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ACTING ON DISASTER DIPLOMACY

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To define and explore disaster diplomacy, the initial question asked was "Do natural disasters induce international cooperation amongst countries that have traditionally been 'enemies'?"[1] Could disaster-related activities, both pre-disaster such as mitigation and prevention and post-disaster such as response and recovery, positively affect relations amongst states which are not normally prone to cooperation? The term "enemy" thus has a wide remit, which is not confined to violent conflict, but refers to states that are not collaborating diplomatically or politically. The first examples that were explored include the earthquakes in Greece and Turkey in 1999, monitoring hurricanes which could hit both Cuba and the United States and preventing a drought disaster across southern Africa.[2] One conclusion from these analyses is that a disaster can significantly spur on a diplomatic process that had a pre-existing basis, but a disaster alone is unlikely to generate new diplomacy. Disaster-related activities can catalyze, but do not create, cooperation.

Since this study, discussion about disaster diplomacy has widened with a growing set of case studies and theoretical analyses.[3] This further work led to a new core question evolving from the one above, namely "Can disaster-related activities induce cooperation amongst enemy countries?" Other disaster diplomacy case studies which were analyzed include the rapprochement between India and Pakistan following the 26 January 2001 earthquake.[4] Additionally, the United States aided Iran after the 26 December 2003 earthquake.[5] The 26 December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in the context of conflicts in Sri Lanka and Aceh, Indonesia were also examined.[6] The case of international aid offered to the United States after Hurricane Katrina in August-September 2005 was also scrutinized.[7]

Categorization of disaster diplomacy in its different forms provides a solid basis for understanding the theory and characteristics of disaster diplomacy which are then applied to analyzing case studies and spin-offs. This literature, however, provides limited discussion regarding how disaster diplomacy might be operationalized; that is, how to turn the knowledge, theory and experience into action.

This paper contributes to filling that gap by identifying pathways of disaster

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diplomacy which could occur or which could be selected. While a specific framework of action would be the ideal outcome, this paper shows that complexities and diversity of experiences make it challenging to formulate and defend a framework of action for disaster diplomacy. Instead, this paper provides a set of possibilities as a disaster diplomacy toolkit from which tools could be selected to develop action frameworks that are specific to each situation and to each actor's interests. The toolkit consists of pathways that either promote or inhibit disaster diplomacy.

The following sections summarize past work, elaborate on disaster diplomacy theory by providing a new typology and place the new theory in the context of two recent case studies: India-Pakistan following the 8 October 2005 earthquake and Ethiopia-Eritrea from 1999 to 2002 during droughts. Next, practical ways of using or not using disaster diplomacy are described by exploring disaster diplomacy failings and how those failings can be overcome. The disaster diplomacy toolkit is also detailed. The paper concludes by summarizing the limitations and prospects of disaster diplomacy. Overall, disaster diplomacy has a significant impact, but realistic expectations are necessary to understand what this process can and cannot do—and what it should and should not do.

Previous Disaster Diplomacy Work

Previous disaster diplomacy work focused on three main areas. The first area is case study analyses, examining where and how disaster diplomacy has been observed or attempted. Examples are given above, such as Cuba-U.S. and India-Pakistan.[8] The second area is spin-offs describing disaster diplomacy lessons applied in other forms and fora. One spin-off is "environmental diplomacy," the issue of whether environmental management issues and treaties could lead to lasting, positive diplomatic outcomes beyond environmental management.[9] Another spin-off is disaster para-diplomacy.[10] Para-diplomacy refers to a non-state government developing a foreign policy and conducting international relations; that is, a non-sovereign jurisdiction's relations with states and international institutions.

The third area consists of characterization and categories of disaster diplomacy. As case study analyses yielded patterns, five suggestions are proposed in the literature: active vs. passive disaster diplomacy, propinquity of the disaster diplomacy states, aid relationship of the disaster diplomacy states, level at which the disaster diplomacy operates and purpose of the disaster diplomacy. Collectively, these categories represent the main elements of disaster diplomacy theory available, although the presentation of these categories has been somewhat ad hoc and some have yet to be completely validated.

One main characterization is the comparison between passive and active disaster diplomacy.[11] This distinction is a helpful beginning for indicating how and when disaster diplomacy might be acted upon (active) compared with a disaster diploma-

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cy process occurring without the actors seeking or being aware of its potential (passive). In active disaster diplomacy, actors can create opportunities for disaster diplomacy, for instance, by working with the media or by lobbying governments to ensure that international relations improve through disaster-related cooperation. In passive disaster diplomacy there are no deliberate linkages between disaster-related activities and diplomatic activities.

Propinquity, or neighborliness, is another characterization of disaster diplomacy for which three categories were suggested.[12] First, there are states that share a land border, such as India and Pakistan. Second, there are states that do not share a land border but that are near each other, normally separated by a short expanse of water. Japan and North Korea are separated by a short stretch of sea as are Cuba and the United States. This expanse of water could be a lake or river. The third propinquity category is that the disaster diplomacy states are not near each other, for example the United States and Iran.

Aid relationship has three categories for describing the form of disaster diplomacy.[13] The first category, mutual aid, indicates that enemy states face a common threat or have been affected by the same event and aid each other as a result. Both Cuba and the United States face hurricanes, often the same storms, such as Hurricanes Dennis and Wilma during the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season. The second category, combined aid, means that enemy states coordinate aid to another state or that several states coordinate aid to a common enemy. For North Korea's droughts and floods after 1995, China, Japan, South Korea and the United States developed a coordinated aid package despite various levels of conflict amongst these states. The third aid relationship category is that of donor-recipient: one state is a donor (assisting) and one state is a recipient (assisted). Examples include the United States offering aid to Iran following the 26 December 2003 earthquake and Iran offering aid to the United States following Hurricane Katrina in August 2005.

Additionally, disaster diplomacy has three levels at which it is conducted.[14] The first level is the government level. The India-Pakistan case study falls into this category because the states' governments were at the forefront of disaster diplomacy efforts. The second level is organization-led disaster diplomacy, involving groups that are not governments such as the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, the media, the private sector, lobby groups and research institutes who lead any disaster-related and/or reconciliation efforts. Some disaster diplomacy of this form was evident following the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004. The third category is people-led disaster diplomacy in which grassroots support directs the disaster-related and/or reconciliation efforts, although that is often trumpeted or given momentum by the media, as in the Greece-Turkey case study. Furthermore, different combinations of levels can occur. Governments can deal bilaterally or multilaterally or can be brought together by organizations. Organizations might deal directly with

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governments or with grassroots groups. People from one state can directly approach the government of another state or national/international organizations.

Finally, purpose is another way to characterize disaster diplomacy.[15] Multiple purposes are often evident in disaster diplomacy outcomes, whether positive or negative. They range from political survival to desire for peace to re-affirmation of old prejudices and enmity. The purposes are often interlinked, while sometimes contradictory purposes lead to contradictory actions. Disaster diplomacy purpose is perhaps the most contentious typology, with views often expressed to conform to already-established partisan opinions.

The above five characterizations are not independent disaster diplomacy variables, nor orthogonal axes in five-dimensional disaster diplomacy space, nor category pigeonholes into which each case study must be placed. Instead, they are descriptors used to identify differences amongst disaster diplomacy case studies to seek patterns for a better understanding of disaster diplomacy.

