greece, *Human Rights Watch*, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8aa10.html, (22.11.2019).
[93] Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 - Greece, *Human Rights Watch*, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8b78.html, (22.11.2019).
[94] Anagnostou, *Deepening Democracy, or Defending the Nation?*, p. 346.
[95] Anagnostou, *Deepening Democracy, or Defending the Nation?*, p. 346.

membership, which is contrary to the ethnic understanding of national membership. European institutions and norms are regarded as an obstacle to the classical concepts of citizenship based on the culture of a national community.

According to Grigoriadis, correspondingly, it was necessary for Greece to 'clear its minority record' and avoid the allegations of 'double-standard' policies. The primary contradiction of Greece was being a promoter of minority rights in the discursive level in the Balkans and having the discriminative Article 19 as a source of its policies.[96] Europeanization efforts started to accelerate with the Simitis government, and this position required democratization and respect for human rights. Also, Greece was given the role of an ideal example for the countries in the Balkans, and this new role also needed to have more democratic attitudes and to stay loyal to European norms as putting the individual before the state.

Simitis's vision was to create a strong Greece with less nationalistic and more European features. As argued by Ioakimidis, Greece was 'a European country in the Balkans, not a Balkan country in Europe', a role model for its neighbors.[97] In June 1998, the Monitoring Committee of the Council of Europe decided to organize a meeting to discuss the initiation of a monitoring process for Greece due to Article 19. According to Grigoriadis, the possibility of facing a monitoring process push Greece for the removal of Article 19.[98] In 1998, the proposal of the new law containing the removal of Article 19 (Law 2623-1998) was brought to the Greek Parliament. All major parties (PASOK, New Democracy, Coalition of the Left and the Communist Party-KKE) within the Greek Parliament supported the proposal and the abolishment of Article 19th, only several MPs from PASOK and ND objected.[99] Even though the Article was abolished in 1998, its legal and discriminative results still persist. Thousands of people have lost their citizenship and remained stateless, whether in Greece, Turkey, and elsewhere in Europe. Most of them who deprived of Greek citizenship due to Article 19 could manage to acquire new citizenship from other countries but not

[96] Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "On the Europeanization of Minority Rights Protection: Comparing the Cases of Greece and Turkey", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2008, p. 29.
[97] Grigoriadis, *ibid.*, p. 29.
[98] Grigoriadis, *ibid.*, p. 29.
[99] Anagnostou, *Deepening Democracy, or Defending the Nation?*, p. 351.

Greece.[100] The abolishment of Article 19 did not provide the automatic acquirement of Greek citizenship for the victims of the article. On the contrary, a person who lost his/her citizenship has to start a very long, unpredictable, and costly period to take their citizenship back. Those who lost their citizenship outside of Greece have gone through a long and difficult process in obtaining the citizenship of their host countries. The same applies to those who lost their citizenship while living in Greece.[101] Aysel Zeybek, was denaturalized together with her family in 1984 when she was a 7-year-old girl, although she had never left Greece. Zeybek (and her struggle for granting her citizenship) has become a symbol of the victims of Article 19. Since the day she became stateless, she has faced numerous difficulties such as receiving social services and has discriminated in Greece. She could hardly enroll in primary school due to her stateless status and also faced problems when she decided to get married.[102] In 1997, Aysel Zeybek began her struggle to receive international attention to the violations towards the Turkish minority of Western Thrace in a press conference in Athens. After the meeting, with the support of Helsinki Watch Greece, they succeeded to draw international awareness to the issue. In the very same year, Zeybek obtained the "Haymatlos" identity which is given to stateless people. She also applied to the European Court of Human Rights and the Court sentenced Greece to pay 16,000 euros in compensation to Aysel Zeybek and her family. In September 2001 she and her mother and two sisters became Greek citizens again.[103]

The positive changes became visible in 1999 when George Papandreou, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared his opinions on the denial of minorities' identities. He stated that, "We should not be afraid of words, although words matter. We cannot deny that there are many Muslims of Turkish origin in Thrace. Of course, the Treaty refers simply to Muslims. However, if the boundaries of Greece are not contested, I do not mind them [the minority population] being called Muslims or Turks, Bulgarians or

[100] Konstantinos Tsitselikis, "Citizenship in Greece: Present Challenges for Future Changes", *KEMO editions*, 2005, http://www.kemo.gr/index.php?sec=show&item=33, (06.10.2019).
[101] These people were denaturalized due to the Article 19 while they were living in Greece. However, "living abroad" was a prerequisite of Article 19.
[102] Ali Chouseyin, *Continuities And Changes In The Minority Policy Of Greece: The Case Of Western Thrace*, Middle East Technical University the Graduate School of Social Sciences, Unpublished Master Thesis, Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. M. Fatih Tayfur, Ankara 2005, p. 127.
[103] TvNet, "Stateless", *TV Net Documentary on the Turks of Western Thrace*, https://www.tvnet.com.tr/belgesel/vatansiz-2126756, (27.11.2019).