At times, clear categorizations emerge. India-Pakistan after the 2001 earthquake reflects the second category of propinquity (land border) and the first category of level (government-led).[16] At times, multiple categorizations appear. North Korean disaster diplomacy occurred at three propinquity levels, namely North Korea shares a land border with South Korea and China, is separated from Japan by a short expanse of water and is not near the United States, while it exhibited the second (combined aid) and third (donor-recipient) aid relationships.[17]

Occasionally, a case study falls in between two extremes, demonstrating a continuum rather than a binary system. In particular, most case studies show aspects of both passive and active disaster diplomacy, although the case study might be tilted towards one side. The Ethiopia-case demonstrates a predominantly active avoidance of disaster diplomacy. In contrast, the Greece-Turkey case was arguably dominated by passivity, with the governments frequently being dragged along by events at a pace more rapid than they would have preferred. Thus, these categorizations describe different forms of disaster diplomacy. They have not yet been developed enough to assist in predicting the strength or success of disaster diplomacy.

Further Disaster Diplomacy Theory

The growing list of disaster diplomacy case studies permits comparisons, examples of which were given earlier, including the characteristics of propinquity, aid relationship and level.[18] The first attempt at comparing case studies used a complex adaptive systems approach: [19]

> The conceptual model of [complex adaptive systems] offers a means of assessing the change process in states that are exposed to potential disaster or have experienced severe disruption. This model focuses on the transition in different states of evolving social, economic and political performance…it recognizes that social systems engage, to varying

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> degrees, in continuous learning and self-organization in reciprocal interactions with the environments in which they are embedded…Literature addresses two basic issues regarding [complex adaptive systems]: 1) the conditions under which they emerge and function; and 2) the actual properties and mechanisms which characterize their operations. The two issues are interactive. [20]

As will be addressed in further detail, the concept of complex adaptive systems provides useful discussion, but has limited applicability for identifying pathways of disaster diplomacy which could occur or which could be selected. A summary is provided of how this concept applies to disaster diplomacy by interpreting four properties and three mechanisms in the context of international affairs. [21]

The four properties of complex adaptive systems are non-linearity, diversity, flow and aggregation. Non-linearity, "or the condition in which small changes in a system's performance over time produce large differences in outcome, reflects the shift in energy and action within the component units of the system toward accomplishing a shared goal."[22] A political example is the decision by only one politician to switch political parties (a small change) which, a few days later, prevented Canada's government from falling in a no-confidence vote on 19 May 2005 (a large difference in outcome). Diversity "acknowledges that specific types of individuals or units may respond differently to the same events in the flow of ideas and actions, and interact accordingly to generate new flow among the components."[23] For example, disaster diplomacy operates at three levels: government-led, organization-led and people-led, as previously mentioned.

The third property, flow, "is the current of actions, materials, ideas and people through a common arena that energises interaction among the individual units."[24] For example, mitigation information flows into a jurisdiction trying to avert disasters. Finally, aggregation "represents the capacity for individual units to interact in a recurring pattern to accomplish a shared goal."[25] For example, the United Nations uses special appeals to aggregate states' resources for disaster relief.[26]

The three mechanisms of complex adaptive systems are tagging, the internal model and building blocks. Tagging "facilitates the process of matching a unit seeking assistance with a unit providing assistance."[27] For instance, rescue units are matched with collapsed buildings that might have trapped people. The internal model "reflects the set of shared assumptions upon which reciprocal actions among components of the system are based."[28] For example, two governments might share assumptions about their mutual friendliness or unfriendliness towards each other. Finally, building blocks "are the elemental units of performance that are used in creating a complex set of recurring interactions, such as communicative acts."[29] An illustration would be meteorological stations monitoring raw weather data and interpreting and communicating those data.

Table 1 is constructed from the description of the properties and mechanisms of

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Table 1: Complex adaptive systems applied to disaster diplomacy case studies

		Cuba-U.S.	Greece-Turkey	Southern Africa
Properties of Complex Adaptive Systems	Non-linearity	present	present	present
	Diversity	present	present	present
	Flow	limited presence	present	present
	Aggregation	present	present	present
Mechanisms of Complex Adaptive Systems	Tagging	limited due to limited flow	recently present	present
	Internal Model	limited due to limited flow	recently present	present
	Building Blocks	present	recently present	present

three disaster diplomacy case studies in order to explain the outcomes.[30] Although this first attempt at cross-case study comparison was helpful, the limitations of applying complex adaptive systems to international affairs are evident. A mechanistic approach can rarely do justice to the multifaceted interactions witnessed amongst the mix of people, cultures, organizations and states. For example, a strong success factor in Greek-Turkish rapprochement was the friendship between the two foreign ministers. Meanwhile, the personality of Cuba's current leader Fidel Castro is a significant factor in Cuban-American antipathy along with U.S. personalities such as Jesse Helms. While animosity and amity can be described within complex adaptive systems' properties or mechanisms, these properties and mechanisms indicate neither from where the hate or friendship arises nor why a certain case study displays a certain attribute. The complex adaptive systems approach does not explain that strong aspects of disaster diplomacy are personality based and why some personalities are able to overcome enmity while others prefer to perpetuate it.

Another limitation of complex adaptive systems applied to disaster diplomacy is that the properties, which might be obviously present or obviously absent in physical systems, are inevitably present in international affairs case studies. The first property, non-linearity, is always present to a high degree. People rarely behave in a straightforward manner, especially when acting under the pressures of history, culture, leadership, politics and media. The second property, diversity, is always present to a high degree because international affairs involves not only more than one state or actor, but also different sectors including politicians and the media. The third property, flow, is always present, although the level varies. Isolated states such as Cuba and North Korea maintain a flow of information at the diplomatic level and have not entirely shut down the flow of internet information or people.[31] Even physically isolated territories such as Pitcairn Island and Tristan da Cunha exploit multiple methods of creating flow; for instance, short-wave radio, exchanges with passing ships, private yachts and scientific expeditions. The fourth property, aggregation, is

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always present, although the level varies. A government's budget frequently pools resources for international affairs issues, such as disaster relief, trade or war. Following an internationally-relevant disaster, some form of resource aggregation commonly occurs at national and international levels.

These statements are supported by Table 1. The only property not completely evident is flow for the Cuba-U.S. case, yet enough flow exists to preclude an "absent" label. The almost universal presence of all four properties in international affairs provides limited assistance in interpreting disaster diplomacy.

Regarding mechanisms in the context of international affairs, their presence or absence is usually determined by the actors. Tagging and the internal model tend to follow rather than lead decisions. If governments, organizations or people wish to tag or to develop shared assumptions, then properties can be developed to enable that. For example, these two mechanisms are limited for Cuba-U.S. disaster diplomacy because of active choices on both sides to impede flow.[32] Similarly, although building blocks are always present, they are used only when the actors choose. For example, the three mechanisms existed for Greece-Turkey disaster diplomacy because the two governments had recently decided to collaborate in order to develop them.[33] Therefore, the three mechanisms do not fully explain why or how disaster diplomacy does or does not manifest.

To determine the impact of disaster-related activities on diplomacy, rather than trying to continue to use complex adaptive systems, Table 2 provides a new comparative examination of why disaster frequently catalyzes, but rarely creates, diplomacy. Four questions are examined:

- Did disaster-related activities lead to diplomatic activities?
- Did new diplomacy emerge? If disaster influences an already-established diplomatic process, then catalysis rather than creation has occurred.
- Is the diplomacy legitimate? The states or actors involved must be seeking rapprochement rather than using the events as a public relations exercise or awaiting an opportunity to avoid proceeding further with the diplomacy.
- Does the diplomacy last? Defining the time scale for "lasting diplomacy" is not straightforward. Diplomacy that lasts years is suggested. A shorter amount of time, for instance months or weeks, seems inadequate to ensure that diplomacy leads to long-term results. A timeframe longer than years, for instance decades, is difficult to analyze because a period of several years is the longest timeframe over which any disaster diplomacy case study has yet been examined. Detailed historical case studies remain a fruitful area for further work. The case study of Cuba-U.S. disaster diplomacy is possibly the longest timeframe yet analyzed, because it arguably dates back to Castro's rise to power in 1959. [34]

When these four characteristics of diplomacy—disaster-related, new, legitimate

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Table 2: Disaster diplomacy typologies

Case Study	Diplomacy Characteristics				Summary of Reasons
	Disaster-Related	*New*	*Legitimate*	*Lasting*	
Aceh after the Indian Ocean 2004 Tsunami[35]	yes	no	yes	yes	Pre-tsunami peace moves had stalled. Post-tsunami, the actors made an agreement work.
Cuba-United States[36]	yes	yes	no	no	Both states consider the lack of diplomacy to be advantageous.
Ethiopia-Eritrea	no	no	no	no	The disaster minimally influenced the conflict.
Greece-Turkey[37]	yes	no	yes	yes	The diplomatic process had started before the earthquakes.
India-Pakistan after the 2001 earthquake	yes	yes	yes	no	The diplomatic process collapsed six months after the earthquake.
India-Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake	yes	no	yes	not yet known	Not enough time has elapsed to judge whether or not the diplomacy is lasting.
Iran-U.S.[38]	yes	no	no	no	No new diplomacy was evident and neither state pursued the potential opening.
North Korea [39]	yes	yes	no	no	Both North Korea and the United States stymied the diplomatic process.
Southern Africa[40]	no	yes	yes	yes	The new, legitimate and lasting diplomacy emerged from political changes. The drought emergency permitted that diplomacy to function and to be seen, but was not a significant causative factor.

and lasting—exist, it is fair to assert that disaster-related activities only, and not other factors, have created "pure" disaster diplomacy. This test entails a demanding combination which is challenging to prove, yet the case studies demonstrate salient features of disaster diplomacy (Table 2). Therefore, disaster-related activities influence diplomatic activities and are sometimes a strong influence, but pure disaster diplomacy has not yet been observed. The disaster diplomacy conclusion to date should be modified to state that evidence exists that disaster can catalyze diplomacy, but evidence does not exist that disaster can create diplomacy.

Further Disaster Diplomacy Practice

With the increased understanding of disaster diplomacy and the modified conclusion developed in the previous section, two further disaster diplomacy case studies are now examined. First, the India-Pakistan rapprochement following the 8 October 2005 earthquake will be explored.[41] Then, the Ethiopia-Eritrea interaction during droughts from 1999 to 2002 will provide a useful case study.[42]

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India-Pakistan

On 26 January 2001, an earthquake disaster struck western India killing more than 20,000 people, mainly in Gujarat. Pakistan's de facto ruler, soon to become president, Pervez Musharraf, offered assistance.[43] The diplomatic outcome included an India-Pakistan summit in July 2001.[44] Despite, or because of, high hopes, the summit ended in acrimony. Over the next year, continuing bitterness nearly led to war. Yet after 2002, India and Pakistan moved forward in restoring diplomatic ties, air links, bus links and cricket test matches. Pakistan offered to get rid of its nuclear weapons if India would do the same.

A significant geopolitical shift occurred following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the northeastern United States. A U.S.-led international coalition ousted Afghanistan's government, which was accused of harboring the perpetrators of those attacks. Pakistan was originally an ally of the Afghan government, but is now considered to support U.S.-led attempts to influence the region's politics, including drug and terrorism issues.[45] Pakistan-U.S. cooperation has shifted some of the regional power balance towards Pakistan.

This shift and the improvement of India-Pakistan relations occurred against the background of terrorist attacks in India and Pakistan, moderate earthquakes in both states and the 26 December 2004 tsunami, which killed over 10,000 people in India. Although changing India-U.S. relations were considered post-tsunami, India-Pakistan relations were scarcely mentioned, suggesting that they were being driven by factors other than disaster-related activities.[46]

Kashmir has been an ever-present difficulty for India-Pakistan relations and regional geopolitics.[47] The "Line of Control" through Kashmir currently serves as the de facto India-Pakistan border there. Politically-related violence occurs on both sides of the Line of Control.

Despite Kashmir, India-Pakistan relations were continuing to warm when, on 8 October 2005, a moment magnitude 7.6 earthquake struck at a shallow depth of 26 kilometers with its epicenter 105 kilometers north-northeast of Islamabad.[48] The disaster killed more than 70,000 people in Pakistan including some in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, more than 1,000 people in India including some in India-controlled Kashmir and several people in Afghanistan. Many states, including India, immediately offered aid to Pakistan.

India and Pakistan then collaborated to facilitate the aid operation by lessening Line of Control restrictions.[49] On 19 October 2005, telephone links were restored across the Line of Control to permit families to contact each other. Over nine days in November 2005, five locations along the Line of Control were opened to permit relief supplies to cross. On 19 November 2005, civilians were permitted to cross one of these checkpoints to seek missing family members. During these events, politi-

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cians, the media and the people voiced thoughts that the earthquake could, and perhaps should, signal a new era for Kashmir, in which the dispute would finally be resolved. Disaster diplomacy, perhaps, would work through Kashmir where it had failed through Gujarat.

The earthquake disaster pushed forward the Kashmir peace process by bringing the issue back onto the world stage and by opening the Line of Control. Before attributing success to disaster diplomacy, two notes of caution are necessary.

First, violence continued in India and Pakistan despite the disaster and the peace overtures.[50] The education minister of India-controlled Kashmir was assassinated (18 October 2005), more than 60 people were killed in bomb attacks in New Delhi (29 October 2005), a fast food outlet was bombed in Karachi killing three people (15 November 2005) and a bomb damaged one of Pakistan's gas pipelines (16 February 2006). The widespread nature of the violence, some involving non-state actors which might or might not be supported by states, illustrates that regional violence is not just a result of Kashmir and is not just a result of inter-state conflict.

Moreover, Kashmir has actors and pressures beyond the conflict between the Indian and Pakistani governments. Some Kashmiri separatists seek independence; China has interests in the area; and drugs are intertwined with violence. Achieving peace in Kashmir, achieving peace in India and Pakistan and achieving peace between India and Pakistan would require much more than Islamabad-New Delhi reconciliation.

Second, the Kashmir initiatives were not a new emergence in India-Pakistan diplomacy. Instead, they represent an acceleration of an ongoing India-Pakistan peace process, including Kashmir. Four days before the earthquake, India and Pakistan had agreed to resolve within three months their dispute over troop withdrawals from Kashmir's Siachen Glacier.[51] On 7 April 2005, a cross-Kashmir bus service had started. The post-earthquake opening of the Line of Control was important, but had precedents and by itself will not end Kashmir-related disputes.