Pomaks".[104] Even though this statement did not represent the official stance of the Greek government; however, it was a significant step for Greek politics. A Minister of Foreign Affairs who was in charge of the country's foreign relations and a member of the Greek government accepted the existence of Greek citizens from different ethnic backgrounds. There were also strong reactions among the MPs in parliament who called for Papandreou to resign because there was no Turkish minority in Greece. This discourse of Papandreou's was regarded as contrary to the Greek position and the Lausanne Treaty, which defined minorities as religious ones. On contrary, Huseyin Zeybek, Syriza MP from Xanthi argues that 'no one cannot say that "you are not a Turk" as long as you identify yourself as Turk."[105]

Although the abolition of Article 19 can be portrayed as a reflection of the civic understanding of citizenship, the consolidated problems of the Turkish-Muslim minority still persist. According to Özgüneş and Tsitselikis, "minority affairs in Greece are subject to legal and political taboos. Naming the minority as Turkish is still taboo and minority members are seen as deserving to be less than equal".[106] The Turkish/Muslim minority of Western Thrace is still facing problems and not yet fully integrated the society. The problems on freedom of religion and election of muftis also remained a conflicting issue. Since 1990, the Greek state put into force a new law concerning the appointment of the muftis. The minority members disputed that two muftis were performing in Komotini and Xanthi. One was appointed, and the other one was elected. The appointed muftis with the state seal in their hands deal with legal issues as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and funerals, whereas the elected muftis who are not recognized by Greek state are performing spiritual duties. There are also problems concerning education, schooling, and minority foundations.

In addition to the ethnic discrimination that Muslim/Turkish Minority faces in Greece, several new issues have emerged concerning the other minorities and the refugees. Greece, for the last few years severely affected by the refugee flow due to the Syrian Civil War and these newcomers, became

[104] Lia Figgou and Susan Condor, "Categorising Category Labels in Interview Accounts about the Muslim Minority in Greece", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2007, p. 439.
[105] Interview with Huseyin Zeybek in Athens, 31 March 2016.
[106] Meriç Özgüneş and Konstantinos Tsitselikis, "Greek and Turkish Reciprocal Minorities", (eds.) Alexis Heraclides and Gizem Alioğlu Çakmak, *Greece and Turkey in Conflict and Cooperation: From Europeanization to De-Europeanization*, Routledge, London 2019, p. 121.

the new target for extreme nationalist groups in Greece. As Huseyinoğlu puts, in big cities, the Muslim immigrants and their places of worship turn out to be primary targets of racial, hate-motivated, and Islamophobic attacks, primarily by members/supporters of Golden Dawn.[107] The discriminative policies of the Greek state and the remaining old and new problems of the minorities in Greece contradict EU norms and values.

Conclusion

Greece has passed through a period of Europeanization under the rule of "modernizers" since 1996. As a first step for improving its human rights record, Greece ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[108] In 1998, a significant step was taken towards the improvement of conditions of the Turkish/Muslim Minority in Western Thrace. Only after 1998, thanks to the heavy pressure from the Council of Europe, Greece removed the discriminative and racist Article 19 of the Citizenship Code that gave state authorities the 'discretion to rescind Greek citizenship from non-ethnic Greeks who left the country with no intention of returning'.[109] Facing strong criticism from the Council of Europe and the European Union, Greece, which was targeting the full integration to the core of Europe, had to abolish the article. On the other hand, people who lost their Greek citizenship due to the discriminative Article 19 could not get the right to automatically regaining their citizenship. To get their citizenship back, they had to apply to the court and consider the fact of facing very long legal processes and the possibility of having no progress in return. Until the end of the 1990s, by denying the fundamental minority rights Greece has been far behind the European standards and norms on minority issues. Simitis, who aimed to move Greece to the core of the EU and modernize the country, had to improve the rights of the minority by decreasing the ethnic discrimination and by providing them equal citizenship. Ethnic Balkan nationalism was a threat to Greece's Europeanization and had never positively served Greek interests. The Simitis

[107] Ali Hüseyinoglu, "Past and Present of Islam in the Balkans: The Case of Greece", *Avrasya Etüdleri*, Vol 50, No 2, 2016, p. 43.
[108] To see the treaty in detail, See: *The United Nations Treaty Collections* http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en, (07.10.2019).
[109] Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou, *ibid.*, p. 9.

government targeted to create a 'European actor in the Balkans rather than a Balkan country in the European Union'.[110]

Despite some positive improvements and the decrease in the ethnic nationalism discourse on the minorities after Simitis, the traditional forces in Greece have always remained a significant barrier to Europeanization, civic understanding of nationalism, and modernization. The most influential advocate of anti-European sentiments in Greece is the Greek Orthodox Church. Since independence to present, the Greek Church has been the main source of nationalism and stance against westernization and modernization of the Greek state and society. The traditional conflict between the modernizers and the traditional forces still exists and confronts the full-fledged adaptation of European norms and values such as respect for minorities and multiculturalism.

This study argues that even though Greece has been a country where ethnic nationalism predominates since the 19th century, Europeanization played a significant role in adopting civic elements after the mid-1990s. Greek nationalism, which embodies civil and ethnic elements at the same time, reinforces Smith's argument of there is no pure ethnic or pure civil nationalism. In the case of Greece, although there has been an increase in the discourse of civic nationalism since the second half of the 1990s, ethnic nationalism still persists.

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