Table 2 summarizes this case study with the four characteristics developed in the previous section. Disaster-related diplomacy and legitimate diplomacy are evident, but terming the diplomacy "new" would be a disservice to the efforts made since 2002 to reduce conflict between India and Pakistan. Whether this diplomacy lasts, or disappears as after the 2001 earthquake, remains to be seen. Nonetheless, the 2005 earthquake sped up the diplomatic process, particularly regarding Kashmir's divide. This case study supports the statement that disaster can catalyze diplomacy, but evidence does not exist that disaster can create diplomacy.

Ethiopia-Eritrea

Disaster diplomacy between Ethiopia and Eritrea was a possibility in 2000. The two states had started fighting a border war in 1998 that was ongoing when a severe

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drought manifested in the area of the Horn of Africa in late 1999. A famine soon affected Ethiopia, its worst food security crisis in 15 years.[52] By April 2000, eight million people in Ethiopia faced severe food shortages and Eritrea required assistance for 211,000 people affected by the lack of rain.[53]

Humanitarian agencies called for Eritrea to permit food aid to be offloaded at Eritrean ports and shipped overland to landlocked Ethiopia.[54] In April 2000, Eritrea agreed but Ethiopia rejected the offer. Some of the fiercest fighting of the war then commenced on 11 May 2000. The possibility for Ethiopia-Eritrea disaster diplomacy recurred in November 2002 when the war had officially ended, but the arbitrated border had not yet been fully defined. Fourteen million people in Ethiopia and 1.4 million people in Eritrea needed food assistance. Ethiopia again rejected Eritrea's offer to ship food to Ethiopia through Eritrean ports.

The reasons given by Ethiopia for not using Eritrean ports include:

- Eritrea's offer was for public relations;
- Eritrean ports needed the business of offloading aid supplies;
- Eritrea steals some of the food aid;
- Non-Eritrean ports were better shipment points than Eritrean ports;
- Ethiopia does not need access to more ports, but needs more food to be delivered through ports already in use.

In this case, disaster diplomacy did not start despite a clear opportunity. New, disaster-related diplomacy was suggested, but rejected by Ethiopia. Therefore, the diplomacy did not meet any of the criteria in Table 2. The decisions and statements of the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments could have been influenced by what was seen as the specter of political advantage of disaster diplomacy. For example, Eritrea could have been seeking to prove Ethiopia's dependence on Eritrea. Meanwhile, Ethiopia could have been trying to prove that reliance on Eritrea was unnecessary. By helping its enemy, Eritrea could have been looking for kudos from the international community rather than wishing to assist Ethiopia. Ethiopia might also have had Machiavellian reasons, perhaps trying to prevent any food aid, legitimate or stolen, from reaching Eritrea. Another possibility is that Ethiopia decided that accusing Eritrea of misconduct, such as stealing food aid or trying to divert food aid from the most efficient routes, was more useful to Ethiopia's cause than either reconciliation or expeditious aid delivery.

Most likely, the situation was driven by a combination of the above factors; however, disaster diplomacy was ultimately used as one tool for perpetuating the conflict. Rather than considering the suffering of people or the advantages of diplomatic solutions to border disputes, both states were perpetuating the conflict by using aid and its possible diplomatic outcomes as a weapon in the war.[55]

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Furthermore, disaster diplomacy appears to have been a distraction from more pertinent issues. Logistical concerns other than the appropriateness of Eritrea's ports existed regarding the transport of food aid to Ethiopia. Bandits commonly attacked vehicles in Ethiopia. Drivers of aid convoys were killed because they were from different ethnic groups or different warlord factions than those who lived in the territory they drove through. Road conditions significantly hampered deliveries. For example, excessive potholes slowed trucks and necessitated frequent repairs. At times, rains made some stretches impassable—ironic, considering the drought. Many trucks were used for military purposes leading to a vehicle shortage. Moreover, many Ethiopians needing aid could not be reached by road. Either aircraft deliveries or communications to people indicating that they would need to walk to roads would have been essential. These two strategies were not extensively implemented, although they too suffered logistical constraints such as a lack of communication equipment and aircraft.

Disaster diplomacy seems to serve as a distraction from more pertinent issues.

It was perhaps more important to resolve security and access constraints in this situation than to attempt disaster diplomacy. Even if disaster diplomacy had worked, these constraints would have remained. Yet if the Eritrean humanitarian corridor had been implemented, perhaps it would have provided a basis for long-term conflict resolution. This approach could have illustrated the advantages of cooperation, rather than supporting people with temporary aid while permitting the conflict to continue. Even if non-Eritrean routes were more efficient for delivering aid, the long-term diplomatic gains of using Eritrean routes could have been weighed against the short-term humanitarian losses. Such speculation, of course, can be neither proved nor disproved.

Since 2002, despite international arbitration and diplomatic pressure on both states, the conflict continued although not as intensely or violently as before.[56] An international ruling in April 2003, which awarded a border town to Eritrea, was not accepted by Ethiopia. In 2004, Ethiopia's harvest improved 24 percent over 2003, but more than two million Ethiopians still required food aid at the beginning of 2005. In April 2005, Eritrea again faced drought with over 800,000 people needing assistance. Eritrea then expelled UN peacekeeping staff in December 2005 amidst troop build-up by Ethiopia and Eritrea along their border. During the diplomacy to avert war into 2006, drought diplomacy was apparently not considered. Instead, the conflict was an issue to be solved separately from the ongoing famine.

This case study supports the statement that evidence does not exist that disaster can create diplomacy but it does not provide further evidence that disaster can catalyze diplomacy.

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Using Disaster Diplomacy

The two case studies in the previous section are examples of active disaster diplomacy, in which attempts were made to deliberately apply and implement disaster-related activities for diplomatic gain. For Ethiopia-Eritrea, the push for active application might have scuttled the attempt. For India-Pakistan, caution learned from the 2001 failure along with significant diplomatic progress since 2002 might lead to post-2005 success.

As disaster diplomacy is increasingly part of international affairs, passive disaster diplomacy is becoming less feasible. People, organizations and governments are attuned to enemies facing similar threats, being affected by similar events or exchanging assistance. Where peace is sought, disaster-related activities become one of many possible excuses for rapprochement. Where peace is not sought, it becomes one of many possible justifications for avoiding disaster-related activities.

Disaster Diplomacy Failings

How can disaster diplomacy be actively used to achieve diplomatic gains? Are there methods which might guide it toward positive outcomes and lessen the chances of failure? One hypothesis is that:

> Disaster diplomacy inevitably provides an opportunity which is rarely grasped because non-disaster reasons dominate diplomatic interactions. Disasters have the potential for improving, worsening, or having minimal effect on diplomacy, depending on how the situation is played and what the players choose. Perhaps disaster diplomacy usually has the potential to yield positive outcomes, but the active decision is often to ensure that it does not work.[57]

The Ethiopia-Eritrea case study represents a situation where disaster diplomacy might have failed due to the threat of unwanted rapprochement. Suggestions that a humanitarian imperative necessitates certain political actions could result in a state refusing to accept that humanitarian imperative for reasons such as loss of face, unwillingness to be dependent on an enemy or wishing to cause further problems for a foe.

The Cuba-U.S. case provides further evidence. Glantz writes, "whenever there appeared to be a chance for rapprochement between the countries, Castro would manufacture a political crisis with his neighbor to the north to bring to an end any improvement in relations."[58] In parallel, any softening of Washington's line is vociferously opposed by the anti-Castro Cuban-Americans, based mainly in Florida, who "have had an inordinate influence on US policy toward Cuba."[59] While Castro is alive, reconciliation between Havana and Washington is not a priority for either state. Instead, it is in both actors' interests to maintain the conflict. By being anti-Castro, the U.S. president courts a large voter bloc in Florida and appeases right-wing voters across the United States. By being anti-U.S., Castro provides a rallying

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point around his leadership and generates excuses for keeping Cuba relatively closed and totalitarian.

The 2005 Atlantic hurricane season provided three examples of failed Cuba-U.S. disaster diplomacy.[60] Despite an evacuation of 600,000 people from vulnerable coastal areas, sixteen fatalities occurred in Cuba when Hurricane Dennis swept over the island in July 2005. Washington offered aid. Havana thanked the American government for the gesture, but declined, instead opting to accept assistance from Venezuela. An opening for Washington-Havana rapprochement existed and Cuba snubbed it. This situation was reversed several weeks later after Hurricane Katrina killed over 1,300 people across the southeastern United States. Cuba offered to send medical personnel and supplies, which were particularly needed in New Orleans, but the United States snubbed Cuba by not replying.[61]

Finally, in October 2005, Hurricane Wilma breached Havana's sea defenses and hundreds of people were rescued from the city. The U.S. State Department offered to send a three-person disaster assessment team and Cuba agreed. Castro later stated that the team would not assess damage and needs, but would discuss Caribbean disaster response coordination instead. The United States withdrew the offer. Despite ample opportunity to proceed with Cuba-U.S. disaster diplomacy due to the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season, both states made an effort to avoid it.

Combining Table 2 with the characterization of the disaster diplomacy case studies according to propinquity, aid relationship and level demonstrates that several factors influence interaction amongst disaster-related and diplomatic activities. Disaster diplomacy exists in different forms and for different reasons. These forms and reasons lead to different outcomes, from a distraction in the case of Ethiopia-Eritrea, to a strong—yet not sole—driver of peace as in the India-Pakistan situation after the 2005 earthquake.

Therefore, the manifestation of disaster diplomacy is not inevitable even when pursued actively. Disaster-related activities are not necessarily the primary concern of diplomatic activities, especially at the government and people levels. At the organizational level, some groups prioritize disaster-related activities highly. Examples are UN agencies and non-governmental organizations dedicated to disaster risk reduction.[62] Some organizations seek to divorce disaster-related and diplomatic activities, epitomized by the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement which include impartiality, independence and neutrality.[63]

The main failings of disaster diplomacy can now be summarized. The principal issue is that disasters provide diplomatic opportunities, but those opportunities are not necessarily grasped because reasons other than disaster-related activities influence diplomatic activities. One such reason is disinterest in positive diplomatic outcomes. Other reasons relate to placing a higher priority on non-disaster issues and non-disaster outcomes than trying to link disaster-related and diplomatic activities.

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Although disaster diplomacy is an encouraging concept in theory, in terms of extracting positive consequences (diplomacy) from an inherently negative experience (disaster), the practice appears to be unrealistic in many situations.

Overcoming Disaster Diplomacy Failings

Even though the humanitarian imperative rarely dominates diplomatic activities, aspects of disaster diplomacy can nevertheless be present. Disaster diplomacy is a process occurring alongside, and interacting with, other processes, from dominance of regional politics to natural resource extraction to sustainable development. Even when disaster diplomacy is actively opposed by some actors, other actors might be passively opposed, neutral, passively supportive or actively supportive.

For Greece-Turkey disaster diplomacy, politicians were reluctant to speed up the ongoing backroom diplomacy but were dragged along by their constituents and the media.[64] For Cuba-U.S. disaster diplomacy, both governments object to disaster diplomacy as evidenced by their words and actions, but some organizations pursue it to some degree.[65] India-Pakistan disaster diplomacy has been led by government leaders, generally garnering popular support for their actions, but fighting against some strong opposition.

Therefore, to implement disaster diplomacy actively requires the patience, creativity and flexibility required of other political processes. Due to inherent complexities, a robust framework of action and specific action recommendations would be challenging to formulate and defend. A set of possibilities, based on case study experience, does exist. As previously mentioned, this set forms a disaster diplomacy toolkit from which tools can be selected to develop a framework of action which is specific to each situation and actor's interests.

The toolkit consists of pathways which promote disaster diplomacy (Table 3) and pathways which inhibit disaster diplomacy (Table 4). In addition to cross-referencing relevant case studies, this framework contains comments regarding the levels at which a pathway is likely to originate and be led by: 1) government, 2) organizations and 3) people. This toolkit is available to all actors.

The purpose of Tables 3 and 4 is to illustrate the tools available to actors trying to determine whether or not they wish to influence disaster diplomacy, and if so, how. If the choice were to influence disaster diplomacy actively, the actor would determine whether to try to promote or inhibit disaster diplomacy. Then, either Table 3 or Table 4 would provide the possible pathways to follow. The choice is assisted by the information provided on which levels have tended to lead that pathway in the past, but would also depend on the similarity of the actor's situation to the case studies in which each pathway had been used. As indicated in the previously mentioned cases, not all pathways were successful in all case studies in which they were used. Therefore, as evident from the discussion on disaster diplomacy's failings,

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Table 3: Disaster diplomacy toolkit of pathways which promote disaster diplomacy

Pathway Name	Lead Levels	Case Study Examples
Avoid forcing	1,2	Aceh after the 26 December 2004 tsunami. Ethiopia-Eritrea Greece-Turkey India-Pakistan North Korea
Focusing on disaster, not diplomacy	1	Cuba-United States Iran-United States
Informal networks	2,3	Cuba-United States Greece-Turkey
Multiple levels	1,2,3	Greece-Turkey India-Pakistan
Multi-way process	1,2,3	Aceh Greece-Turkey India-Pakistan North Korea
Science	2,3	Cuba-United States Middle East Seismology[66]
Symbolism	1	Hurricane Katrina India's involvement in the 26 December 2004 tsunami and 8 October 2005 earthquake.

an actor cannot assume that the choice made or the pathways selected will yield the desired outcome.

The pathways which promote disaster diplomacy, as listed in Table 3, are now defined. [67] The "avoid forcing" pathway refers to the fact that disaster diplomacy cannot be forced nor can it be presumed to work. As with most diplomatic processes, care and extensive communication are needed to avoid misunderstandings. Additionally, a pace is needed which is not so fast that some actors lose track of events and decisions, but not so slow that progress is limited or is overtaken by other events.

Focusing on disaster, not diplomacy, means declining to link disaster-related and diplomatic activities. Such an approach obviously inhibits disaster diplomacy in a direct manner. Conversely, and more importantly, that approach might permit disaster-related cooperation to lay the groundwork for later diplomacy. Collaboration on disaster-related activities without further expectations can build trust, make connections and illustrate successes, giving enemy states the confidence to build on and to pursue other collaborations.

The "informal networks" pathway refers to communication and interaction away from formal settings, which are effective in providing opportunities for disas-

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ter diplomacy and laying the groundwork for formal negotiations, although they are unlikely to create breakthroughs. Examples are scientists in enemy states sharing real-time data on environmental phenomena; people donating money and goods to a disaster-affected enemy state; and disaster-related organizations, non-governmental or governmental, from enemy states meeting in a neutral state or in international fora to share experiences.[68]

The "multiple levels" pathway implies that disaster diplomacy at a single level is usually unsuccessful. If disaster diplomacy is only government-led, people can undermine the efforts, as illustrated by Sri Lanka's election of a hard-line president in November 2005 despite possible post-tsunami reconciliation with the Tamils.[69] If disaster diplomacy is only organization-led, then the process can have minimal credibility with governments and the people, although the media can be a significant influence which induces governments or the people to join. If disaster diplomacy is only people-led then, "While public opinion is undoubtedly powerful, it is also fickle…what the people have given directly, the people can take away."[70] A combination of actors at multiple levels is needed for disaster diplomacy.

Requiring a "multi-way process" suggests that without exchanges amongst all actors, disaster diplomacy is unlikely to be promoted. Rather than one state or level pushing the process, making concessions or suggesting how to proceed, a continual exchange of ideas and steps is needed. Even when a donor-recipient relationship is evident, the recipient's words (such as public gratitude) and actions (such as access to the state or a reduction of hostilities) are needed for disaster diplomacy to continue.

"Science" is related to informal networks. Scientific and technical exchange between governmental and non-governmental agencies as well as individuals can provide a powerful basis for further cooperation. Scientists frequently believe themselves to be above politics and immune to the concerns and subjectivity of international relations. Despite this naïveté, claiming to be objective and apolitical is a helpful approach for enabling disaster-related interaction amongst enemy states. For example, numerous scientific exchanges have continually occurred between Cuba and the United States and "their success may be related to the lack of explicit attention drawn to them."[71]

The final pathway in Table 3 is "symbolism," which means using disaster-related activities to make diplomatic points. One reason for India rejecting aid after the 26 December 2004 tsunami and the 8 October 2005 earthquake was to appear to be a donor, rather than a recipient.[72] Symbolism which promotes disaster diplomacy occurs when states which have traditionally been recipients 1) do not necessarily need proffered assistance but accept it and 2) become donors, as in the case of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka's donations to the United States after Hurricane Katrina.[73] Symbolism can backfire. Cynics might suggest that when recipient states donate, they are ingratiating themselves to a major donor in order to extract bene-

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Table 4: Disaster diplomacy toolkit of pathways which inhibit disaster diplomacy

Pathway Name	Lead Levels	Case Study Examples
Avoiding diplomacy	1	Cuba-United States Ethiopia-Eritrea Iran-Israel[74]
Dependency on disaster	1,2,3	This pathway is evident to some extent for India-Pakistan and North Korea, but the evidence does not suggest that these diplomatic processes are fully dependent on disaster.
Disaster as a weapon	1,2	Several examples exist throughout history.[75]
Disasters worsening relations	1	India-Pakistan
Distraction	1,2,3	Ethiopia-Eritrea This pathway is evident to some extent for Greece-Turkey.
Events overwhelming disasters	1	Cuba-United States North Korea Iran-United States
Expectations	1,2,3	Greece-Turkey India-Pakistan Iran- United States
False propinquity	1,2,3	Several case studies display this pathway to some extent, but none have enough evidence to support the claim that it affected disaster diplomacy.
Spotlight	1,2,3	Aceh Cuba-United States Greece-Turkey India-Pakistan Iran-United States
Vindictiveness	1	Accusations were made in the media that this pathway was chosen by Cuba, Iran and Venezuela when offering aid to the United States; by the United States when offering aid to Cuba; and by Eritrea when offering to help Ethiopia.

fits later or, like India, are trying to demonstrate that they deserve to play a more prominent international role.

The pathways that inhibit disaster diplomacy, as listed in Table 4, are now defined. Avoiding diplomacy or the appearance of diplomacy is a reason for a state refusing to collaborate on disaster-related activities. Additionally, relying on disaster-related activities to advance diplomacy (dependency on disaster) can be detrimental. Because many disaster-related activities are short-term whereas diplomacy tends

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to require extensive work over the long-term, dependency on disaster is unlikely to lead to lasting diplomatic success.

Disasters can be used as weapons. Examples are taking advantage of an enemy suffering from an event or trying techniques such as weather modification or earthquake inducement to create a disaster in an enemy's territory.

Disasters have the potential to worsen relations, especially if the event does not involve an environmental phenomenon and if the event is considered to be perpetuated by the enemy state. India's parliament was attacked by militants on 13 December 2001. Although Pakistan's government and Kashmiri separatists condemned that violence, India-Pakistan relations suffered. An example involving an environmental phenomenon occurred in East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh: "The 1970 cyclone and its subsequent alleged mismanagement, was one of the many influences that triggered the Bangladesh War of Independence which commenced in March 1971."[76]

Disasters can be used as weapons and worsen relations between countries.

The "distraction" pathway refers to disaster diplomacy not necessarily being the most appropriate pathway either for dealing with a disaster or for pursuing diplomacy. Even if actors support disaster diplomacy, it might detract from the core issues and long-term solutions surrounding both disaster-related and diplomatic activities.

The pathway of "events overwhelming disasters" indicates that non-disaster events can affect diplomacy more than disasters. The Elián González incident influenced Cuba-U.S. relations more than hurricane preparation and response.[77] The election of George W. Bush to the American presidency in November 2000 and his subsequent "axis of evil" statement in the State of the Union address in January 2002 hindered U.S. relations with North Korea and Iran despite disasters in those two states.[78] Sometimes commentators claim that such events could or should be interpreted as disasters.

The "expectations" pathway refers to raising diplomatic expectations beyond what can reasonably be achieved and thereby hampering rapprochement. Voicing expectations that disaster-related activities should result in peace can apply undue pressure when diplomats, politicians, the media or the people are not ready to accept the peace principle or to complete the details. When expectations are not immediately met, people can seek blame and previous enmity can manifest.

"False propinquity" implies the unrealistic assumption that states being near each other must provide a basis for cooperation. In reality, the role of propinquity in promoting a humanitarian imperative and rapprochement can be overstated. Trying too hard to be too friendly in the short-term despite cultural and ideological distances can jeopardize long-term, lasting reconciliation.

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Disaster diplomacy can also be inhibited by the "spotlight" pathway. When a peace process becomes prominent, especially following a disaster, a spotlight is often placed on every word, action and innuendo that is publicized, analyzed and misanalyzed, to generate news or political value. After the 26 December 2003 earthquake in Iran, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell made remarks that were interpreted as softening the U.S. government's attitude towards Iran. Powell was, in fact, repeating the U.S. government's stance on Iran as outlined two months earlier by his deputy. That fact was conveniently forgotten in the euphoria of possible Iran-U.S. disaster diplomacy.[79] A spotlight on a peace process makes it an even greater target for critics, especially when that peace process is based on, or is believed to be based on, as tenuous a link as disaster-related activities.[80]

Offering aid can be used to highlight a state's weakness and one's own strength.

The final pathway from Table 4 is "vindictiveness." Offering aid can be used to take advantage of a state's suffering or to highlight a state's weaknesses and one's own strengths. The goal is humiliating the enemy, enhancing the conflict or seeking revenge. Disaster mitigation knowledge and techniques can also be proffered in order to appear friendly while implying a state's weakness in taking care of its people.

The pathways which promote or inhibit disaster diplomacy cannot be prioritized in terms of relative importance, because they form possible tools, some of which would be more or less important depending on the specific instance and actors. It is telling that each pathway is relevant to all case study categories of propinquity and aid relationship. While that taxonomy is useful for understanding case studies, its predictive power is limited for turning knowledge and theory into action. Similarly, the complex adaptive systems approach provides limited predictive power for explaining when certain pathways will or should be chosen.

How can disaster-related activities be predicted to be a root cause of diplomacy? The answer is that actors explicitly or implicitly choose to make it so by selecting and avoiding certain pathways to yield the desired disaster diplomacy process. If different actors prefer different pathways, then the actors with more resources, speed, power or creativity in pursuing their choice are liable to succeed.

The disaster diplomacy framework for action therefore cannot be a set of bullet points describing what should or should not be done. Nor can it be a flowchart delineating specific nodes with clear options and choice consequences. Instead, acting on disaster diplomacy must be achieved through an awareness of its case studies, characteristics and tools. Disaster diplomacy as a process implies actions over the long-term and a framework which shifts as events happen (for example, an earthquake disaster) or are made to happen (for example, a cross-border flood mitigation program). The toolkit and its uses must evolve as politics, states and diplomacy evolve while being supported by increasing experience and understanding of practical examples.

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Conclusion

This paper is an initial attempt to detail modes of acting on disaster diplomacy. New theory for comparing case studies and new case studies were combined with past work to analyze disaster diplomacy's failings and how those failings might be overcome. A toolkit of pathways was developed from which actors can choose to create their own framework for action depending on their specific situation and aims. Although the assumption might be that moves towards conflict reduction are sought, that assumption is not always valid. At times, disaster diplomacy can lead to and be used to generate conflict.

It is disingenuous to suggest that a specific and single framework can or should be developed for acting on disaster diplomacy. While different proposals will provide material for academic debate, at the practical level, general predictions for how certain disaster conditions or events will lead to positive, negative or no diplomacy are unlikely to stand up to scrutiny. Considering the diversity of outcomes emerging from superficially similar situations (for instance, one earthquake or shared hurricane vulnerability), it appears that disaster-related activities can impact diplomatic activities in a manner chosen by the different actors. Different actors have different goals, adding complexity.

Caution: disaster diplomacy does not provide the complete answer to conflict.

Instead, knowing the availability of different facets, options and measures of success will be most useful for the practical application of disaster diplomacy. This paper contributes toward that goal. Acting on disaster diplomacy means that disaster diplomacy cannot be interpreted as an outcome which starts with a specific disaster and ends with post-disaster reconstruction. Instead, it is an ongoing process related to the waxing and waning of disaster-related and diplomatic activities and their interactions.

The main lesson is that evidence exists that disaster-related activities can catalyze diplomatic activities but evidence does not exist that disaster-related activities can create diplomatic activities. If actors choose, that catalysis can be made to happen and disaster diplomacy can be put into action.

The principal caution is that disaster diplomacy does not provide the complete answer to conflict. The reason is that a humanitarian imperative rarely dominates diplomatic decisions and actions. Meanwhile, the intermittency of many disaster-related activities implies that it is challenging to maintain sustained interest in a peace process based on disaster-related activities.[81] Disaster diplomacy can also be used to create and perpetuate conflict. As shown by the case studies, especially when disaster diplomacy achieved little, disaster-related and diplomatic activities interact in more ways than disaster diplomacy. Motives other than disaster diplomacy tend to dominate those interactions, superseding potential disaster diplomacy outcomes.

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The disaster diplomacy situation is not entirely bleak. Disaster-related activities can be opportunities to demonstrate that cooperation can provide dividends—perhaps surprisingly. The long-term results from targeted, shorter-term confidence-building activities can be important in international affairs.[82] Even if disaster diplomacy appears to fail, functional relationships amongst individuals and organizations inside and outside of governments often continue afterwards. These relationships provide a potential base for future cooperation. Moreover, many interlinked factors and activities including transport, trade, culture, sport and economics continually influence diplomacy. If chosen, disaster-related activities can be an influential part of that interplay. People and organizations often form a powerful force for disaster diplomacy, into which governments can tap more successfully, if the goal were agreed upon. Therefore, the disaster diplomacy process can be pursued in different ways once that process is selected.

Disaster diplomacy does have a significant impact. Realistic expectations must be maintained regarding what this process can and cannot do—and what it should and should not do. ♔

NOTES

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1 Ilan Kelman and Theo Koukis, eds., "Disaster Diplomacy," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 14, no. 1 (2000): 214-294.

2 James Ker-Lindsay, "Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: The Impact of 'Disaster Diplomacy'?" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 14, no. 1 (2000): 215-232; Michael H. Glantz, "Climate-Related Disaster Diplomacy: A US-Cuban Case Study," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 14, no. 1 (2000): 233-253; Ailsa Holloway, "Drought Emergency, Yes...Drought Disaster, No: Southern Africa 1991-93," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 14 no. 1 (2000): 254-276.

3 See http://www.disasterdiplomacy.org.

4 Ilan Kelman, "Beyond Disaster, Beyond Diplomacy," in *Natural Disasters and Development in a Globalizing World*, Mark Pelling, ed., (London: Routledge, 2003), 110-123.

5 Ilan Kelman, "One Earthquake Won't Seal a U.S.-Iran Bond," *Newsday*, 11 January 2004; Maaike Waarner, "Shaken, not Stirred: Iranian Foreign Policy and Domestic Disaster," (master's thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam: 2005).

6 Ilan Kelman, "Tsunami Diplomacy: Will the 26 December, 2004 Tsunamis Bring Peace to the Affected Countries?" *Sociological Research Online* 10, no. 1 (2005), http://www.socresonline.org.uk/10/1/kelman.html; Weizhun Mao and Que Tianshu, "Disaster Diplomacy: A New Diplomatic Approach? The Apocalypse of the Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami," *World Politics and Economy* [Swarna Rajagopalan, "Post-Tsunami International Relations: A Sea Change?" (*Chaitanya Brief* 1 no. 2, Chaitanya Consult, 24 June 2005).]

7 Ilan Kelman, "Hurricane Katrina Disaster Diplomacy," *Disasters* 30 (forthcoming).

8 Glantz (2000); Kelman (2003).

9 Kelman (2003).

10 Ilan Kelman, Tom Mitchell, Megan Davies, Godfrey Baldacchino, Iain Orr and Robert Conrich have been contributing to a framework for how non-sovereign islands such as the Faroes and Tasmania, termed

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sub-national island jurisdictions (SNIJs), might implement para-diplomacy for issues including disaster risk reduction.

[11] After Kelman (2003).

[12] Kelman (2006).

[13] Ibid., after Waarner.

[14] Kelman (2006); after Glantz.

[15] Kelman (2006).

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.; See also Waarner.

[19] Louise Comfort, "Disaster: Agent of Diplomacy or Change in International Affairs?," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 14 no. 1 (2000): 277-94.

[20] Ibid., 280.

[21] Based on John H. Holland, *Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity* (Reading, Massachusetts: Helix Books, Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1995).

[22] Comfort, 282.

[23] Ibid., 282.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., 281.

[26] United Nations appeals are listed at: http://www.reliefweb.int/appeals.

[27] Comfort, 282.

[28] Ibid., 283.

[29] Ibid.

[30] These results are summarized from Comfort and for the three case studies in Kelman and Koukis. Cuba-U.S. is by Glantz; Greece-Turkey is by Ker-Lindsay; and southern Africa is by Holloway.

[31] For North Korea, Koryo Tours (http://www.koryogroup.com) arranges trips and the government maintains an official website at (http://www.korea-dpr.com) in addition to diplomatic ties with a few other states and involvement in international endeavors such as the United Nations (as a member state) and the Antarctic Treaty (as an acceding state). Cuba has regular flights departing and arriving, the government maintains several websites such as the meteorological service, Instituto de Meteorología de la República de Cuba (http://www.met.inf.cu) and the state is involved in many international endeavors including aid and development.

[32] Comfort.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Glantz; Kelman (2003); For background to Castro's revolution and his leadership of Cuba since then, see, for example, Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, *Castro, Cuba, and the World* (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1986); John Miller and Aaron Kenedi, eds., *Inside Cuba: the History, Culture, and Politics of an Outlaw Nation* (New York: Marlowe and Company, 2003).

[35] Kelman (2005).

[36] Glantz; Kelman (2003).

[37] Ker-Lindsay.

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38 Kelman (2004); Waarner.

39 Kelman (2003).

40 Holloway.

41 Detailed history regarding nation-building and conflict in India and Pakistan is given by, for example, Selig S. Harrison, Paul H. Kreisberg and Dennis Kux, eds., *India and Pakistan: The First Fifty Years* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Ian Talbot *India and Pakistan: Inventing the Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

42 Detailed histories of Ethiopia and Eritrea, including the conflicts, are given by, for example, Harold G. Marcus, *A History of Ethiopia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994); and Roy Pateman, *Eritrea: Even the stones are burning*, 2nd ed. (Lawrenceville, New Jersey: Red Sea Press, 1998). More detail regarding the complexities of the conflict are given by Leenco Lata, "The Ethiopia-Eritrea War," *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no. 97 (September 2003): 369-88; and Günther Schlee, "Redrawing the Map of the Horn: the Politics of Difference," *Journal of the International African Institute* 73, no. 3 (1 October 2003): 343-68.

43 For background on Musharraf's political roles, see Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror* (New York: Armonk, 2005).

44 Kelman (2003), 113-114 provides further detail.

45 Hassan Abbas, "Pakistan" (background note, U.S. Department of State, Bureau; South Asian Affairs, Washington, DC: December 2005), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm.

46 Kelman (2005).

47 Extensive background, including on the wars fought between India and Pakistan along with China's Kashmir role and interests, is given by Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003); Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir in conflict: India, Pakistan and the unending war* (London/New York: I.B. Taurus and Company, 2003).

48 United States Geological Survey National Earthquake Information Center, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqinthenews/2005/usdyae. Moment magnitude is an appropriate measure for earthquake magnitude because it applies to earthquakes of all sizes. Moment magnitude 7.6, being well above 7.0 on the more commonly used Richter scale, represents a powerful earthquake. For further details on measuring earthquakes, see http://earthquake.usgs.gov/image_glossary/magnitude.html; http://earthquake.usgs.gov/docs/020204mag_policy.html, and http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/phase_data/mag.

49 Events are summarized from *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk.

50 Events are summarized from *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk.

51 "Rivals set Siachen deal deadline," *BBC News*, 4 October 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4307092.stm; Amit Mishra, "Foreign Ministers Meeting, 2-6 October 2005," *IPCS Update*, no. 10 (10 October 2005).

52 Daniel Maxwell, "Why do Famines Persist? A Brief Review of Ethiopia 1999-2000," *IDS Bulletin* 33, no. 4 (1 October 2002): 48-54.

53 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "A Human Catastrophe Looms in the Horn of Africa," *FAO Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture*, no. 306 (18 April 2000).

54 Events and each state's comments are summarized from *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk.

55 This possibility is not unusual. Food aid is used as a psychological and physical weapon of war, as noted by McCorkindale, "Food Aid: Human Right or Weapon of War?" *British Food Journal* 96, no. 3 (July 1994): 5-11.

56 Events are summarized from *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk.

57 Kelman (2005), paragraph 5.4.

58 Glantz, 239.

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[59] Ibid., 238.

[60] Events are summarized from *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk

[61] In addition to *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk, see Kelman, 2006.

[62] For example, see http://www.unisdr.org; For example, see http://www.redr.org.

[63] From http://www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp, which states "the seven Fundamental Principles bond together the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, The International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.".

[64] Ker-Lindsay.

[65] Glantz.

[66] For example, the Middle East Regional Cooperation (MERC) Program, http://www.relemr-merc.org and the Middle East Seismological Forum http://www.meseisforum.net.

[67] Diplomatic pathways other than disaster diplomacy exist—for example, talking for the purpose of reconciliation rather than for any other reason—but the pathways here are related to disaster diplomacy.

[68] Environmental phenomena include earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, heat waves, volcanic activity, landslides and epidemics. In disaster and risk contexts, they have been termed "natural hazards" leading to "natural disasters." These two phrases are now being used less often in order to emphasize the human role in creating all disasters and to emphasize that a "hazard" only exists because it is hazardous to humanity. In contrast, "environmental phenomena" highlights that these events are normal environmental processes, even though they are sometimes involved in disasters.

[69] Background on Sri Lanka's conflict is provided by Kenneth D. Bush, *Intra-Group Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Learning to Read Between the Lines* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Partha S. Ghosh, *Ethnicity Versus Nationalism: The Devolution Discourse in Sri Lanka* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003).

[70] Ker-Lindsay, 216 and 229.

[71] Glantz, 243.

[72] India has extensive domestic and international experience and capability in post-disaster assistance. For instance, see SEEDS http://www.seedsindia.org and the Disaster Mitigation Institute http://www.southasiadisasters.net. To suggest that Indians suffered because their government rejected aid for political reasons would be unfair. Instead, India used these events to demonstrate that the state had the ability to take care of its own disaster relief because (a) India can and (b) it would gain respect internationally. India accepted international aid after the 26 January 2001 earthquake, but then stated that the scale of the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 in India was far less than that earthquake. After the tsunamis, India provided support to Sri Lanka and the Maldives and later accepted some aid for the tsunamis.

[73] Kelman (2006).

[74] After the 26 December 2003 earthquake, Iran said that it would accept aid from any country except for Israel; see Kelman (2006); Waarner.

[75] See Glantz, 245-246 for a discussion on weather modification and Kelman (2003), 118-119 for a discussion on natural disasters as weapons of war.

[76] James Lewis, *Development in Disaster-prone Places: Studies of Vulnerability* (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1999), 25.

[77] See the United States court decisions: *Elián González by and through Lazaro González v. Janet Reno et al.*, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, no. 00-11424, D.C. Docket No. 00-206-CV-KMM (23 June 2000); *Lazaro Gonzalez v. Janet Reno et al.*, "Certiorari: Petition concerning Elian Gonzalez denied (99–2079)," *Journal of the Supreme Court of the United States*, (October Term 1999) (28 June 2000): 1020. For background to and a summary of the case, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/627262.stm.

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[78] George W. Bush, "State of teh Union Address," (Address, United States Government, Washington, DC: 29 January 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.

[79] See full discussion in Kelman (2004).

[80] After Ker-Lindsay.

[81] After Glantz.

[82] After Holloway.